sustain. We now observe that there is no donbt but we should be crushed into atoms in an instant, by this pressure, were not all parts of our bodies filled either with air, or some other elastic fluid, the spring of which is just sufficient to counterbalance the weight of the atmosphere. But whatever this fluid may be, we are sure that it is just able to counteract the atmospherical gravity, and no more; for if any considerable pressure be superadded to that of the air, as by going into deep water, or the like, it is always severely felt; and if the weight of the atmosphere is taken off from any part of the human body, the hand, for instance, when put upon an open receiver, from whence the air is afterwards extracted, the weight of the atmosphere then discovers itself, and we feel a sensation as if the hand was strongly sucked down into the glass.

The variation of the pressure of the atmosphere we have noticed above, and that our bodies, in consequence of it, sustain a greater or a less weight accordingly. It is surprizing, however, that the spring of the internal fluid, already mentioned, which acts as a counterpoise to the atmospherical gravity, should, in all cases, seem to keep pace with it, when the pressure is naturally diminished. Thus, in that kind of weather when the pressure of the air is least, we never perceive our veins swell, or are sensible of any inward expansion in our bodies. On the contrary, the circulation is languid, and we seem rather to be oppressed by a weight. Even in going up to the tops of mountains, where the pressure of the atmosphere is diminished more than three times what it usually is in the plains below, no such appearances are observed.

Some travellers indeed have affirmed, that, on the tops of very high mountains, the air is so light as to occasion a great difficulty of respiration, and even violent retching and vomiting of blood. It seems doubtful, however, whether these assertions are well founded. Mr. Brydon found no inconvenience of this kind on the top of mount Etna; nor is any such thing mentioned by Mr. Houel, who also ascended this mountain.

Sir William Hamilton indeed says, that he did feel a difficulty of respiration, independant of any sulphureous steam. But, on the top of a volcano, the respiration may be affected by so many different causes, that it is impossible to assign the true one. The French mathematicians, when on the top of a very high peak of the Andes, did not make any complaint of this kind, though they lived there for some time. On the contrary, they found the wind so extremely violent, that they were scarce able to withstand its force; which seems an argument for at least equal density of the atmosphere in the superior as in the inferior regions.

Dr. Heberden, who ascended to the top of Tenriffe, a mountain higher than Etna, makes no mention of any difficulty of respiration. M. Saussure, however, in his journey to the top of Mont Blanc, the highest of the Alps, felt very great uneasiness in this way. His respiration was not only extremely difficult, but his pulse became quick, and he was seized with all the symptons of a fever. His strength was also exhausted to such a degree, that he seemed to require four times as long a space to perform some experiments on the top of the mountain as he would have

he was

done at the foot of it. It must be observed, however, that these symptoms did not begin to appear till he had ascended two miles and a half perpendicular above the level of the sea. The top of the mountain is only about a quarter of a mile higher; and in this short space reduced to the situation just mentioned. But it is improbable that so small a difference, even at the end of his journey, should have produced such violent effects, had not some other cause concurred. A cause of this kind, he himself mentions, viz. that the atmosphere at the top of the mountain was so much impregnated with fixed air, that lime water, exposed to it, quickly became covered with a pellicle occasioned by the absorption of that fluid. Now it is known, that fixed air is extremely pernicious to animal life, and will bring on symtems similar to those abovementioned. There is no reason, therefore, to have recourse to the variety of the atmosphere for solving a phenemenon which may more naturally be accounted for otherwise.

When the pressure of the atmosphere is augmented, by descending, in the diving-bell, to considerable depths in the sea, it does not appear that any inconvenience follows from its increase. Those who sit in the diving-bell are not sensible of any pressure as long as they remain in the air; but they feel it very powerfully upon going into the water: notwithstanding, it is certain, that the pressure in both cases is the same; for the whole pressure of the atmosphere, as well as of the water, is sustained by the air in the diving-bell, and consequently communicated to those who sit in it.

But though artificial compression of the air, as well as natural rarefaction, can thus be borne, it is otherwise with artificial rarefaction.

Animals in an air pump show uneasiness from the very first, and cannot live for any time in an atmosphere rarefied artificially even as much as it appeared to be from the barometer on the top of Mont Blanc. Many a sparrow, and many a mouse have fallen martyrs to the curiosity of philosophers in making experiments with the air pump.

The variations of heat and cold to which the atmosphere is subject, have been matter of much speculation. These are said to depend upon the light of the sun reflected into the atmosphere from the earth, and where this reflection is difficient, even though the light should be present ever so much, the most violent degrees of cold are found to take place. Hence, on the tops of mountains, the cold is generally excessive, though by reason of the clearness of the atmosphere the light of the sun falls upon them in greater quantity than it can do on an equal space on the plain. In long winding passages also, such as the caverns of Etna and Vesuvius, where the air has room to circulate freely, without any access of the sun, the cold is scarce tolerable.

TO BE CONTINUED.

AN ADDRESS TO ATHEISTS.

MEN WITHOUT A GOD,

PERMIT

me to address you on a subject of the greatest importance, and, as you profess rationality, I beseech you to exercise your rational powers on what I shall offer for your consideration.

What can have so benumbed your intellects, and perverted your understanding as to prevent your discovering full evidence of the existence and government of God? Can you hesitate to admit that fundamental principle in all philosophical reasoning, "There can be no effect without a cause?" Do you not know that every effect must have an adequate cause, by which it is produced, whether or not that cause be fully discoverable by us? Can you help seeing that the visible worlds, with all their furniture and inhabitants, are in reality effects, and must have been produced by some cause, distinct from, and fully adequate to the production of such a stupendous and complicated system of being? Have you ever seen a new order of beings produced, either by chance, fatality, or the ingenuity and efforts of man? How then can you suppose that the wonderful objects which present themselves to your eyes, in the heavens and on the earth, could ever be produced in a fortuitous way? If you suppose matter to have been eternal, you cannot but know that life and motion are not natural to, or essential properties of matter. divine power must be necessary to give matter that variety of forms which we now behold, to endow it with life and motion, and to establish those laws by which material objects are governed. How can you avoid seeing evident marks of design in every partof nature? in the arrangement, connexion and co-operation of the various parts of the amazing spectacle? that, consequently the whole must be the work, and under the government, of a being infinitely powerful and wise? That though such a being is invisible to our senses, yet his existence is evidenced by his manifest operations?

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A

you

where

Have you not observed that the whole economy of nature is a combination of causes and effects? And where can you find a visible cause which is not itself the evident effect of some prior cause? trace, the chain of natural causes and effects back, link by link, will you be able to stop? Surely no where, until you arrive at a self existent, eternal, and invisible being, the first cause of all things. Can it have escaped your notice that there is a connexion between cause and effect in the moral, as well as in the natural, world? that the constitution and operation of the human mind demonstrates it? consequently that an invisible being must have fixed that connexion, as we know of no visible being capable of doing it? The progressive state of man, the manner in. which circumstances are combined together, and made to operate, frequently contrary to the design and expectation of the immediate actors, the production of great events by apparently slight and improbable causes, are not these things manifest proofs of a superintending providence? You talk of credulity, of believing without

evidence; but are not you the most credulous men in the world, while you profess to believe there is no God? consequently, that the amazing system of the universe, which displays such incomparable marks of wisdom in the contrivance, and power in the execution, rose into existence, and is sustained in being, without either creator or governor? You not only believe without evidence, when you believe the world to exist without a maker; but in opposition to the strongest evidence, the evidence of the existence of a cause arising from the contemplation of its effects. What can you find sufficient to induce a belief, contrary to all sound philosophy, that a universe of effects can exist without a universal cause?

If the existence and government of God were inimical to the well being of the creation, or even if the dearest interests of creatures were not inseparably connected with, and dependant on, his being and government, atheism might be ranked among other speculative points, and your unbelief might assume the appearance of philanthropy. But consider what an alarming situation creation would be in without God and his government. If it be the production of chance, some future accident may destroy it, or produce such complete derangement in its parts, which by mere accident co-operate for good, as will render absolute misery the standing order throughout the universe. If there be no divine governinent, virtue and vice must be things merely indifferent, any further than relates to present convenience. Upon your principles no future state can be reasonably expected; man is merely the ephemerą of a day, the earth a hot bed producing intelligences, and, when their powers begin to expand, entombing them for ever. All man's hopes respecting futurity, upon your hypothesis, are mere illusions of fancy, for nature itself may at some future period become an absolute blank; as what chance produces, chance may destroy. He can look for no termination to his labours and sorrows but in total oblivion. The perfectibility of the mind must be a mere figment of the brain; for after a few days we shall be crumbled to dust, without any hope of ever being raised up again, to renew our mental progress. Such are the consequences which atheism involves. O ye Atheists, think what ye are doing, your principles would deprive men of their only lasting ground of dependance, God; extinguish the powerful incentives to moral actions, hope and fear, any further than they have the things of the present transient life for their object; make virtue and vice to consist merely in the accommodating ourselves to circumstances, for the sake of present gratification; and leave us no prospect of rest but in total forgetfulness. Can you be called the friends, are you not the enemies of mankind?

If God was either weak, foolish, or destitute of goodness, you would have some ground for your infidelity; but all his works proclaim him, and all who believe in his existence acknowledge him, to be infinitely wise, powerful, and good. Let reason say which is most desirable, most for the happiness of the creation, that every thing should be left to the guidance of mere chance, or be under the superintendence and direction

of a being infinitely wise, powerful, and good. In the former case, nothing but anarchy could be expected; it would be unreasonable to look for that order and harmony which appears in the economy of nature, or to expect that union and peace should ever universally obtain among rational creatures. In the latter case, the order and harmony which appears in the system of nature is what might be expected to exist among the works of an infinitely wise, powerful, and good being, and the union and happiness of rational creatures, living under the same divine government, is certainly both possible and probable. Atheism must certainly be favourable to vice, as it leaves the vicious nothing to fear hereafter from the hand of the righteous governor of the world; but supposes that their crimes will be buried in the same oblivion with the virtues of the good man; it must at the same time be highly discouraging to the virtuous, as it leaves them no hope of a future reward: on the contrary, the belief of God and his government is unfavourable to vice, as it leads the vicious to dread future punishment; and highly favourable to virtue, as it inspires the virtuous with the hope of a future reward.

Will you object that the existence of evil is incompatible with the government of a being infinitely wise, powerful, and good? Can you help seeing that this objection is infinitely outweighed by the evidence which the whole creation furnishes of the being and government of God? Is it not absurd to reject as false a subject so credible and important in itself, and which is substantiated by so many proofs, on account of a single difficulty? in particular when the denial thereof would involve still greater difficulties, namely, the existence of a universe of effects without a universal cause? May not the existence of evil be fully accounted for without denying the divine government? Is it not possible to prove that the sufferance of evil is perfectly consistent with the government of a being infinitely wise, powerful, and good? Is it not a more noble work to form rational creatures, free intelligences, voluntary agents, endowed with the power of acting from themselves, than to form mere machines? Can a wise governor be as well pleased with that subjection which arises from mere compulsion, as with voluntary obedience? But if men be not mere machines, if the obedience which God requires of them must be voluntary, it follows, that they must enjoy that degree of liberty which affords them 'opportunity of either obeying or disobeying, and the existence of evil is at once accounted for. Can voluntary agents be made virtuous and happy against their wills? Is it not easy to conceive that it must be wisest and best for God to leave his intelligent creatures to the developement of their own powers; to learn by experience, the happy effect of virtue, and the painful consequences of vice; for him to vary his dealings with them until he hath, under the operations of his government, conducted them to perfect rectitude and happiness, by bringing them to choose, and by free choice to be established in, that which is good? If this be admitted the existence of moral evil can be no objection to the divine government, because its existence is temporary, and will be over-ruled for good. As for physical evil, it seems to be