no gratuitous assumption. It flows from a principle deeply rooted in our nature, and which influences many of our opinions, and much of our conduct.

It may, perhaps, be said that our knowledge of the design of the artist in any piece of mechanism, or of the architect in planning and building a palace or a city, arises from our having seen other things of the same kind, and having been informed of the design, but that the universe is something of its own kind; that it is one only; that there is no fair analogy between it and any work of man; and that, therefore, we cannot trace design in it. It is true, indeed, that the universe is but one. It consists, however, of many parts; and if, either in the whole, or in any of the parts, we perceive those kinds of combinations and relations which, according to the constitution of our nature, and all our observation and experience, we consider as indicative of design, then we are as irresistibly led to infer the existence of a designing cause in the one case as in the other. And in proportion as the universe, or any part of it, is superior to any effect of human contrivance and power, so the designing cause must, in the same proportion at least, be superior to man in wisdom and might. A watch is but one, yet it consists of many different parts, and plainly indicates design and contrivance. And though there were only one watch in the world, no man in the possession of his understanding would pronounce it a casual production.

The distance between the construction of any piece of mechanism, and that of the vast system of the universe is, indeed, immeasurably great. This, however, does not destroy the analogy; but it greatly weakens the impression of that analogy on our minds. In comparing a mite with an elephant, we, in some measure, lose sight of the comparison by the immense disparity between the things compared. This is much more the case in comparing the world with a piece of mechanism. In order to see and feel the full force of the comparison, there must be something like equality between the things compared; or, at least, we must be able to compute the inequality. For, it is only in proportion as we are able distinctly to see, and accurately to compute the difference between the things compared, that we feel the force of the comparison. But the disparity between the universe and the effects of human ingenuity and power are incalculable, and therefore the argument from analogy does not make a due impression on our mind.

We do not pretend fully to understand the designs of God

in his works; but to argue that we can know no part of those designs, because we cannot comprehend them in all their variety and extent, is attempting to draw a general conclusion from partial premises. Because we do not fully understand the economy of the comets, can it be logically inferred that we know nothing of the solar system, or of the design of the sun? Will any man assert that we are ignorant of the design of the organs of sense, because we cannot explain how the nerves connected with different organs produce different sensations? Such conclusions, drawn from such premises, are not entitled to much consideration. To state them plainly is a sufficient refutation. The man who denies that it is any part of the design of the sun to enlighten, warm, and fertilize the earth; or of the eye to see, and of the ear to hear; or who seriously maintains that, from the effects, we cannot fairly infer such a design, is unquestionably under the influence of very powerful prejudices. In these instances the relations are obvious; and every unperverted mind must be fully satisfied that it is the design of the sun to communicate light and heat to the earth, of the eye to see, and of the ear to hear. These we may confidently assume as designs of the Deity; and may reason concerning the fitness of the means to accomplish the ends, and from that fitness may form our estimate of the attributes of the Supreme Intelligence.

In inquiring into the designs of the Creator in his works, there is no presumption. Our inquiries ought to be conducted with profound reverence for the Being who formed and who upholds the universe; and, when so conducted, instead of being indications of impiety or audacity, they are expressions of admiration and homage. The essence of Deity is not the object of our senses; but he exhibits himself to us in his works, and in these he invites us to contemplate the proofs of his existence and the glory of his perfections. To trace the hand of the Almighty in the fabric of the universe, is a suitable exercise of the noble faculties with which he has endowed us: it is a tribute of homage to him who made us; and must be the means of much improvement and happiness to ourselves. "The works of the Lord are great, sought out of all them that have pleasure therein."*

The a priori argument I have not introduced, because to my mind it has never appeared very satisfactory. Dr. Ried (Intell. Powers, p. 314, 4to ed.) says, "Sir Isaac Newton thought that the Deity, by existing everywhere, and at all times, constitutes time and space, immensity and eternity. This probably suggested

BOOK II.

EVIDENCES OF DESIGN IN NATURE.

CHAPTER I.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS.

WE shall now proceed to consider some of the evidences of design in the fabric of nature; and, instead of selecting a

to his great friend Dr. Clarke what he calls the argument a priori for the existence of an immense and eternal Being. Space and time, he thought, are only abstract or partial conceptions of an immensity and eternity which forces itself upon our belief. And as immensity and eternity are not substances, they must be the attributes of a Being who is necessarily immense and eternal. These are the speculations of men of superior genius. But whether they be as solid as they are sublime, or whether they be the wanderings of imagination in a region beyond the limits of human understanding, I am unable to determine."

Professor Dugald Stewart, in his dissertation on the progress of Metaphysical, Ethical, and Political Philosophy, in the Encyclopædia Britannica, Part II., p. 65, says, "How far the peculiar cast of Newton's genius qualified him for prosecuting successfully the study of mind, he has not afforded us sufficient data for judging; but such was the admiration with which his transcendant powers as a mathematician and natural philosopher were universally regarded, that the slightest of his hints on other subjects have been eagerly seized upon as indisputable axioms, though sometimes with little other evidence in their favour but the supposed sanction of his authority. The part of his works, however, which chiefly led me to connect his name with that of Clarke, is a passage in the Scholium annexed to his Principia, which may be considered as the germ of the celebrated argument a priori for the existence of God, which is commonly, though, I apprehend, not justly, regarded as the most important of all Clarke's contributions to metaphysical philosophy. I shall quote the passage in Newton's own words, to the oracular conciseness of which no English version can de justice.

few insulated examples from particular departments of the world, shall take a rapid but wide survey of the universe, and

“Æternus est et infinitus, omnipotens et omnisciens; id est, durat ab æterno in æternum, et adest ab infinito in infinitum. Non est æternitas et infinitas, sed æternus et infinitus; non est duratio et spatium, sed durat et adest. Durat semper et adest ubique, et existendo semper et ubique durationem et spatium constituit.' Proceeding on these principles, Dr. Clarke argued, that as immensity and eternity (which force themselves irresistibly on our belief as necessary existencies, or, in other words, as existencies of which the annihilation is impossible) are not substances, but attributes, the immense and eternal Being, whose attributes they are, must exist of necessity also. The existence of God, therefore, according to Clarke, is a truth that follows with demonstrative evidence from those conceptions of space and time which are inseparable from the human mind."

After quoting the passage from Dr. Ried, cited at the beginning of this note, Mr. Stewart proceeds and says, "After this candid acknowledgment from Dr. Ried, I need not be ashamed to confess my own doubts and difficulties on the same question."

Dr. Thomas Brown in his 92d lecture says, "If the world had been without any of its present adaptation of parts to parts, only a mass of matter, irregular in form, and quiescent,—and if we could conceive ourselves, with all our faculties as vigorous as now, contemplating such an irregular and quiescent mass, without any thought of the order displayed in our own mental frame, I am far from contending that, in such circumstances, with nothing before us that could be considered as indicative of a particular design, we should have been led to the conception of a Creator. On the contrary, I conceive the abstract arguments which have been adduced to show that it is impossible for matter to have existed from eternity,-by reasonings on what has been termed necessary existence, and the incompatibility of this necessary existence with the qualities of matter,—to be relics of the mere verbal logic of the schools, as little capable of producing conviction, as any of the wildest and most absurd of the technical scholastic reasonings, on the properties, or supposed properties, of entity and nonentity. Eternal existence, the existence of that which never had a beginning, must always be beyond our distinct comprehension, whatever the eternal object may be, material or mental, and as much beyond our comprehension in the one case, as in the other, though it is not impossible for us to doubt, that some being, material or mental, must have been eternal, if anything exists."

Sir James Mackintosh, in his dissertation on the progress of

endeavour to show that evidences of design occur everywhere throughout the vast system. Such evidences appear not merely in a few thinly-scattered phenomena of a dubious aspect, pressed into the service, and constrained to give a reluctant and suspicious testimony; but they abound in every province of nature, and upon many occasions force themselves upon the notice even of the careless observer. Such a general survey is not necessary to prove the being of God; but it will serve to familiarize this great truth to our imagination, and accustom us to associate the existence and perfections of Deity with the contemplations of his works. Moreover, we may often have occasion to remark the indications of wisdom and goodness which appear in every department of nature, and the frequent recurrence of these indications cannot fail to make a deep impression on the mind, and to fortify it against objections to those attributes of the Creator. Before entering, however, upon this extensive survey, it is proper to premise,

1. That although we may not understand every phenomenon, or be able to point out design in every appearance of nature, yet this can form no objection against what we are able to explain. Our ability to prove the existence and illustrate the perfections of Deity from the fabric of the universe,

ethical philosophy, in the seventh edition of the Encyclopædia Britannica, speaking of Dr. Clarke, says, "Roused by the prevalence of the doctrines of Spinoza and Hobbes, he endeavoured to demonstrate the being and attributes of God, from a few axioms and definitions, in the manner of geometry; an attempt in which, with all his powers of argument, it must be owned that he is compelled sometimes tacitly to assume what the laws of reasoning required him to prove; and that, on the whole, his failure may be regarded as a proof that such a mode of argument is beyond the faculties of man.”

In a note, Sir James adds, "This admirable person had so much candour as in effect to own his failure, and to recur to those other arguments in support of this great truth, which have in all ages satisfied the most elevated minds. In Proposition VIII. (Being and Attributes of God, p. 47), which affirms that the first cause must be 'intelligent,' (where, as he truly states, 'lies the main question between us and the atheists,') he owns, that the proposition cannot be demonstrated strictly and properly a priori,"

Having mentioned these high authorities, I shall add nothing of my own respecting the argument a priori.