'is' may be is included or contained in,'—e. g., 'the tiger is (sc., included in the generic term) predacious. But if we examine each of these several meanings, it will be found that in each the expression used may be changed to the affirmation that the subject of the proposition is included in or contained under the predicate as the inclusive generic designation.

'Definition.'

(The

The

The

In the use of the preposition to express the relation of subject and predicate we may distinguish attribution and inclusion. The terms of a proposition are the subject and predicate; they are the words which limit and express the meaning of the proposition. adequate conception of a thing fully determined in the fewest terms.) The test of a sound definition is that the terms should be convertible. Reasoning, discourse of reason, or logic, consists essentially in inference. The most felicitous contrivance for this purpose is what is denominated the Aristotelian syllogism, for it enables the reasoner to know by the form itself whether the reasoning be correct. model of syllogistic reasoning is the categorical syllogism. validity of any inference depends upon the principle that a predicate or logical term, which rightly designates or which includes a class, rightly designates or includes whatever that class contains. Or a logical term which excludes a whole class excludes whatever the class contains. All logical reasoning is mediate, that is, consists in the position that a proposition being true, or admitted to be true, another proposition may be legitimately inferred from it. The inviolable rule is that if the major term include the middle, it includes all that is included in the middle term, but no more. 'Three acts are indispensable to an argument —namely, seclusion, inclusion, and conclusion.' Formal logic consists in generalization; that is, the logical process of bringing the facts and phenomena of experience under their appropriate kinds or genera, and in all cases generalization is a logical process, implying syllogism.

"We ought ever to be on our guard against the fallacies in reasoning, the danger of which continually besets us, and which may easily escape detection without constant vigilance. Let it be remembered that formal logic can do no more than give the rules for drawing a valid conclusion, assuming the premises; but that the premises may be right or wrong, and that they require, for determining their truth, the sound judgment which belongs to an understanding enlightened by reason. The only major premiss, which does not and cannot require proof, is a proposition containing the statement of a self-evident truth, and to suppose the contradiction of which would be self-contradictory. Our first

attempts at classification of the products of nature-and the same holds good with respect also to the classification of mental objects and psychical phenomena have the same origin as all our thoughts of things, and depends upon a comparison by which we note the resemblances and differences of the objects offered to our attention. This is "the method of artificial classification." To give such attempts the character of science, we are under the necessity of giving definitions or adequate descriptions of the meaning of the generic conceptions and terms employed, and of proceeding according to the rules of technical logic. But if we are to

go beyond the merely logical or artificial method of classification, we have to discover principles which, though not superseding the use of logic, transcend the boundaries of empirical knowledge. more numerous the resemblances and coincidences in character, habits,

The

properties, organization, functions, and agencies of groups and components of groups, the safer will be the inference of their natural affinity, and the greater the surety of the identification of the idea or generic type out of which they have proceeded, and consequently the more secure the ground upon which to found a natural method of classification. A class founded on a generic conception is an empirical abstract, whereas a class founded on a type or idea is a causative principle. 'Induction' does not mean merely the record of the results of experience; but the process of inferring, of inducing upon our empirical knowledge the appre hension and insight of the causes and laws which govern the universe, moral and physical. In all cases of inductive reasoning the argument may be thrown into, and virtually consists of, a syllogism; of which the major premiss states the condition or rule under which the conclusion may be valid; of which the minor premiss is the statement of the particular fact or facts under consideration; and of which the conclusion is the proposition which raises the particulars into the generality or universal law, contemplated in the problem at issue. The process of gathering empirical knowledge, and of constituting thereby our experience, is both inductive and deductive. It is by means of the universal light of reason that we are enabled to raise up axioms of experience, and to show that experience is built upon the foundation of truths of reason which attest their derivation by their self-evident nature. rational mind cannot be satisfied with less than that the facts, phenomena, and changes which form the sphere of our sensible and psychical experience shall be rendered intelligible to, and rationally accounted for by, our mind. Hypothesis is a preconception presumed to account for a particular change or event in the course of nature, but it is only prospective, anticipative, and substitutive till tested and verified. Hypothesis may be, and probably often is, the precursor of a theory. Theory ought to be distinguished from 'law.'

The

A perfect theory might be regarded as a law contemplated subjectively, that is, as a product of the human mind, and satisfying the conditions of human intelligence. The discovery of any great law of nature has uniformly the character of felicity, and of a revelation, as by a flash of divine light, of the legislative wisdom of the Creator;

the down

shine of a light from above, which is the power of living truth; and which, in irradiating and actuating the human mind, becomes for it (reveals itself as) reason; yea, which is the revelation of those divine acts, at once causative and intelligential, which man recognises as first principles or ultimate truths, ideas for the human mind, and constitutive laws in nature.

case.

"Science can be predicated only of any scheme of knowledge connected as a chain of necessarily dependent truths; so that, any link of the chain being given, any other may be deduced as a necessary consequence of the principle which determines the relations of all, and which gives to its pos sessor the power of anticipating and predicting its results in any given Principles are the postulates of science and the problems of philosophy. Philosophy in its eminent sense and highest significancy is the discovery and establishment of first principles or ideas. If the reason be contemplated merely as 'speculative,' that is, merely in its intelligential functions, and as the organ of philosophy in clusively of science, then it is the light, but the light only, by which man

apprehends and comprehends divine and eternal truths. But if, as the cause of truth urges us to do, we are to regard the reason, not only as light, but as life; not only as speculative intelligence, but as a living and inexhaustible source of reality, we must search for some principle which shall at once enliven and enlighten that ultimate principle of our being which we call will.

"Adopting as the final aim and object of spiritual philosophy the discovery of a principle which shall secure to it the reality of living truth; and accepting as the postulate (afterwards to be vindicated) that the required principle of the unity of the manifold of the universe, physical and moral, shall be ONE, of all reality the absolute cause, which, affirming and realizing itself as its own abiding and self-sufficing ground, utters and reveals itself in the infinite manifold of being, entire in all and entire in each; adopting, I say, this as the indispensable postulate of philosophy when contemplated in its utmost height, breadth, and depth, I venture to affirm, with the fullest confidence of establishing its evidence, that the principle sought for is WILL. No sooner will the self-investigator have thus distinguished the thinking mind from the thought which is the object of the mind's thinking, than he unavoidably identifies, and becomes aware that they are but relations of a somewhat which he is conscious is the self. In order to constitute it an act of self-consciousness, of subjective apprehension, I must be also distinctly conscious that it is I who am the subject. I must know that it is I, thinking, willing, feeling. By 'will' we mean, as we cannot but do, a self-determinant agency and the only source of originative power. The actuation of the individual will not only does not exclude self-determination, but implies it-implies that, though actuated, but actuated only because already selfoperant, it is not compelled or acting under a law of outward causation. If we have no cognizance of a self, other than in the changes which the self undergoes, we can have no knowledge of the operative cause of those changes, and the will ceases to be a fact for us. The individual will cannot be other than self-ponent; implies self-ponency, so will is inconceivable as a reality, except as a selfponent causator; except as an individual, personal, and selfconscious agent, self-constitutive by the perpetual act by which it secures its identity of being in its manifold change of agency.

and, as all will

I

know that I think, feel, will; but more than this, I can abstract from these thoughts, feelings, and volitions, myself as the subject: I know myself: and meanwhile under the sense of power which arises simultaneously out of the depth of his inward being, 'man' invests nature with life, action, causality, spontaneity. Whatever becomes other than it was before, and acquires a change of attributes, or whatever must be contemplated as, or traced to, a beginning de novo, cannot but imply the productive efficient by which the change is wrought and rendered intelligible; namely, the causative power, which is recognised in and by the constant and unvarying character of its effects. Reason, considered as speculative intellect or philosophy, in its search for absolute truth, combines three distinct forms of operation. I. Cause, or that which satisfactorily accounts for any observed change. II. That which in any and every object, or collective manifold, amid every variety and change of attributes, properties, and accidents, amid all mutations or transformations of phenomenal existence, is itself permanent and abiding; that which may

be accepted as the reality in contradistinction to the appearances of things, and constitutes their individual being; that which is the ground of the distinction between what a thing is and what it has. It is obvious that the distinction here intended is that recognised as subject and attribute, substance and accident. III. The irrepressible desire and striving after unity, by the habitual effort to bring whatever may be the object or objects of knowledge or inquiry into the relation of a whole and its parts; derived from an antecedent and causative energy, which, as intelligent power, having produced a whole of parts, remains as its conservative principle. Those three forms, in relation to the real and effective unity which is required, cannot but be regarded as the correlative elements and exponents of the unity. Reason in man, regarded abstractedly as speculative, prompts him to search unceasingly for the unity, insight of which the reason supplies for the comprehension of his manifold knowledges; and that, wherever this is attainable by the discovery of a principle adequate to account for the many as a totality proceeding from a one, and exhibited in a unity of interdependent parts, the human mind attains to the possession of an 'idea.' And thus the functions of speculative reason in forming ideas is integration; and that every idea may be expressed as the integral, of which all the forms within our experience are but approximations.' The unity of the manifold of the universe physical, must (I said) be ONE, of all reality the absolute cause, which, affirming and realizing itself as its own abiding and self-sufficing ground, utters and reveals itself in the infinite manifold of being, entire in all and entire in each. The principle sought for is will. To what principle, other than that of will, dare we attribute rational intelligence, pre-determining and achieving actual results in the antecedent unity of a final aim and purpose? or how otherwise shall we conceive such will than as a personal agent? The advocates of

the spiritual philosophy affirm, and rightly affirm, that, in order to any real and effectual unity, the conceptions of causative power and will are not only indispensable to the fulfilment of the conditions under which the human mind can only contemplate a real unity or organic whole, but are securely attainable within the limits of human consciousness. Will, as causative of reality, cannot be conceived or contemplated in its integrity, or inherent tendency thereto, except under such conditions of integration; we submit the following as the axioms of rational

or spiritual integration.

"Axiom 1st. Will, as the principle which is absolutely causative of reality, and by which alone all causality is rendered intelligible.

"Axiom 2nd. All will must primarily will itself; that is, assert itself to be a will, or to have being as a will.

"Axiom 3rd. The will

is guided and governed by a purpose, or final aim, which, as antecedent unity, contains prospectively and potentially the realization of what it proposes.

"Axiom 4th.

fullest integrity.

Whatever is willed cannot but be willed in its

"Axiom 5th. Every will tends to be absolute, or aims at absolute ponency, in the act of willing.

"Axiom 6th. The will is ideally a principle of absolute freedom.

But reason, regarded as distinct from will, is the essential principle of necessity. Hence, in order to a true conception of will enlightened by

reason, it is incumbent on us to provide for the conciliation of the opposite conditions of spontaneity and necessity.

"Axiom 7th. The will in its ideal integrity cannot but will what is universal; that is, what may and ought to be the will of all wills. "Axiom 8th. The will in its ideal integrity cannot but will that which ever remains the same under all change and diversity. A will, constituted according to its idea, cannot but will that which is eternal. Thus ever idem gignitur alter,' and the same will, which appears differenced into forms, is recognised as the same abiding substance under all change.

Dialectic,

"The formula of polar logic is an adequate description of the relations, or elementary factors, required in order to the conciliation of the opposites, viz.,-identity, thesis, indifference, antithesis, synthesis. In the ideal construction, which exhibits the genetic development of a principle, every new distinction may call forth a new opposite, and therefore that which was primarily a unipolarity is calculated to be a multipolarity, or system of correlatives. or a conflict of positions, is inevitable. Truth, in its integrity, embraces two sides, or relations. We might designate the sort of logic now under consideration, the logic of reason. It is the process for disentangling the mind from the inevitable dialectic imposed upon it by the forms and mechanism of the understanding, which, as the faculty of reasoning by means of conception,' is opposed to reason, as the faculty of reasoning by means of ideas.' The reason, as the organ of

spiritual truths, is the opposite, or countervailing power, to the understanding, and by its inherent tendency to ideal integration, turns at once from the merely empirical to those truths which transcend all experience, sensible and psychical. The reason strives to express, or to obtain the exponent of an idea; but the understanding, or logical faculty, can supply only conceptual forms; and the reason, in order to obtain the exponent it needs, uses conceptions which, in contradicting each other, suggest the ideal truth aimed at. The categories, or concipiences, so

often adverted to, are used in a twofold sense, as moulds of the understanding, and as forms of reason, viz.:-1st, in the service, and with the meaning of sensible and psychical experience; and 2nd, in the service and with the meaning of ideal or spiritual experience; that is, by uniting conceptions representative of the intellectual forma formantes, which are inherent, and à priori in the speculative reason as a constituent of the human mind. The idea, which the concipiency of substantiality discloses, when interpreted in its spiritual sense and significancy, is that of the will contemplated as the absolute ground of all well-being; that the idea contained in the concipiency of causality, interpreted in like manner, is that of the will as absolute causality-that the idea, in which the concipiency of totality, or of a whole and its parts, is grounded, is that of the will as the realization of absolute unity and exhaustless distinction. There is but one ultimate ground, namely, the WILL, as the absolute idea, and the sole and fontal principle of speculative philosophy.

"Man can only occupy a sphere, of which the limits are predetermined. And hence we have to assign to his will, in its self-ponency and agency, at least these, that on one hand, it requires solicitation from without, and on the other impulse from within. The soul is a will, self-affirmed, and self-ponent in its individual sphere of agency