to claim and exercise right. Administration is mechanical and instrumental, but the motive power of the entire administrative system depends on the amount and energy of the selfhood it receives its impetus from. The Sovereign is the State only when he is the representative of the people's will; the Cabinet is only the Government when it effects the purposes which the people have agreed to and embodied in legislation; and legislation itself is only law when it expresses and contains the will of the people freely, fully, and deliberately formed and registered in the choice of representatives, in the presenting of petitions, and in the acquiescent acceptance of the legislation proposed, as the embodied and fixed decision of the Commons, agreed to by the nobles, and formally ratified by the assent and consent of the supreme representativethe Sovereign.

The Government is administrative and executive, but in administration it is controlled and regulated by the representatives of the people, and in the exercise of its executive functions it is restrained and overmastered by the law. The people govern, the cabinet administers, the sovereign ratifies; and these together form the State. The nobles exercise their presentative rights directly because they are few, and are supposed to have given guarantees to the country of community of feeling with it, and whenever their sympathy dulls or their interests run counter to the general good-or what is deliberately believed to be so-means are always taken to bring into harmony in the long run the opinions of the peers and the people. The people exercise their presentative rights when, by their individual votes, unswayed by any outward force, and undictated to by any person, clique, party, or power whatsoever, in accordance with and in conformity to their own free, deliberate, and unbiassed personal conviction, they make choice of a representative to the Commons House of Parliament. These representatives instruct the cabinet, and advise the sovereign; and in the name, with the authority, and on behalf of the people, they revise, review, amend, control, suggest, or countermand the acts proposed to be done in or by the State-through its officials, subordinate or sovereign.

Man is first of all to himself a self, an individual, a possessor and exerciser of personal life, with all the natural rights which the possession of individual personality implies, and bound to all the duties which it involves. All the duties towards self which the individuality of the individual demands are summed up in self-conservation. As this is an original and inalienable duty which each owes to himself, it both measures and marks out the rights to which he must lay claim, and the duties to which he must yield obedience. He must neither suffer nor agree to anything which would make this conservancy of his own being and well-being impossible; and conversely he must neither ask nor do anything which would impair or lessen the power of self-conservancy in others. The State is a conservator, and as the most precious of all things to man is himself, 80 he requires that the State shall guarantee his personality-in

cluding as far as may be existence, subsistence, and persistence, or progressive continuance; and he guarantees to the State by his person, including his property, in return, a due observance of the being and well-being of others. The State, in this way, acknowledges and recognises the individuality of each as the grand ultimate of conserving care, while the individual acknowledges and recognises the State as his representative guardian and defender; and the protector and upholder of the rights of others, as well as the claimant of the proper performance of duty by each and all.

Each being thus bound to each by a life for life guarantee, the State is ultimately based upon the individuality of its members or shareholders; the body of a nation's laws being the conditions of the covenant, into which he enters by birth, i. e., personal being as a partaker and he becomes a proper claimant of all the rights of life when he becomes properly effective in the discharge of all life's duties. He has only at most a claim upon the State in proportion to his actual performance of (or willingness to perform) the duties of his station. Citizenry, therefore, is an acknowledgment on the part of the State of a person's claim of rights, and on the part of the subject a confession of the claim of the State to dutifulness and obedience. The moment at which the substitutionary citizenship of parentage, and the novitiate of subjection in youth should cease and determine, is clearly a matter of pact or usage, but citizenship is itself a fact, and implies functions.

It requires to be conceded as the basis of individuality in citizenship that (1) each man is the steward of his own being, and either knows or ought to know how best to work out his life to the best ends; and hence it follows that it is each man's right and duty to manage his own concerns in his own way and for his own endseach duty being reciprocally a limit to each right; (2) that in regard to all matters by which he either is or is likely to be affected it is the right and the duty of each to have the opportunity of knowing and understanding all the possible effects which each such matter may have on him; to discuss their incidence, and to determine how far he shall voluntarily agree to be affected by such matters; (3) that he shall be free from any dictation or intimidation whatever, except such as arises from the suasive influences of reasoning, or of the sympathy of those who agree and act with him; (4) that any coercive restraint to which he may be subjected shall be declared openly and administered fairly by those who are placed in similar circumstances as himself, and who, therefore, in case of acting as he did, would undergo a like coercive restraint. The true safeguard and protection of the personality of each person is summarily expressed in the law, "Whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, do ye even so to them." This is the charter of personal independence as well as the law of social duty, and is of very high authority, as well as necessity, in a state of civilization such as that in which we live, wherein personality is so hard to preserve, "and the individual withers, and the world is more and

more." On the right to be an individual depends the farther right of presentation to assert, maintain, or defend his rights, and the duty of presentation to consider, uphold, and administer the rights of others. From the right of presentation there follows the right of representation, which is the accomplishment by proxy of those duties which we owe to society, and the exercise of those rights by deputy which have been guaranteed by the State.

When in any local associated group, or assembly of persons, individuals present themselves to take into consideration any matter that concerns them, to discuss its fitness, or to decide upon its advisability, a vote or voice is granted, in the determination of the question, to all who are present, in conformity with the conditions of the assembly. This is presentative political action. If the decision come to be made by motion, be embodied in petition, or take the form of resolutions affirmed by the meeting, and to be given effect to by a committee or a deputation, we have representative political action; and when the committee, deputation, or other form of representative activity succeeds in so bringing the decision arrived at before the executive or administrative functionaries of the State as to have it consented to and acted upon, we have ministerial political action. The individual concedes his effective influence to his representatives, and these representatives again concede their effective influence to the administration, so that the State is the result of the conceded individuality of the people, and not the source of the people's influence. Representation concentrates, emboldens, conserves, and energizes public opinion : as rillets conjoin to form rivers, and rivers, by their confluent waters, form seas, so do laws result from the decisions of individuals on moral questions, collected into proposals, and urged by representatives till they acquire the sanction of the Legislature, and are placed in the statute-book.

It has been a matter of considerable difficulty among speculative politicians to determine whether representation ought to be a representation of persons, property, position, intelligence, or class, and much may be said on behalf of each. It is, however, all but impossible without cross-division, which philosophy and practical life equally abhor, to fix upon any permanent and general basis except the personal one. It is for the individnal that society exists; abolish human individuality, and the State becomes a tyranny, and Government a despotism; we may have law, but we cannot have legislation; and there may be subjects, but not people. Representation presupposes personal presentativeness, and therefore implies individuality. But each individual, in so far as he possesses property, attains position, acquires intelligence, or becomes aggregated with a class, must-so far as these affect and move, impress or sway the individual-less or more add to his personal feeling and interest the desire and design of preserving and conserving all that has thus become attached to his individuality, and hence will, in the ultimate, see to it that personality shall be represented, as far as

possible, with its adjuncts and its acquisitions, so that a properly regulated personal representation will afford all due facilities for making Parliament a mirror in miniature of the opinions and feelings of the nation.

Hence it is that not only sovereigns and cabinets but people

"Musttake care

To cherish these Assemblies of Estate,

Which in great monarchies true glasses are

To show men's grief, excesses to abate;

Brave moulds for Laws-a medium that in one
Joins, with content a people to the throne."

We are unable within our space to pursue this portion of the subject farther, and we condense the sum of our ideas into the following table, which we recommend the reader to think out and test for himself; self-culture approves of this plan, and the interest of the topic will induce to the adoption of it.

(1) in opinion.

(2) in consideration.
(3) in voting.
(1) in aim.

(2) in choice.

(3) in responsibility.

(1) of purpose.

(2) of party.
(3) of person.

(10) of debate.
(29) of choice.

(3°) of representation.

(19) in proceedings.

(20) at elections.
(3°) in business.

(40) after elections.

(1o) to person.
(20) to property.
(3°) to party.

(i.) in thought.
(ii) in speech.
(iii.) in investigation.
(iv.) in adaptation.
(i.) towards electors.
(ii) towards the State.
(iii) towardsthe Sovereign.
(i.) in Parliament.
(ii.) in study.

(iii.) in communications
to, for, and with his
clients.

Epoch Men.

THOMAS HOBBES, OF MALMESBURY.

(Continued from page 260.)

"Great books are not within everybody's reach ; and it is a good work to give a little to those who have neither time nor means to get more.”S. T. Coleridge.

WE continue our analysis of "The Leviathan." We have now reached "Part II. Of Commonwealth," which begins with chapter xvii. of the ori ginal; and here, there follows, in the briefest form consistent with comprehensibility, an outline of the opinions on this subject of the bearer of, as G. L. Craik thinks, "one of the most distinguished names, both in English literature and in modern metaphysical, ethical, and political philosophy." The work proceeds :

"Of the Causes, Generation, and Definition of a Commonwealth" (17). "The final cause, end, or design of men, who naturally love liberty and dominion over others, in the introduction of that restraint upon themselves, in which we see them live in commonwealths, is the foresight of their own preservation, and of a more contented life thereby." "For the laws of

nature, as justice, equity, modesty, mercy, and in same doing to others as we would be done to of themselves, without the terror of some power to cause them to be observed, are contrary to our natural passions, that carry us to partiality, pride, revenge, and the like. And covenants without the sword are but words, and of no strength to secure a man at all." "The multitude sufficient to confide in for our security is not determined by any certain number, but by comparison with the enemy, we fear." "And be there never so great a multitude; yet if their actions be directed according to their particular judgments and particular appetites, they can expect thereby no defence nor protection, neither against a common enemy nor against the injuries of one another."

I

"Nor is it enough.. that they be governed and directed by one judgment for a limited time." "The only way to erect such a common power. . is to confer all their power and strength upon one man, or upon one assembly of men, that may reduce all their wills, by plurality of voices, unto one will;" "and therein to submit their wills, every one to his will, and their judg ments to his judgment." "As if every man should say to every man, authorize and give up my right of governing myself to this man, or to this assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up thy right to him, and authorize all his actions in like manner. This done, the multitude so united in one person is called a Commonwealth." "And he that carrieth this person is called sovereign, and said to have sovereign power; and every one besides his subject." "Of the Rights of Sovereigns by Institu tion" (18). "A common wealth is said to be instituted when a multitude of