is to be observed that some passions may be, rhetorically speaking, opposite to each other, though in strictness they are not so; viz. whenever they are incompatible with each other. E. G. The opposite, strictly speaking, to Anger, would be a feeling of Good-will and approbation towards the person in question; but it is not by the excitement of this, alone, that Anger may be allayed; for Fear is, practically, contrary to it also; as is remarked by Aristotle, who philosophically accounts for this, on the principle that Anger, implying a desire to inflict punishment, must imply also a supposition that it is possible to do so; and accordingly men do not, he says, feel Anger towards one who is so much superior as to be manifestly out of their reach; and the object of their Anger ceases to be so, as soon as he becomes an object of Apprehension. Of course the converse also of this holds good; Anger, when it prevails, in like manner subduing Fear. Savage nations, accordingly, having no military discipline, are accustomed to work themselves up into a frenzy of rage by their war-songs and dances, in order to excite themselves to courage.* .* Compassion, likewise, may be counteracted either by Disapprobation, by Jealousy, by Fear, by Ridicule, or by Disgust and Horror; and Envy, either by Good-will, or by Contempt.

This is the more necessary to be attended to, in order that the Orator may be on his guard against inadvertently defeating his own object, by exciting feelings at variance with those he is endeavoring to produce, though not strictly contrary to them. Aristotle accordingly notices, with this view, the dif ference between the "Pitiable," (hɛɛròv,) and the "Horrible or Shocking," (detrov,) which, as he observes, excite different

See Arist."Rhet." B. II. in his Treatises on 'Ogy and Doßos; and "Ethics," B. III. on Ovuós.

feelings, destructive of each other; so that the Orator must be warned, if the former is his object, to keep clear of any thing that may excite the latter.

Ridicule.

The remark, cited by Aristotle, of the Rhetorician Gorgias, that the serious arguments of an opponent are to be met by ridicule, and his ridicule, by serious argument, (which is evidently one that might be extended, in principle, to other feelings besides the sense of the ludicrous,) is, of course, only occasionally applicable in practice; and considerable tact is requisite for perceiving suitable occasions, and employing them judiciously. For, a failure does great injury to him who makes the attempt. If you very gravely deprecate some ridicule that has been thrown out, without succeeding in destroying its force, you increase its force; because a contrast between the solemn and the ludicrous heightens the effect of the latter. And if, again, you attempt unsuccessfully to make a jest of what the persons addressed regard as strong arguments, and serious subjects, you raise indignation or contempt; and are also considered as having, confessedly, no serious and valid objections to offer..

Of course, regard must be had to the character of those you are addressing. If these are ignorant of the subject, superficial, and unthinking, they will readily join in ridicule of such reasoning as the better-informed and more judicious would despise them for not appreciating. And again, they may easily be brought (as has been remarked above, Part I. Chap. III. 7.) to regard a valid argument which exposes to ridicule some sophistry, as nothing more than a joke.*

*It is almost superfluous to remark, that there is a dignified and an undignified way of employing either irony or any kind of ridicule.

But when you wish to expose to ridicule something really deserving of it which has been advanced seriously, or to rescue from ridicule what has been unfairly made a jest of, it will usually be advisable to keep a little aloof, for a time, from the very point in question, till you have brought men's minds, by the introduction of suitable topics, into the mood required, the derisive, or the serious, as the case may be,and then to bring them up to that point, prepared to view it quite differently from what they had done. And if this be skilfully managed, the effect will sometimes be very striking.

Such a procedure, it should be added, is sometimes (as I have above remarked, Part I. Chap. III. § 7,) adopted unfairly; that is, men who are mortified at finding the absurdity of their conduct, their tenets, or their arguments exposed to contemptuous ridicule, will often persuade others, and even themselves, that this mortification is a feeling of pious indig nation in behalf of a serious or sacred subject, against which they falsely represent the ridicule as having been directed.

The sort of character which Aristotle calls "Bomolochus,” - answering apparently to what we call in colloquial language a “wag,” or a "jack-pudding," - one who lays himself out to divert the hearers or readers at any cost; or any one, again, who displays a flippant and trifling levity of character that seems incapable of viewing any thing seriously, or such a tone of heartless and unfeeling mockery as denotes an incapacity for any tender or kindly sentiment, -any such person, though he may manifest such ability as to make one dread him for an opponent, is likely to be still more dangerous to the cause he espouses.

And it is a common practice of skilful sophists to confound with such a character as one of these last, any one, however opposite to it, who may have successfully derided some absurdity they may have been maintaining; and thus to hold him up to detestation and

scorn.

Great caution therefore is requisite—as was formerly remarked — in employing such a weapon as Ridicule.

It will often happen that it will be easier to give a new direction to the unfavorable passion, than to subdue it; e. g. to turn the indignation, or the laughter, of the hearers against a different object. Indeed, whenever the case will admit of this, it will generally prove the more successful expedient; because it does not imply the accomplishment of so great a change in the minds of the hearers. See above, Chap. II. § 6.

Lecture on the Intellectual and Moral Influences of the Professions. Delivered before the Society of the Dublin Law Institute, on the 31st of January, 1842. [See Note, page 241.]

SOME ancient writer relates of the celebrated Hannibal, that during his stay at some regal court, the evening entertainment on one occasion consisted of a discourse, (what we in these days should call a "lecture,") which an aged Greek Philosopher, named Phormio, if I remember rightly, had the honor of being permitted to deliver before the king and courtiers. It was on the qualifications and duties of a General. The various high endowments- the several branches of knowledge, and the multifarious cares and labors appertaining to an accomplished military leader, were set forth, as most of the hearers thought, with so much ability and elegance, that the discourse was received with general applause. But, as was

natural, eager inquiries were made what was thought of it by so eminent a master in the art military, as Hannibal. On his opinion being asked, he replied with soldierlike bluntness, that he had often heard old men talk dotage, but that a greater dotard than Phormio he had never met with.

He would not however have been reckoned a dotard — at least he would not have deserved it, (as he did,)—if he had had the sense, instead of giving instructions in the military art to one who knew so much more of it than himself, to have addressed an audience of military men, not as soldiers, but as human beings; and had set before them correctly and clearly, the effects, intellectual and moral, likely to be produced on them, as men, by the study and the exercise of their profession. For that is a point on which men of each profession respectively are so far from being necessarily the best judges, that, other things being equal, they are likely to be rather less competent judges than those in a different walk of life.

That each branch of study, and each kind of business, has a tendency to influence the character, and that any such tendency, if operating in excess, exclusively, and unmodified by other causes, is likely to produce a corresponding mental disease or defect, is what no one I suppose would deny. It would be reasonable as an antecedent conjecture; and the confirmation of it by experience is a matter of common remark. I have heard of a celebrated surgeon, whose attention had been chiefly directed to cases of deformity, who remarked that he scarcely ever met an artisan in the street but he was able to assure himself at the first glance what his trade was. He could perceive in persons not actually deformed, that particular gait or attitude that particular kind of departure from exact symmetry of form that disproportionate development