"To say what ought to be in human wills, To long to see the ends-and end of all things; As suns look into space." It cannot be doubted that he gave a new impulse to English thought on the grounds and bases of faith, duty, morals, destiny, and the conditions of the life proper to man as at once a religious and a rational being; and that he gave fresh interest to "the study of ultimate principles of belief and of thought, and of the ultimate grounds of voluntary action, commonly called metaphysics and ethics." He re-connected philosophy in modern times with the Christianized Platonism of More and Cudworth, and brought back Cambridge, at least, from its acquiescence in Locke and its tolerance of Paley to a reconsideration of the problems of existence and thought in a higher light than that of the sensationalism of the school which, through Hartley, James Mill, &c., had been developed out of Locke's Essay. The express and absolute originality of the contributions Coleridge has made to the sum of English thought on the fundamental principles of human knowledge has been of late severely criticised. Ferrier, Hamilton, De Quincey, J. H. Green, Sara Coleridge, Hare, &c., have taken part in the controversy on this topic which has materially altered the form of " Coleridge's claim to be regarded as the founder of a philosophy" by proving his indebtedness to Kant, Schelling, Maass, Lessing, &c., for the main elements of his extant works. The subject has been recently re-investigated by Dr. C. M. Ingleby with considerable fulness and much acuteness, in two contributions to the Transactions of the Royal Society of Literature-one on "The Unpublished MSS. of Samuel Taylor Coleridge," 12th June, 1867, and the other "On the Philosophy of Coleridge," April 28th, 1869; as well as in different parts of his "Introduction to Metaphysic." The result of this explorer's researches is given in this outcome:-"In all these works [of Coleridge] "compacted, there can be extracted nothing that can, without gross inaccuracy, be described as a system of philosophy. There is nothing in the whole series but certain discrete and unconnected fragments of a philosophical character." Though, however, it may be held as proved that, so far as philosophy goes, he was not an original thinker; it need not be held as affirmable that his was not an influential mind. Indeed, few facts can be better authenticated than the effectiveness of Coleridge as a simulator of minds-as a discipliner of reflective thought. That he exercised witchery over the intellects of men almost as marvellous as the power of fascination over the physical frame by "the glitter ing eye" of the "Ancient Mariner," no one can doubt who has any acquaintance with modern biography or literature. In the former we learn how, when he spoke, such men as Wordsworth, Southey, De Quincey, Wedgewood, Sterling, Hare, Maurice, Edward Irving, Wm. Hazlitt, Arnold, Carlyle, &c., listened in rapt astonishment as he threw forth from his emotioned mind such ideas as are "Like rays of stars that meet in space, And mingle in a bright embrace; " while in the latter we have Coleridgean influences running through the writings of Wilson, Keble, Coplestone, Whewell, A. J. Scott, W. A. Butler, Archbishop Thomson, T. S. Baynes, John Veitch, &c., in this country, as well as in those of Alcott, Channing, Emerson, Tappan, &c., in America-though it is, to an English reader, not a little remarkable to find that Coleridge seems to be almost unknown in France, and is very little valued in Germany. To have gathered up for us and put into form some of the most patent and potent of Coleridge's thoughts, Green professes to ; he translates the invisible writing of Coleridge jotted down in his own mind, and reads off for us-not, perhaps, always accurately or pointedly the interpretation of the marginalia of memory made by Coleridge in the mind of Green. The book in which this brief abstract of Coleridgeanism appears is issued posthumously at the request of Mrs. Green, the author's widow. It was substantially prepared for the press, all the matter having been revised for publication except one chapter which was to be condensed from two other productions; and though, while it was passing through the press, he intended to write recapitulatory sections, and probably a chapter summing up the entire contents, yet the work, so far as the philosophical interest of it goes, is complete. The editor has only made clerical alterations, and has only added the brief Memoir of his "dear friend and master," extending to about sixty pages, to which, assisted by a few side lights, we owe the main details of the biographic sketch which we shall place before the reader. The editor, Dr. John Simon, was born in 1810, took classes in King's College under Dr. Green's professoriate in 1832, and was apprenticed as a surgeon to his professor in 1833, passed in 1841 his LL.B. examinations at London University, in 1844 was elected Fellow of the Royal College of Surgeons, and subsequently became Surgeon to St. Thomas's Hospital, where also he is Lecturer in Pathology, or the doctrine of morbid action. He is besides medical officer of Her Majesty's Privy Council, and author of many important communications on the sanitary condition of England. The book displays appreciation of Green's character, but does not appraise his philosophical position. In this present paper we propose to present our readers-after these explanatory preliminaries with an epitome of the first volume of The Spiritual Philosophy" founded on the teaching of the late Samuel Taylor Coleridge, as interpreted, systematized, and extended, where to him it seemed necessary, by Dr. Joseph H. Green. In our second paper we shall give an outline of the career and labours of the Coleridgean executor, a notice of the main contents of the second volume, and a criticism of the whole matter of Coleridgeanism as expounded by his most eminent disciple. In this way we hope to make both papers interesting and instructive to those who wish to know somewhat of the results of the most popular attempt made in the beginning of this century to construct, out of the chaos of sense and self, a cosmos of wisdom and willinghood; to satisfy the holy hunger of the heart for a systematic knowledge of truth as thought, and to find a means of bringing into one diamond-like essence of light, an entire conglobed unity of unstained radiancy, the truth of being, duty, and deity. But yet one proof more that in this mere mortal state philosophy must ever be, like "Eos and Hesperus-one with twofold light, "A system of philosophy does not deserve its name, unless it virtually include the law and explanation of all being, conscious and unconscious, and of all correlativity and duty, and be applicable, directly or by deduction, to whatsoever the human mind can contemplate-sensuous or supersensuous -of experience, purpose, or imagination. "L. The aim and object of all philosophy is to attain to the insight of first principles or ideas-yea, to the insight of the absolute first principle, from which whatever is must be derived, and in which whatever is must have the intelligible ground of its being. "2. There exists in man, as the essential characteristic of his humanity, a power of faculty of intelligence, best named the reason, which discloses to him the need, and enables him to fulfil the inherent desire of contemplating his manifold knowledges in their absolute integrity. "3. The contemplation of such absolute integrity will have been obtained by the conscious possession and insight of an idea :-that is, of a causative principle, containing, predetermining, and producing its actual results in all their manifold relations in reference to a final purpose; and realized in a whole of parts, in which the idea, as the constitutive energy, is evolved and set forth in its unity, totality, finality, permanent efficiency, and integrity of being. "4. The requisite insight of such causative principles is derived from the idea of the will, as revealed in human self-consciousness. The "5. The distinction, in the will of intelligence and causative power, implies also the distinction of the speculative and practical reason. speculative reason is intelligence, considered abstractedly from the agency of the will. The practical reason, on the other hand, is the in telligence, which, in union with power, is necessary to inform the will and to direct and guide its operance in the light of a definite aim and purpose. In other words, it is the enlightened will; and so reason is the constituent without which will is inconceivable, as the causative of reality in the integrity of being. It might be said that life is the perpetual process of the realization of the will in and by the light of reason, and that reason is the light of life. "6. The reason, considered as pure intelligence, or as the speculative intellect, is the appropriate organ of philosophy. By means of reason, and by it alone, the human mind may become a conscious mirror, in which is imaged an epitome of the universe, physical and moral, as the work of God-yea, in which is revealed the spiritual image of the Divine Author himself. "7. It is necessary to distinguish from the speculative reason that form of intelligence which may most conveniently be designated the understanding. It is the faculty of experience, sensible and psychical. The reason (here the speculative reason) supplies the universal and necessary forms of concipiency, otherwise known as the categories or moulds of the understanding, namely:-1. Cause and effect; 2. Subject and attribute, sometimes called substance and accident; and 3. The whole and ts parts. 8. Truths of reason vindicate their distinctive stamp and character by the fact that they are demonstrable, apoeictic, and self-authoritative, by reason of their evidentness. "Truths of the understanding' must be authenticated by facts of sensible or psychical experience." The universal forms of concipiency, or so-called categories, are the indispensable aids to the acquirement of experience or of scientific knowledge. Whatever requires a satisfactory explanation of its production, its occurrence or recurrence, requires for its explanation the assignment of an antecedent condition, which under the name of 'cause,' is adequate to account for or render intelligible the product, consequent, or effect.' The conception of Power,' as antecedent condition in the order of thought, is derived not from sensible experience, whose limits of cognition it transcends, but from the self-consciousness of will. Without the assignment of a principle, upon whose operance any whole of phenomenal facts, simultaneous or successive, may be shown to depend for their occurrence and recurrence, our knowledge could be neither certain nor predictive. The originant power is what is properly called 'cause; and the predetermined form of its agency is named 'law.' In forming a conception of an object of sensible or psychical experience, a distinction is necessarily made" "between an idem, which constitutes the identity of a thing, amid the changing and exponential alter of its sensible manifestations. The term 'substance' may be used not merely in the sense of an assumed or unknown supporter of phenomena, but may be employed as significant of actual being; as realized in a specific and characteristic form of being, which may be fitly called a type. generalization and classification for scientific purposes implies the recognition of likeness with difference; and the empirical faculty would be powerless without adopting the conception of a permanent type, of the modifications of which experience takes cognizance in the forms of actual existence. The concipiency or category of substance and accident would be justly deemed incomplete without adverting to the sub-categories of quality and quantity. By 'quality' we mean any sort or kind of impression which any object is calculated to produce, or any specific and constant mode of operance by which any object, agent, or agency may, or does, affect a percipient. 'Quantity' has been defined as that attribute of objects, or things, under which they may be conceived as subect to increase or diminution. But we distinguish two kinds of quantity, All We cannot form an in namely, the continuous and the discrete. telligible conception of any whole in the physical or moral world, except as an unity of independent parts. This unity is not a mere sum-total or aggregate of the parts, but includes the superadded insight of the interdependency of the constituents, as reciprocally needing and implying each other, and of their conspiration to the accomplishment of the one constructive aim which the organic whole presents. These mental materials, which are to be wrought into thoughts, may be described as impressions, which adequately excite the conscious attention. They are of two kinds, viz.,-1. Those that affect the inner sense, such as emotions, feelings, volitions, or any psychical change of state: -2. Those which affect the outer sense, and consist in the affections of the several senses. But the sense, both inner and outer, is exercised only under the inherent conditions' which are designated as space and time. space is the form of universal objectivity; time is the form of universal subjectivity. By generalization is meant the mental process of bringing the notices of the sense, or the facts and phenomena by which we have been consciously impressed, severally under their appropriate kinds or 'genera,' each genus being distinguished by a name or descriptive designation. Abstraction designates the process by which, in contemplating any object, our thoughts are directed to some one part or property exclusively, withdrawing our attention from the rest. By noticing the different in the like, and the like in the different, these elementary factors of thought, abstraction and generalization, are the indispensable aids to the naming, sorting, and classing of all the materials of which sensible and conscious experience are composed. a distinction should be made between associative thoughts and logical thoughts or conceptions. An associative thought is one which recalls a resemblance; a logical thought or conception is one which requires a definition, or such a description as would justify generic inclusion. Every generic conception may be designated by an appropriate term, which includes, and is significant of, all the objects to which the term is applicable in its generic sense. It is then an act of judgment, when we affirm or deny that any object or appearance is included in any generic conception or designation. Now the expression of such an act of logical judgment in terms is called a proposition. Not an unimportant question connected with the nature of a judgment, as expressed in a proposition, is that of the nature of the relation between subject and predicate. The word 'is,' which is the copula between subject and predicate, may be used in several senses. Thus it may mean simply 'is like '-e. g., 'a whale is (sc., like) a fish; '-or it may stand for 'is designated by the term,”'the appropriation of what belongs to another man is (sc., designated by the term) theft;" -or it may be equivalent to 'is recognised by the property, -e. g., ' vinegar is (sc., recognised by the property) of acid taste; -or its meaning may be 'is described as,' me. g., a bird is (sc., described as) that which has aptitude for flight; ' -or its power may be ' is defined as,'—e. g., man is (sc., defined as) a rational being; '-or, according to some logicians, it answers to 'agreement;' that is, expresses that the subject agrees with the predicate, or vice versâ, -e. g., 'the temperature of 100° F. is (sc., agrees with the description) hot ;'-or, again, the explanation of the word 'is' may be 'is equivalent or equal to,'-e. g., 'an excuse is (sc., equivalent to) an admission or confession of the fault charged ;-or, lastly, the value of the 2 e. g., |