pursuit, since by exciting distrust, it counteracts the very purpose of it; that a system of rules imperfectly comprehended, or not familiarized by practice, will (while that continues to be the case) prove rather an impediment than a help; as indeed will be found in all other arts likewise; and that no system can be expected to equalize men whose natural powers are different. But none of these concessions at all invalidate the positions of Aristotle; that some succeed better than others in explaining their opinions, and bringing over others to them; and that, not merely by superiority of natural gifts, but by acquired habit; and that consequently if we can discover the causes of this superior success, the means by which the desired end is attained by all who do attain it, — we shall be in possession of rules capable of general application; which is, says he, the proper office of an Art.* Experience so plainly evinces, what indeed we might naturally be led antecedently to conjecture, that a right judgment on any subject is not necessarily accompanied by skill in effecting conviction, nor the ability to discover truth, by a facility in explaining it, that it might be matter of wonder how any doubt should ever have existed as to the possibility of devising, and the utility of employing, a System of Rules for "Argumentative Composition" generally; distinct from any system conversant about the subject matter of each composition. I have remarked in the Lectures on Political Economy (Lect. 9), that "some persons complain, not altogether without reason, of the pre- for logical inacvailing ignorance of facts, relative to this and to many other subjects; and yet it will often Knowledge of facts no remedy curacy. be found that the parties censured, though possessed of less "Οπερ ἐστί τεχνῆς ἔργον. — Rhet. Book I. Ch. I. knowledge than they ought to have, yet possess more than they know what to do with. Their deficiency in arranging and applying their knowledge, in combining facts, and correctly deducing and employing general principles, shall be greater than their ignorance of facts. Now to attempt remedying this fault by imparting to them additional knowledge, to confer the advantage of wider experience on those who have not the power of profiting by experience, is to attempt enlarging the prospect of a short-sighted man by bringing him to the top of a hill. "In the tale of Sandford and Merton, where the two boys are described as amusing themselves with building a hovel with their own hands, they lay poles horizontally on the top, and cover them with straw, so as to make a flat roof: of course the rain comes through; and Master Merton then advises to lay on more straw: but Sandford, the more intelligent boy, remarks that as long as the roof is flat, the rain must, sooner or later, soak through; and that the remedy is to make a new arrangement, and form the roof sloping. Now the idea of enlightening incorrect reasoners by additional knowledge, is an error similar to that of the flat roof; it is merely laying on more straw: they ought first to be taught the right way of raising the roof. Of course knowledge is necessary; so is straw to thatch the roof; but no quantity of materials will supply the want of knowing how to build. "I believe it to be a prevailing fault of the present day, not indeed to seek too much for knowledge, but to trust to accumulation of facts as a substitute for accuracy in the logical processes. Had Bacon lived in the present day, I am inclined to think he would have made his chief complaint against unmethodized inquiry and illogical reasoning. Certainly he would not have complained of Dialectics as corrupting Philos. ophy. To guard now against the evils prevalent in his time, would be to fortify a town against battering-rams, instead of against cannon. But it is remarkable that even that abuse of Dialectics which he complains of, was rather an error connected with the reasoning process than one arising from a want of knowledge. Men were led to false conclusions, not through mere ignorance, but from hastily assuming the correctness of the data they reasoned from, without sufficient grounds. And it is remarkable that the revolution brought about in philosophy by Bacon, was not the effect, but the cause, of increased knowledge of physical facts: it was not that men were taught to think correctly by having new phenomena brought to light; but on the contrary, they discovered new phenomena in consequence of a new system of philosophizing." It is probable that the existing prejudices on the present subject may be traced in great measure to the imperfect or incorrect notions of some writers, who have either confined their attention to trifling minutiae of style, or at least have in some respect failed to take a sufficiently comprehensive view of the principles of the Art. One distinction especially is to be clearly laid down and carefully borne in mind by those who would form a correct idea of those principles; viz. the distinction already noticed in the " Elements of Logic," between an Art, and the Art. "An Art of Reasoning" would imply, "a Method or System of Rules by the observance of which one may reason correctly;" "the Art of Reasoning" would imply a System of Rules to which every one does conform (whether knowingly, or not,) who reasons correctly and such is Logic, considered as an Art. In like manner" an Art of Composition " would imply "a System of Rules by which a good Composition may be pro A rightly formed system does not cramp the natural powers. duced;""the Art of Composition,"-" such rules as every good Composition must conform to," whether the author of it had them in his mind or not. Of the former character appear to have been (among others) many of the Logical and Rhetorical Systems of Aristotle's predecessors in those departments. He himself evidently takes the other and more philosophical view of both branches: as appears (in the case of Rhetoric) both from the plan he sets out with, that of investigating the causes of the success of all who do succeed in effecting conviction, and from several passages occurring in various parts of his treatise; which indicate how sedulously he was on his guard to conform to that plan. Those who have not attended to the important distinction just alluded to, are often disposed to feel wonder, if not weariness, at his reiterated remarks, that "all men effect persuasion either in this way or in that;""it is impossible to attain such and such an object in any other way," &c. ; which doubtless were intended to remind his readers of the nature of his design; viz. not to teach an Art of Rhetoric, but the Art; not to instruct them merely how conviction might be produced, but how it must.* If this distinction were carefully kept in view by the teacher and by the learner of Rhetoric, we should no longer hear complaints of the natural powers being fettered by the formalities of a System; since no such complaint can lie against a System whose rules are drawn from the invariable. practice of all who succeed in attaining their proposed object. No one would expect that the study of Sir Joshua Reynolds's lectures would cramp the genius of the painter. No See Appendix, Note [AA.] Popular objec tions. one complains of the rules of Grammar as fettering Language; because it is understood that correct use is not founded on Grammar, but Grammar on correct use. A just system of Logic or of Rhetoric is analogous, in this respect, to Grammar. One may still however sometimes hearthough less, now, than a few years back — the hackneyed objections against Logic and Rhetoric, and even Grammar also. Cicero has been gravely cited (as Aristotle might have been also, in the passage just above alluded to, in his very treatise on Rhetoric) to testify that rhetorical rules are derived from the practice of Oratory, and not vice versa; and that consequently there must have been as there still is such a thing as a speaker ignorant of those rules. A drayman, we are told, will taunt a comrade by saying, "you're a pretty fellow," without having learned that he is employing the figure called Irony; and may employ "will" and "shall" correctly, without being able to explain the principle that guides him. And it might have been added, that perhaps he will go home whistling a tune, though he does not know the name of a Note; that he will stir his fire, without knowing that he is employing the first kind of Lever; * and that he will set his kettle on it to boil, though * It is a curious circumstance, that no longer ago than the early part of the last century, Mathematical Studies were a common topic of contemptuous ridicule among those ignorant of the subject; just as is the case, to a certain extent, even now, with Logic (including great part of the matter treated of in this volume), with Political Economy, and some others. Pope speaks of what he calls "mad Mathesis," as "running round the circle" and "finding it square!" One may. find also among the fugitive poetry of his times, descriptions of a Mathematician as something between fool and madman. And Swift's Voyage to Laputa evinces his utter contempt for such studies, and |