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When we refer to the concurring sentiments of men as the ultimate taste of what is to be accounted beautiful in the arts, this is to be always understood of men placed in such situations as are favourable to the proper exertions of taste. Every one must perceive, that among rude and uncivilized nations, and during the ages of ignorance and darkness, any loose notions that are entertained concerning such subjects, carry no authority. In those states of society, taste has no materials on which to operate. It is either totally suppressed, or appears in its lower and most imperfect form. We refer to the sentiments of mankind in polished and flourishing nations; when arts are cultivated and manners refined; when works of genius are subjected to free discussion, and taste is improved by science and philosophy.

Even among nations, at such a period of society, I admit that accidental causes may occasionally warp the proper operations of taste; sometimes the taste of religion, sometimes the form of government, may for a while pervert; a licentious court may introduce a taste for false ornaments, and dissolute writings. The usage of one admired genius may procure approbation for his faults, and even render them fashionable. Sometimes envy may have power to bear down, for a little, productions of great merit; while popular humour, or party spirit, may, at other times, exalt to a high, though short-lived reputation, what little deserved it. But though such casual circumstances give the appearance of caprice to the judgments of taste, that appearance is easily corrected. In the course of time, the genuine taste of human nature never fails to disclose itself, and to gain the ascendant over any fantastic and corrupted modes of taste which may chance to have been introduced. These may have currency for a while, and mislead superficial judges; but being subjected to examination, by degrees they pass away; while that alone remains which is founded on sound reason, and the native feelings of men.

I by no means pretend, that there is any standard of taste, to which, in every particular instance, we can resort for clear and immediate determination. Where, indeed, is such a standard to be found for

who found it upon established principles which can be ascertained by reason, is more an apparent than a real difference. Like many other literary controversies, it turns chiefly on modes of expression. For they who lay the greatest stress on sentiment and feeling, make no scruple of applying argument and reason to matters of taste. They appeal, like other writers, to established principles, in judging of the excellencies of eloquence or poetry; and plainly show, that the general approbation to which they ultimately recur, is an approbation resulting from discussion as well as from sentiment. They, on the other hand, who, in order to vindicate taste from any suspicion of being arbitrary, maintain that it is ascertainable by the standard of reason, admit, nevertheless, that what pleases universally, must, on that account, be held to be truly beautiful; and that no rules or conclusions concerning objects of taste, can have any just authority, if they be found to contradict the general sentiments of men. These two systems, therefore, differ in reality very little from one another. Sentiment and reason enter into both; and by allowing to each of these powers its due place, both systems may be rendered consistent. Accordingly, it is in this light that I have endeavoured to place the subject.

deciding any of those great controversies in reason and philosophy, which perpetually divide mankind? In the present case, there was plainly no occasion for any such strict and absolute provision to be made. In order to judge of what is morally good or evil, of what man ought, or ought not in duty to do, it was fit that the means of clear and precise determination should be afforded us. But to ascertain in every case with the utmost exactness what is beautiful or elegant, was not at all necessary to the happiness of man. And therefore some diversity in feeling was here allowed to take place; and room was left for discussion and debate, concerning the degree of approbation to which any work of genius is entitled.

The conclusion, which it is sufficient for us to rest upon, is, that taste is far from being an arbitrary principle, which is subject to the fancy of every individual, and which admits of no criterion for determining whether it be false or true. Its foundation is the same in all human minds. It is built upon sentiments and perceptions which belong to our nature; and which, in general, operate with the same uniformity as our other intellectual principles. When these senti ments are perverted by ignorance and prejudice, they are capable of being rectified by reason. Their sound and natural state is ultimately determined, by comparing them with the general taste of mankind. Let men declaim as much as they please concerning the caprice and the uncertainty of taste, it is found, by experience, that there are beauties, which, if they be displayed in a proper light, have power to command lasting and general admiration. In every composition, what interests the imagination, and touches the heart, pleases all ages and all nations. There is a certain string to which, when properly struck, the human heart is so made as to answer.

Hence the universal testimony which the most improved nations of the earth have conspired, throughout a long tract of ages, to give to some few works of genius; such as the Iliad of Homer, and the Eneid of Virgil. Hence the authority which such works have acquired, as standards in some degree of poetical composition; since from them we are enabled to collect what the sense of mankind is, concerning those beauties which give them the highest pleasure, and which therefore poetry ought to exhibit. Authority or prejudice may, in one age or country, give a temporary reputation to an indifferent poet or a bad artist; but when foreigners, or when posterity examine his works, his faults are discerned, and the genuine taste of human nature appears. "Opinionum commenta delet dies; "naturæ judicia confirmat." Time overthrows the illusions of opinion, but establishes the decisions of nature.

QUESTIONS.

WHY does the nature of the present and an improved understanding? How undertaking lead our author to begin is this illustrated from the reading of with some inquiries concerning taste? the Eneid of Virgil? In proportion to Of it what is observed? In what order what will our pleasure be increased? does our author propose to treat it? Through what are we pleased; and How may it be defined? What is the what does reason show us? Where first question that occurs concerning it? must the understanding always have Of reason, what is observed? From a greater part to act? For what is there what does it appear evident that taste here a wide field; in what particular; is not resolvable into any operation of and hence what arises? Of spurious reason; and why? How is this farther beauties, &c. what is observed? How illustrated, and what follows? Why may the illusion be dissipated? From must it not be inferred, from what has what does taste receive its improvebeen said, that reason is entirely ex- ment? Of what is it the result in its cluded from the exertions of taste? perfect state; and what does it supThough taste is ultimately founded on pose? What remark is added? Of a certain natural sensibility to beauty, moral beauties what is observed? How yet what follows? How does it appear is this illustrated? Persons of what dethat taste, in the sense in which it has scription must, necessarily, have a very been explained, is a faculty common to imperfect relish of the highest beauties all men? How is this remark illustra- of eloquence and poetry? To what are ted? What must we therefore con- the characters of taste, in its most perclude; and why? Though none are fect state, reducible? What does delientirely devoid of this faculty, yet how cacy of taste respect; and what does it does it appear that the degrees in which imply? How is this illustrated? Where it is possessed are widely different? What may we in general observe? How does it appear that the constitution of our nature, in this respect, discovers admirable wisdom? To what is this inequality of taste among men, to be, in part, attributed? To what is it more particularly owing? To what does the illustration of this lead? Of this remark, what is observed? How may we be convinced of the truth of this assertion? Of this difference, what is observed? What is one of the first laws of our nature? How is this illustrated? What, therefore, cannot be doubted? In what have we a clear proof of this remark; and how is this illustrated? Of the beauty of composi- Having viewed taste in its most im tion and discourse, what is observed? proved state, what does our author How does it appear, that when a per- next consider? Why does this bring us son commences an acquaintance with to the most difficult part of our task? works of genius, the sentiment which of what have the greatness and freattends them is obscure and confused? quency of its variations created suspiWhat will be the effect of greater ex-cions? How is this illustrated from the perience in works of this kind? How is architecture, eloquence, and poetry of this further illustrated? As taste is the ancients; and the taste for poetry ultimately founded on sensibility, why among the moderns? What interrogamay we not consider its foundation in tions follow? If there is no standard of instinctive sensibility alone? How may taste, what consequence follows? Of we be satisfied that a good taste con- this position what is remarked? How sists in natural sensibility to beauty, is this illustrated? As it would be con

does taste in this state exist? Of a person of delicate taste, what is observed? How is it illustrated, that delicacy of taste is judged of by the same marks by which we judge of the delicacy of an external sense? What does correctness of taste principally respect? What is remarked of a man of correct taste? How does it appear that delicacy and correctness mutually imply each other? In what is the power of delicacy chiefly seen; and of correctness? To what do they respectively lean? Of what is the former the gift; and how is the latter produced? What examples of illustration are given from the ancients; and from the moderns?

sidered extravagant to talk in this acquire authority in matters of taste manner, to what conclusion are we formed? Why is it necessary that the unavoidably led? To prevent mistakes, person to whom we refer as a standard, what observation is it necessary, in the should live under circumstances fanext place, to make? How does it ap-vourable to the exertions of taste? To pear that the tastes of men may differ the inhabitants of what nations do we, very considerably in their object, and therefore, refer? Among nations at such still none of them be wrong? Though a period of society, in what different all differ, yet upon what do all pitch? ways may the proper operations of How is this illustrated? To explain this taste be warped? What appearance matter thoroughly, what observation is do such casual circumstances give to necessary? When does this disagree- the judgments of taste? How is that ment among men cease to be diversity appearance easily corrected? Of the of taste; and what follows? How is currency which these may have for a this remark illustrated from the pre- while, what is remarked? To what ference given by some men to Homer, does our author not pretend; and what and by others to Virgil? How long illustrative remarks follow? What conmay our diversity be considered natu- clusion is given, upon which it is sufral and allowable? What assertions ficient for us to rest? Of its foundation would induce us to consider a man's what is remarked; and upon what is taste corrupted in a miserable degree; it built? When these sentiments are and to what do we appeal? What do perverted by ignorance and prejudice, we, on any subject, consider a standard? how may they be rectified? How is What illustrations are given? How far their sound and natural state ultimatemay nature be regarded as a standard? ly determined? Though men declaim In what cases does nature afford a full concerning the caprice of taste, yet and distinct criterion of what is truly what is found by experience to be true? beautiful? Of reason, in such cases, How is this illustrated; and hence what is said? Why are we sometimes what follows? For an indifferent poet, under the necessity of searching for or a bad artist, what may authority or something that can be rendered more prejudice do? But when will his faults clear and precise than nature, as a be discerned, and the genuine taste of standard of taste? On what is taste mankind appear? ultimately founded? A person of what description might be considered a standard of taste? But as there is no such living standard, what follows; and hence what is the ultimate standard? 1. Introductory remarks. How is this illustrated? How would 2. The definition of Taste. the taste of such a person be regarded; 3. The nature of Taste. why; and what follows? What interrogations follow; and to them what reply is given; and why? Of the admirer or censurer of any work of genius, what remark follows? Though reason can carry us a certain length in judging concerning works of taste, yet what must not be forgotten? Concern- 4. ing what may we speculate and argue? On this subject, what will just reasoning correct? At the same time, to what 5. do these reasonings always appeal? On what foundation do they rest? Upon this ground, what receives our preference? How are principles which

6.

ANALYSIS.

A. Instinct and Reason.

B. Its universality.

c. Its degrees.

D. Sources of its improvement. a. Exercise.

b. Reason and good sense.
c. Morals.

The characters of Taste.
A. Delicacy.

B. Correctness.

The variations of Taste.
The standard of Taste.

A. Arguments for, and against a
standard.

B. The conclusion.

LECTURE III.

CRITICISM....GENIUS....PLEASURES OF TASTE....
SUBLIMITY IN OBJECTS.

TASTE, criticism, and genius, are words currently employed, without distinct ideas annexed to them. In beginning a course of lectures where such words must often occur, it is necessary to ascertain their meaning with some precision. Having in the last lecture treated of taste, I proceed to explain the nature and foundation of criticism. True criticism is the application of taste and of good sense to the several fine arts. The object which it proposes is, to distin guish what is beautiful and what is faulty in every performance; from particular instances to ascend to general principles; and so to form rules or conclusions concerning the several kinds of beauty in works of genius.

The rules of criticism are not formed by any induction à priori, as it is called; that is, they are not formed by a train of abstract reasoning, independent of facts and observations. Criticism is an art founded wholly on experience; on the observations of such beauties as have come nearest to the standard which I before established; that is, of such beauties as have been found to please mankind most generally. For example: Aristotle's rules concerning the unity of action in dramatic and epic composition, were not rules first discovered by logical reasoning, and then applied to poetry; but they were drawn from the practice of Homer and Sophocles: they were founded upon observing the superior pleasure which we receive from the relation of an action which is one and entire, beyond what we receive from the relation of scattered and unconnected facts. Such observations taking their rise at first from feeling and experience, were found on examination to be so consonant to reason and to the principles of human nature, as to pass into established rules, and to be conveniently applied for judging of the excellency of any performance This is the most natural account of the origin of criticism.

A masterly genius, it is true, will of himself, untaught, compose in such a manner as shall be agreeable to the most material rules of criticism for as these rules are founded in nature, nature will often suggest them in practice. Homer, it is more than probable, was acquainted with no systems of the art of poetry. Guided by genius alone, he composed in verse a regular story, which all posterity has admired. But this is no argument against the usefulness of criticism For as no human genius is perfect, there is no writer but may receive assistance from critical observations upon the beauties and faults of those who have gone before him. No observations or rules can indeed supply the defect of genius, or inspire it where it

as an art.

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