according to the number and different organs of the spectators; and which must have the same effect upon them, as if the work, however miraculous, was truly and really performed. For how could they distinguish, when an outward miracle is performed, and when it is that their own sight only is altered? Could they forbear doubting equally concerning all miracles, nay, concerning all the objects of sense, if * they once firmly believed that their senses, the only judges of them, were liable to be thus deceived? If the delusion of Satan consists, not in affecting the organs of sight, but in placing false appearances before them, such as are perfect imitations of divine miracles; this is liable to the very same objections as the former. To be able to make things appear what they are not, and to impose upon the spectators beyond their capacity of detecting the cheat, would be equivalent to a power of performing the greatest miracles.

It will now, perhaps, be inquired, "If miracles are neither the effects of natural causes, nor of superior created intelligences acting from themselves alone; and if it cannot be proved that they do universally and necessarily require the exertion of infinite power, to what cause are they to be ascribed?" I answer, They are always to be ascribed to a divine interposition: by which I mean, that they are never wrought but either immediately by God himself, or by such other beings as he commissions and empowers to perform them. Miracles may not require a degree of power absolutely incommunicable to any created agent; and yet God

may

may never actually communicate a miraculous power, to any creature, or do it only where he directly authorizes its use. Now, whether God works the miracles himself alone, or whether he enables and commissions others to work them, there is equally a divine interposition. And in either case every purpose of religion will be secured: for whatever God authorizes and empowers another to do, is, in effect, done by God, and is as manifestly a declaration of his will as what he does immediately himself. He can no more authorize another to act, than he can himself act, in opposition to his own nature, or in confirmation of imposture.

The point then which I shall undertake to establish is this," that miracles are the peculiar works of God, or such as can never be effected without a divine interposition," in the sense of the phrase already explained. This point we shall endeavour to establish both by reason and revelation. And should we succeed in this attempt, there will then be no difficulty in shewing that miracles are in themselves certain proofs of the divinity of the mission and doctrine of the performer, and the most effectual methods of recommending him to the regard of mankind.

CHAPTER

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CHAPTER II.

Arguments from REASON, to prove that Miracles are never effected without a divine Interposition.

MIRACLES, considered as means of conviction, or as proofs of an extraordinary divine revelation, pre-suppose an ability of judging whether God be the author of them, and they can be fitly regarded as his immediate declaration and testimony in favour of their performer. The appeal in this case is plainly made to natural reason; which must first be satisfied with the evidence of any supernatural revelation, before we acknowledge its authority, or submit to any of its decisions. And therefore, before we examine the sense of the Jewish and Christian revelations, with regard to the author of miracles, we will consider what may be advanced from REASON, to prove that they can never be performed without the immediate interposition of God.

We shall begin with examining the idea which reason teaches us to form of superior created intelligençes; and in the next place endeavour to shew, that the supposition of their power to work miracles is contrary to fact and experience; and, lastly, point out some of the numerous absurdities which would follow from their possessing a miraculous power.

SECTION I.

The same arguments which prove the existence of superior created intelligences do much more strongly conclude against their acting out of their proper sphere. The objection from their spiritual and invisible nature answered.

WE are far from denying that there are in the universe beings of a higher order than mankind, such as surpass us far both in natural and moral excellencies. All that we here undertake to shew is, that reason is so far from clearly informing us of the power of any superior beings, besides God, to work miracles, that the best arguments it can employ, to prove the existence of creatures of a higher order than man, do much more strongly prove that they can act only within a certain limited sphere. Those arguments are chiefly the two following:

1st. From the diversity of creatures, and the gradual ascent from the lowest to the highest order of existence, observable here on earth, it has been inferred, that the scale of beings is continued upwards above man, and that there are numberless species of creatures superior to him, as we know there are of such as are inferior to him. "Is it not very unlikely," we are asked, "that the gradation of being should stop just at man, the lowest order of reasonable creatures? Is the immense space between man and the Deity quite empty, at the same time that there is not the least chasm between man and nothing?" In answer to this reasoning *, I observe,

First,

* It is hardly necessary to take notice of the great impropriety

there

First, That it has not, perhaps, all that force in it which its having been uncontroverted might lead us to suppose. We may allow, indeed, that the infinite number of living beings with which the earth is stocked, affords ground to conclude, that the other regions of the universe are equally furnished with inhabitants adapted to their respective situations. We may allow further, that the gradation of being from lower to higher, which we observe in our system, furnishes a proof, that the like gradation obtains in other systems, and that their inhabitants differ from one another in degrees of excellence, and rise one above another in beautiful order. But whether they rise above us in perfection, the argument from analogy alone, as I apprehend, cannot determine. For that only enables us to judge, by God's manner of acting in one case, how he will act in another; and of what we do not see and know of his ways, by what we do. But all that we observe in the system to which we belong is an innumerable variety, and a gradation of beings. By the rule of analogy therefore some similar economy may take place in other systems, and they may contain numberless orders of creatures rising one above another till we come to the highest of them*. Beyond this the argument from ana

logy

there would be in supposing that the chasm between man and his maker can possibly be filled up. Were the chain of intelligence continued upwards from man, through as many orders of created beings as you can imagine, yet the uppermost link of this chain would be at an infinite distance from the throne of God.

*This may likewise serve as an answer to another objection.

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