possibility of ascertaining his course. By his intrepidity and coolness, however, he succeeded, in a great measure, in saving the guns and property, and got off all his crew. He was examined before a court of inquiry, at his own request, in relation to this loss, and not merely acquitted of all blame, but highly applauded for his conduct. He also received a very complimentary letter, on the occasion, from the secretary of the navy, Mr. Hamilton. Soon after this event, he returned to Newport, where he married the daughter of doctor Mason. In the beginning of 1812, he was promoted to the rank of master and commander, and ordered to the command of the flotilla of gun-boats stationed at the harbor of New York. After remaining there a year, he grew tired of the irksome and inglorious nature of this service, and solicited to be removed to another of a more active kind. His request was complied with; and, as he had mentioned the lakes, he was ordered to repair to Sacket's Harbor, lake Ontario, with a body of mariners, to reinforce commodore Chauncey. Such was his popularity amongst the sailors under his command, that, as soon as the order was known, almost all of them volunteered to accompany him. The rivers being completely frozen at the time, he was obliged, at the head of a large number of chosen seamen, to perform the journey by land, which he safely accomplished. Not long after his arrival at Sacket's Harbor, commodore Chauncey detached him to take command of the squadron on lake Erie, and superintend the building of additional vessels. He immediately applied himself to increase his armament, and, with extraordinary exertions, two brigs, of twenty guns each, were soon launched at Erie, the American port on the lake. When he found himself in a condition to cope with the British force on the same waters, although the latter were still superior in meu and guns, he sought the contest, and, on the morning of the 10th of September, 1813, he achieved the victory which has given his name a permanent place in the history of his country. The details of this famous action, the manner in which it was brought to a fortunate issue by the intrepidity of the commander, in exposing himself in a small boat, for the purpose of shifting his flag from a vessel no longer tenable to one in which he could continue the fight, and in which he did continue it, until the enemy's pennant was lowered, are particularly described in the article Navy. The merit of Perry is greatly enhanced by the reflection, that, whilst no victory was ever more decidedly the result of the skill and valor of the commander, this was the first action of any kind he had ever seen. The moderation and courtesy which he displayed towards the enemy, after the termination of the contest, were worthy of the gallantry by which it was gained, and caused the British commander, who had lost the battle by no fault of his, to say that "the conduct of Perry towards the captive officers and men, was sufficient of itself to immortalize him." In testimony of his merit, Perry was promoted to the rank of captain, received the thanks of congress and a medal, and the like marks of honor from the senate of Pennsylvania. After the evacuation of Malden by the enemy, Perry acted as a volunteer aid to general Harrison, in his pursuit of the British, and was present at the battle of Moraviantown, October 5. At the time of the invasion of Maryland and Virginia, he commanded a body of seamen and marines on the Potomac. He was afterwards appointed to command the Java frigate, built at Baltimore, and, on the conclusion of peace with England, sailed, in 1815, in the squadron under commodore Decatur, despatched to the Mediterranean to settle affairs between the U. States and Algiers. While in that sea, some difference arose between him and Mr. Heath, commandant of marines on board his ship. This produced a courtmartial, by which both were subjected to a private reprimand from commodore Chauncey; but the affair did not terminate until a hostile meeting had taken place. The duel was fought in New Jersey, opposite to New York, in the summer of 1818. Neither party was injured, Heath having missed his aim, and Perry having fired in the air. In June, 1819, commodore Perry sailed from the Chesapeake in the U. States ship John Adams, for the West Indies and a cruise, with sealed orders, and was subsequently joined by other vessels, the whole under his command. His term of service, however, was near its end. In August, 1820, he was attacked by the yellow fever, and, after a few days' illness, expired on the twenty-third of the same month, just as the vessel in which he was, entered Port Spain, Trinidad. He was buried the next day with due honor; and in his own country every tribute of respect was paid to his memory. Congress made a liberal provision for the maintenance and education of his family. PHILOSOPHY (from pos, friend, and gogía, wisdom). Philosophy owes its name to the modesty of Pythagoras, who refused the title copos (wise), given to his predecessors, Thales, Pherecydes, &c., as too assuming, and contented himself with the simple appellation of piropos (a friend or lover of wisdom). The term was afterwards commonly applied to men eminent for wisdom, as Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and others.-I. Idea and Object of Philosophy. Various as the idea of philosophy may be, since it is the product of independent thinking, which necessarily leads to opposite views and opinions, its subjects are the same in the minds of all reflecting men, and are the most important which can occupy human thoughtGod, the world, man, and their relations in general. Its end is the highest knowledge which can be attained of these subjects. With reference to its subjects, Cicero called it the "science of things human and divine." Many modern philosophers have called it the "science of the fundamental truths of human knowledge," or the "science of the essence of things;" others the "science of ideas," believing that through them we come to the knowledge of the essence of things, and, as all ideas centre in the idea of the absolute, the "science of the absolute" (thus it is called by the school of Schelling). Considered with regard to its end, namely, the attainment of the knowledge of which we have spoken, and the intellectual action by which this end is to be effected, it has been designated as the "science of reason." To philosophize, therefore, means, to reflect intelligently on the most elevated subjects of human knowledge, and to represent clearly and coherently the ideas thus attained. The latter is required to constitute philosophy a science, which necessarily requires system. The middle ages called this science sapientia sæcularis, as contradistinguished to theology, or revelation, that is, the Christian religion, whose origin is referred immediately to God. The various views of the great aim of philosophy-the relation of the infinite to the finite, the absolute to the conditional, of man to nature, &c.-form the ground of the various philosophical systems, whose mutual connexion is shown by the history of philosophy.-II. Division of Philosophy. Philosophy may be divided into pure philosophy, or philosophy strictly so called, which forms general notions, and investigates the laws of the mind, and applied philosophy, which applies the results of the former to the subjects of experience. To the latter belong, for exam ple, psychology (q. v.), pedagogics (see Pedagogue), politics (q. v.). Philosophy, properly so called, was generally divided by the ancients into logic, or dialectics (as the doctrine of the possibility, form and method of philosophy); physics (at a later period metaphysics, q. v.), the science of the ultimate causes of all being; and ethics, the science of the moral nature and destiny of man. In modern times, the division of philosophy into theoretical and practical has been the most general. The theoretical or speculative philosophy was considered to have for its object the investigation of the highest truths respecting God, the world, nature and mind; the practical, their application. But it was soon seen how little the latter idea was adapted to the sciences comprehended under practical philosophy; and this was then defined to be the science of action, or of the moral nature of man in particular. Some, therefore, call theoretical philosophy the explanatory or illustrative philosophy, as it has for its object that which exists without our aid, and is the subject of our knowledge; while they term practical philosophy the imperative, or preceptive, as it gives precepts for the regulation of human action. Esthetics (q. v.), which originated at a later period, has been considered, at times, as belonging to the practical, at times to the theoretical philosophy. Where philosophy confines itself merely to the knowledge of the action of the human mind, theoretical philosophy is the science of the laws of conceiving and knowing (æsthetics, in this case, as being the science of taste, or rather the science of the rules for judging of the beautiful, has been added to it), and practical philosophy the science of the laws of acting, or of lawful acting. But this view very easily sinks into formalism, by letting the objects of knowledge escape out of sight, while we reflect on its laws. At least, it will be acknowledged, that the science of the laws and criteria of knowledge is rather an introduction to theoretical philosophy than theoretical philosophy itself. Those who define the latter in the last-mentioned manner, consider logic and metaphysics as belonging to theoretical philosophy, ethics and natural law to practical. Finally, philosophy may also be divided, with reference to the three highest ideas of man, the ideas of the true, of the good, and of the beautiful,—into theoretical, practical and aesthetical philosophy.-III. History of Philosophy is the relation of the most important attempts to realize the ideas of philosophy, or, accord 1 ing to Tennemann, the pragmatical representation of the gradual developement of philosophy as a science. It is of great value, as one of the most important branches of the history of human civilization, and from the aid which it affords to philosophical genius, because it presents the most important problems of philosophy in their true meaning, extent and connexion, illustrates the various philosophical systems, and affords a survey of the progress and aberrations of the human mind, which teaches the most instructive lessons. The history of philosophy is commonly divided into the ancient, middle and modern. Some divide it into the Greek (including the Greek philosophy in the Roman empire) and the modern European. In this division, the philosophy of the middle ages forms, as is obvious, the transition. The first period begins with the Greek, because, though the disposition to philosophize is confined to no particular nation, but is inherent in all, so that every tribe forms philosophical notions as soon as its religious conceptions pass over into reflection, and its feelings into doubt, yet philosophy was first studied scientifically by the Greeks. The philosophic notions of the inhabitants of the East must be mentioned in such a history, principally as introductory, and with reference to their connexion with the Greek philosophy, in which many Oriental notions were incorporated. Tennemann characterizes the first period (that of the Greek and Roman philosophy) as the period of the free striving of reason for the knowledge of the ultimate causes of nature and liberty. It forms a whole in itself, which, to a certain degree, carries in it the germs of all the subsequent philosophies. The Greek mind elevated itself through poetry to philosophy. The theogonies, cosmogonies and gnomes formed the introduction to philosophy, and connected it with religion. In the first division of this period-the youth of philosophy, in which reflection was not yet systematized nor separated from poetry-inquirers strove to solve the question respecting the origin of nature and the original matter of the world; a. in the Ionian (q. v.) school (beginning with Thales, 610 B. C.), by reflection on nature and the origin of natural things, or the first existence; further, b. by imaginary conceptions, as in the case of Pythagoras (q. v.) and his school (the Italian); c. by the dialectical opposition of reason and experience in the Eleatic The (q. v.) school; and, d. by the union of both in the atomic school. Socrates (about 422 B. C.) opposed the notions of the Sophists, which threatened to destroy moral principle, and turned his inquiries to the moral nature and destiny of man, in which many of his pupils followed him. Philosophy thus received quite a new direction, which was first made manifest in a systematic form by his pupils, particularly Plato and Aristotle. second division of the first period begins, therefore, with Socrates and his pupils: a. Plato (the founder of the academy, q. v.), and, b. Aristotle (the founder of the peripatetic school, q. v.). It is characterized by a systematic striving to embrace all the objects of philosophy. Plato laid the foundation of a systematic philosophy; Aristotle developed the system. The former was distinguished for the warmth and vividness of his conceptions; the latter aimed at cool and patient reflection on the nature of things. By the side of the academic and peripatetic schools, c. the Stoic (q. v.) school, founded by Zeno, and, d. the Epicurean (q. v.), placed themselves in opposition. All these systems were attacked by the sceptic school, founded by Pyrrho. (See Scepti cism.) The other Socratic schools-e. the Cyrenaic, Megarean, Cynian, Elian and Eretrian-followed the practical direction of their master with more or less deviation and peculiarity. "We see here," says Schulze, speaking of this period. "the philosophic spirit, undertaking, with manly circumspection, the solution of philosophical problems and the philosophical investigation of all subjects important for mankind." For this reason the inquiries of this period into the grounds of human knowledge, are of so great importance. In the third division, the philosophic spirit appears, like an enfeebled old man, striving only to unite the conflicting parties (with the Eclectics, q. v.), or, in order to escape from scepticism, flying to mysticism (with the Alexandrians, q. v., and New Platonists, q. vwhose founder was Ammonius Saccas, 193 B. C.). The Romans propagated and fostered only the philosophy which they had received. (For more information respecting this period, see Greek Literature, and the articles on the different philosophers and sects.) 2. The history of the philoso phy of the middle ages, from 800 to 1500, A. D., or of the scholastics (q. v.. shows the struggle of reason for philosoph ical knowledge, under the influence of a principle elevated above it, and given by the Christian revelation, or acting in the service of the church. (See Scholastic Philosophy.) The Arabians, the flourishing period of whose literature falls in the middle ages, only cultivated the Greek philosophy and some detached religious philosophemes. 3. The third period, which begins with the fifteenth century, is characterized, says Tennemann, by a freer, more independent spirit of inquiry, penetrating deeper and deeper into ultimate causes, and striving for a systematic union of knowledge. First, the scholastic philosophy was attacked by those who called to mind the ancient Greek philosophy in its original purity. After this struggle, new views were presented. Some built upon experience, as Bacon and Locke. Opposed to them, Descartes, with whom some begin modern philosophy, strove to establish it upon its own ground, by dialectic reasoning; passing over from doubt to dogmatism, and taking the consciousness of thought and existence (cogito, ergo sum) as the foundation of his philosophy, whence modern philosophy first received its direction towards idealism. Spinoza and Leibnitz pursued the trodden path of reflection; the latter in the way of idealism, the former in that of realism. We intend now to give a brief sketch of the philosophy of England, Germany and France. The celebrity of the German philosophy would seem to entitle it to an extended notice. But to give a satisfactory account of it would far exceed the limits of this work. The very explanation of the terminology of the German philosophers, which would be necessary to qualify an English reader to understand their systems, would occupy much more space than we can give to the whole of this article, so that we can barely touch upon some of the most prominent points of the subject. English Philosophy. Modern philosophy in England must be dated from Bacon. In his Novum Organum (1620), he takes a path directly opposite to that universally followed in his time, and, instead of appealing by dialectics to the notions of the understanding, he attempts to restore knowledge by the aid of observation, through induction. He was not the founder of a sect; he did not deliver opinions; he taught modes of philosophizing; he did not attempt to discover new principles, but to render observation and experience the predominant character of philosophy. His services consist in his dethroning scholastic philosophy, directing the attention to nature and observation, and reject ing final causes from physical inquiries; yet he made some detached psychological remarks of great value. Bacon is the father of experimental or empirical philosophy. Hobbes, the friend of Bacon, a bold and profound thinker, was the founder of modern sensualism. Philosophy, according to him, is such a knowledge of effects or appearances as we acquire by true reasoning from the knowledge we have of their causes or generation, or such causes and generations as may be, from knowing first their effects. The object of philosophy is any body of which we can conceive any generation, or which is susceptible of composition or decomposition. It is therefore either natural or civil. All knowledge is derived from the sense by motion; thoughts are representations of the qualities of bodies without us; the cause of sense is the pressure of the external object on the organ of sense; what we call sensible qualities are nothing but motion, and can produce nothing but motion in us; imagination is nothing but decaying sense, and understanding is imagination raised by words or other voluntary signs. Besides sense and thought, and train of thoughts, the mind has no other motion. Whatever we imagine is finite; therefore there is no idea of any thing infinite. Reasoning is nothing but reckoning, that is, adding or subtracting. The passions are internal voluntary motions; when appetites and aversions, hopes and fears, arise alternately about the same thing, the whole sum of these motions is deliberation, and the last appetite or aversion in deliberation, is will, not the faculty, but the act of willing. (See Hobbes's Human Nature, 1650, and Leviathan, 1651.) From these principles Hobbes having concluded that right and wrong were unreal, because they are not perceived by the senses, Cudworth (Intellectual System of the Universe, 1678) endeavors to refute the doctrines of the sensual theory. He maintains that there are many objects of the mind which are not derived from the sense, and could be formed only by a faculty superior to sense; these are not fantastical (conceivable by the imagination), but only noëmatical. Cudworth was, in most points, a follower of Plato; his plastic nature, a vital and spiritual but unintelligent and necessary agent, created by the Deity for the execution of his purposes, is Plato's soul of the world; and he maintains the Platonic doctrine of innate ideas. Locke introduced into the study of the human mind the method of investigation, which had been pointed out by Bacon, and gave the first example of an ample enumeration of facts, collected and arranged for the purpose of legitimate generalization. Without meddling with physiological hypotheses or transcendental metaphysics, he seeks, "in a plain, historical method, to give an account of the ways in which the understanding attains the notions it has, for which," says he, "I shall appeal to every one's own experience and observation." This cautious empiricism has been little observed by those who have called themselves his disciples in England and France, and who, neglecting his method, have seized upon some unguarded expressions to build up systems of idealism (Berkeley), scepticism (Hume), or sensualism and materialism (the French philosophers and the Hartleian school). The true spirit of the Lockian philosophy was first revived in the Scotch school (Reid and Stewart). Rejecting innate ideas, Locke teaches that sensation and reflection are the only sources of knowledge, external objects furnishing the mind with the ideas of sensible qualities, and the mind furnishing the understanding with ideas of its own operations. Seosation convinces us of the existence of solid extended substance, and reflection of the existence of thinking ones, of the cause and nature of which two kinds of being we can know nothing. Perception is a communication between the mind and external objects carried on by means of images present to the mind; these he calls ideas, which he defines to be the immediate objects about which the mind is employed in thinking. Having treated at length of the origin, nature and qualities of ideas, he proceeds to consider the instrument by which men communicate their ideas to each other; and his remarks on this subject (Book iii, of Language) form the most valuable dogmatic part of his work. Knowledge is the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas, which consists in identity or diversity, relation, coëxistence, and real existence. Of the existence of ourselves and of God we have intuitive knowledge, which is the immediate perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas: demonstrative knowledge is the discovery of it by the intermediation of other ideas: and these two sorts of knowledge yield complete certainty. Sensitive knowledge leads to the belief of the existence of other beings, and carries with it a reasonable confidence. Judgment is a supposition or opinion of the agreement or disagreement of ideas, and supplies the want of knowledge. Its conclusions are only probable. The ethical consequences which had been deduced from the sensualist school of Hobbes, and from a partial view of the doctrines of Locke, led Berkeley, who was not less remarkable for the virtues of his character than for the acuteness of his philosophy, to the adoption of idealism (Theory of Vision, 1709; Principles of Human Knowledge, 1710; Alciphron, or the Minute Philosopher, 1732). His Theory of Vision,which is the most valuable part of his labors, and which is an important addition to the knowledge of mind, was the first exposition of the difference between the original and acquired perceptions of the eye, and now forms an essential part of the science of optics. His scheme of idealism was founded on the Lockian doctrine of ideas. Proceeding from the principle, that we are percipient of nothing but our own perceptions and ideas, and that all the objects of human knowledge are ideas of sensation or reflection existing in the mind itself, he comes to the conclusion that the existence of bodies out of a mind perceiving them, is not only impossible, and a contradiction in terms; but, were it possible, and even real, it were impossible we should ever know it. By thus "expelling matter out of nature," he thought we should get rid of the chief cause of all error in philosophy, and all infidelity in religion. Granting the premises of Berkeley, which were the commonly received philosophical views, at least in England, his conclusions could not be refuted; but it was reserved for Hume to trace out, by a vigorous and unshrinking logic, the legitimate consequences of the Cartesian and Lockian philosophy to their ultimate results, and thus, though unintentionally, by a sort of reductio ad absurdum, to produce the great metaphysical revolution, of which Reid and Kant were the first movers. This he did with such power of logic, acuteness and cogency of reasoning, boldness, precision, clearness, and elegance, that scepticism never appeared more formidable or more seducing than in his writings (Treatise of Human Nature, 1738, cast anew in the Inquiry concerning Human Understanding, 1748). After showing that all attempted demonstrations of the necessity of a cause to every new existence are fallacious and sophistical, Hume endeavors to prove that the proposition, whatever has a beginning has a cause, is not intuitively certain, but is derived only from custom and belief, and is rather an act of the sensitive than of the cogitative part of our nature. In this argument, he pro |