XVII.

THE THEOLOGY OF THE INTELLECT AND THAT OF THE FEELINGS.1

ARTICLE II.

WE are really sorry to find that Professor Park has been so much pained by our review of his Convention Sermon. His reply evinces a great deal of wounded feeling. The transparent vail which he has thrown over his acerbites, only renders them the more noticeable. A homely face may pass in a crowd without attracting much attention; but if its unfortunate owner attempt to conceal it by a gauze mask, every eye will be turned upon him. He had better put the mask in his pocket, and let his face pass for what it is. Some allowance must be made for our author. When a man delivers a discourse with great eclat, it must, we presume, be very painful to find that the reading public does not confirm the verdict of the admiring audience. This is a very common occurrence. Instead, however, of being satisfied with the obvious solution of this familiar fact, the author, if a politician, is very apt to attribute such unfavorable judgment to party spirit, and if a preacher, to theological bigotry. We are the more disposed to be charitable in the present case, because, in our small way, we have had a somewhat similar experience. We wrote a review which we intended to make a model of candor and courtesy. To avoid the danger of misrepresentation, we determined, instead of giving disconnected extracts of the discourse reviewed, to present a full analysis of it, as far as possible in the author's own words; and to guard against discourtesy, we resolved to abstain from all

'Remarks on the Princeton Review, Vol. XXII. No. IV. Art. VII. By EDWARDS A. PARK, Abbot Professor in Andover Theological Seminary. Bibliotheca Sacra, January, 1851. Art. IX.-PRINCETON REVIEW, April, 1851.

personal remarks, and to confine ourselves to the theory under discussion. We flattered ourselves that we had been tolerably successful as to both these points. Partial friends confirm us in our self-complacency. Even opponents, though dissenting from our opinion of the sermon, acknowledged the courtesy of the review. Judge then of our chagrin to learn that it is a tissue of misrepresentations, filled with arguments ad captandum vulgus and ad invidiam, unblushing in its misstatements,' violating not only the rules of logic, but the canons of fair criticism, and even the laws of morals, the offspring of theological bigotry and sectional jealousy, &c., &c. All this may be accounted for in various ways, except so far as the imputation of unworthy motives is concerned. That we are at a loss to explain. Does not Professor Park know in his heart that it would be a matter of devout thanksgiving to all Old-school men to be assured that their doctrines were taught at Andover? Does he suppose there is a man among them capable, from motives conceivable or inconceivable, of wishing that error should be there inculcated? If he can cherish such suspicions, he is of all Christian men the most to be pitied.

Having failed so entirely to understand the Sermon, we shall not be presumptuous enough to pretend to understand the Reply. It is not our purpose, therefore, to review it in detail. We must let it pass and produce its legitimate effect, whatever that may be. We take a deep interest, however, in the main point at issue, which is nothing more or less than this: Is that system of doctrine embodied in the creeds of the Lutheran and Reformed Churches, in its substantial and distinctive features, true as to its form as well as to its substance? Are the propositions therein contained true as doctrines, or are they merely intense expressions, true not in the mode in which they are there presented, but only in a vague, loose sense, which the intellect would express in a very different form? Are these creeds to be understood as they mean, and do they mean what they say, or is allowance to be made for their freedom, abatement of their force, and their terms to be considered antiquated and their spirit only as still in force? For example, when these creeds speak of the imputation of Adam's sin, is that to be con

1 Professor Park says repeatedly his reviewer does not blush to say this, and does not blush to say that.

sidered as only an intense form of expressing "the definite idea, that we are exposed to evil in consequence of his sin." This is surely a question of great importance.

From an early period in the history of the church, there have been two great systems of doctrine in perpetual conflict. The one begins with God, the other with man. The one has for its object the vindication of the divine supremacy and sovereignty in the salvation of men; the other has for its characteristic aim the assertion of the rights of human nature. It is specially

'Sermon, p. 535. In the following article the references to Professor Park's Sermon are to the edition of it contained in the Bib. Sacra for July, 1850; and those to his Remarks on the Princeton Review are to the Bib. Sacra for January, 1851. That the point at issue is what is stated in the text will be made more apparent in the sequel; for the present it may be sufficient to refer to the following passages. In giving his reasons for the title of the sermon, Professor Park says: "Secondly, the title was selected as a deferential and charitable one. The representations which are classified under the theology of feeling are often sanctioned as 'the true theology,' by the men who delight most in employing them. What the sermon would characterize as images, illustrations, and intense expressions, these men call doctrines." "We call one system of theology 'rational' or 'liberal,' simply because it is so called by its advocates; much more then may we designate by the phrase 'emotive theology,' those representations which are so tenaciously defended by multitudes as truth fitted both for the feeling and the judgment." Remarks, p. 140.

"A creed, if true to its original end, should be in sober prose, should be understood as it means, and mean what it says, should be drawn out with a discriminating, balancing judgment, so as to need no allowance for its freedom, no abatement of its force, and should not be expressed in antiquated terms, lest men regard its spirit as likewise obsolete. It belongs to the province of the analyzing, comparing, reasoning intellect; and if it leave this province for the sake of intermingling the phrases of an impassioned heart, it confuses the soul, it awakens the fancy and the feelings to disturb the judgment, it sets a believer at variance with himself by perplexing his reason with metaphors and his imagination with logic; it raises feuds in the church by crossing the temperaments of men, and taxing one party to demonstrate similes, another to feel inspired by abstractions. Hence the logomachy which has always characterized the defence of such creeds. The intellect, no less than the heart, being out of its element, wanders through dry places, seeking rest and finding none. Men are thus made uneasy with themselves and therefore acrimonious against each other; the imaginative zealot does not understand the philosophical explanation, and the philosopher does not sympathize with the imaginative style of the symbol; and as they misunderstand each other, they feel their weakness, and 'to be weak is to be miserable,' and misery not only loves but also makes company, and thus they sink their controversy into a contention and their dispute into a quarrel; nor will they ever find peace until they confine their intellect to its rightful sphere, and understand it according to what it says, and their feeling to its province and interpret its language according to what it means, rendering unto poetry the things that are designed for poetry, and unto prose what belongs to prose." Sermon, p. 554.

solicitous that nothing should be held to be true, which cannot be philosophically reconciled with the liberty and ability of man. It starts with a theory of free agency and of the nature of sin, to which all the anthropological doctrines of the Bible must be made to conform." Its great principles are, first, that "all sin consists in sinning; that there can be no moral character but in moral acts; secondly, that the power to the contrary is essential to free agency; that a free agent may always act contrary to any influence, not destructive of his freedom, which can be brought to bear upon him; thirdly, that ability limits responsibility; that men are responsible only so far as they have adequate power to do what is required of them, or that they are responsible for nothing not under the control of the will.' From these

'We give from authoritative symbols and writings a few extracts confirming the account given in the text of the two systems referred to.

Our Relation to Adam.

Apology of the Confession of the Remonstrants, p. 84. Fatentur Remonstrantes, peccatum Adami a Deo imputatum dici posse posteris ejus, quatenus Deus posteros Adami eidem malo, cui Adamus per peccatum obnoxium se reddidit, obnoxios nasci voluit, sive quatenus Deus malum, quod in poenam Adamo inflictum fuerat, in posteros ejus dimanare et transire permisit. At nihil cogit eos dicere, peccatum Adami posteris ejus sic fuisse a Deo imputatum, quasi Deus posteros Adami revera censuisset ejusdem cum Adamo peccati et culpæ, quam Adamus commiserat, reos.

Limborch Theol. Christ. 3. 3. 8. Quod itaque imputationem peccati Adami attinet, qua statuitur, Deum primum Adami et Evæ peccatum omnibus ipsorum posteris ita imputasse, ut omnium peccatum sit omnesque in Adamo peccaverint et propterea mortis ac condemnationis æternæ rei facti sint, eam impugnamus.

Ibid. 3. 3. 19. Dicimus, Deum innoxios posteros non punire ob peccatum Adami.

Original Sin.

Apol. Conf. Remonstr. p. 84. Peccatum originale nec habent (Remonstrantes) pro peccato proprie dicto, quod posteros Adami odio Dei dignos faciat, nec pro malo, quod per modum proprie dictæ pœnæ ab Adamo in posteros dimanet, sed pro malo, infirmitate, vitio aut quocunque tandem alio nomine vocetur. * * * Peccatum autem originis non esse malum culpæ proprie dictæ, quod vocant, ratio manifesta arguit; malum culpæ non est, quia nasci plane involuntarium est, ergo et nasci cum hac aut illa labe, infirmitate, vitio vel malo. ** * Multo minus itaque fieri potest, ut sit culpa simul et pœna.

Limborch Theol. Christ. 3. 4. 4. Nullam scriptura in infantibus corruptionem esse docet, quæ vere ac proprie sit peccatum. 4. 5. Absurdum est statuere, Deum homines punivisse corruptione tali, quæ vere ac proprie dictum est peccatum, et ex qua omnia actualia peccata tanquam ex fonte necessario scaturiunt, et deinde propter illam corruptionem homines denuo punire pœna inferni.

Ibid. 4. 7. Nullum peccatum pœna dignum est involuntarium, quia nihil magis debet esse voluntarium, quam quod hominem poenæ et quidem gravissimæ, æternæ