between reason and the doctrine of Jesus are only ap parent upon an imperfect view and consideration. rang

He is particularly sceptical about the credibility of that historical evidence on which the Gospel (as generally received) rests; and, therefore, we shall take up that matter specially. Some other things we advert to, as more general grounds of scepticism, and as entertained by other persons besides Christian Rationalists, for Mr Taylor appears to wish to hold himself a Christian. The great leader among the unqualified sceptics or unbelievers is Hume, and his views, as discussed by Campbell, require an early and sort of preliminary attention, under the head of evidence.

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What sort of evidence should be offered and accepted in proof that miracles have been wrought in support of, or as an intrinsic part of, a divine revelation, and of supernatural interference of the Deity in behalf of man's salvation. Toni woda 1

I have thought proper to say this much in reference to the bearing of my argument upon Mr Taylor's publi cation. It is not a complete review of his argument, but only an exposure of some particular sophisms. There is one general remark on the spirit of his book that I would notice here however.

Mr Taylor (Religious Union with Intellectual Free dom) constantly talks of the historical evidence of the gospels presented by such authorities as Lardner, with a kind of sneering contempt; but, in point of fact, there is no historical evidence more respectably supported in the world. It is no good argument, that to appreciate such evidence there is required a degree of learning and research which common people cannot give. This ap plies to all historical facts whatever, and to the learned as well as to the unlearned; for no man, learned or unlearned, has had time and opportunity, nor could have it in a lifetime, to examine personally all the original documents on which a historical narrative may rest. He must trust to those who preceded him for many facts as being sufficiently established, for the universal cons sent of those who had such opportunities is a sufficient voucher. This in the nature of the thing. But if the want of time, capacity, or opportunity, were valid objections

to the judgment of the people concerning historical evidence, the same objection is good against the reasons assigned or felt for philosophical scepticism. The people either do not understand them, or do not trouble themselves about them. Objections, therefore, grounded on such general and abstract views are useless for or against the respective systems of supernatural agency, and of natural. Their merits are comparative, and must be judged by the contrast of the evidence which is the most credible.

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1

It is remarkable that a man who, like Mr Taylor, asserts and lays so much stress on the corruptions or false glosses put on the history of the gospels (as we have them, and as they are commonly received), should show such carelessness or disinge nuousness as to assert or insinuate that he is “satisfied, from examining the evidences of Christianity, that there is no sufficient proof in them that Jesus worked miracles or ever claimed to work them." (Religious Union, p. 32.) Now, every reader can here judge for himself what truth is in his statement.The Scriptures, as we have them, and as they are now generally received, do assert that miracles were wrought, and that Jesus appealed to them as authority of his mission.As to the assertion that other miracles (legends) were afterwards added to this history, that is another thing. But what do you think, with the Bible lying before you, of an assertion that its history contains no account of mi racles being wrought by Jesus and claimed by him? Verily, after that, any thing. It is tantamount to del nying us the use of our senses and understanding, that we may bow to his authority. Look to our Scriptures or remember. It is needless to quote passages for state ments so familiar to every one. After this piece of confusion or disingenuousness, made evident by its spe cification, who can have, or ought to have, any confidence in his general asseverations about historical corruptions? I believe they will be found all equally without foundation as this instance. Specific instances we shall notice, some by and bye on their own merits. Meantime, let us dismiss the vague prejudice attempted to be supported by loose cavils on history, and proceed

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to the consideration of evidence generally requisite to establish the credibility of miracles,

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I have said, respecting the plan of our discussion, that the general topic of evidence would require a distinct and preliminary consideration. I shall, therefore, begin with the consideration of it. What evidence can be reasonably required in proof of miracles having been wrought? I assume that miracles are possible. The Almighty power of God, who established the laws of nature such as we find them, must be able, if he see fit, to alter or suspend them. Their invariable uniformity we cannot suppose to be the result of any necessity external to the will of God; but it seemed good to him, and we can understand the reason why, that natural laws should be uniform in their operation. It was for the benefit of his intelligent offspring that they should be so, in order that they might know what to depend upon, and how to regulate their conduct in the affairs of this life. Without that we could have no experience to guide us; but man is a child of experience, and not of instinct like the lower animals, and must be governed accordingly. If, therefore, for the purpose of of carrying forward the education of his intelligent offspring, and preparing them for another state of existence, wherein the order and laws of nature might be different-if, for such a purpose, a temporary suspension or alteration in the existing natural laws was requisite to rouse their attention and direct their hopes then it is credible that God would interpose by miracle. All I contend for, however, in this stage, is the postulate, that the thing is possible, and, under the supposed destiny of man for immortality, is not incredible. In other words, I demand, as the basis of all discussion and argument," that there is a God, the Creator of all things, wise, good, and omnipotent, and that he has designed man for immortality.”red of th30 to 97

-To understand that Mr Taylor and others to whom we refer, grant so much. They are theists, but not atheists. Therefore I may assume their acquiescence in the postulate laid down. no 97d ban /11 bo Now, supposing God was about to work a miracle, the strongest evidence to be given was addressed to the

Spector witness of

sense of the it. He sees ana hears certain things out of the course of nature. There is afforded opportunity of investigating the him every phenomena, but he cannot refuse the testimony of his senses. He is irresistibly convinced that God is present, and interfering with the ordinary course of nature. But the evidence of f sense cannot be given to ev man, for

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every

racles in at would be turning the occurrence of mi

a fixed law. The constant interference of God would be the rule, and not the exception. As it has pleased God to bestow on man a certain degree of liberty, and of power to make him responsible for the exercise of it, a constant and arbitrary interference with him would be contradictory to this, and defeat the general design; and it supposes such an inconsistency of conduct as is incompatible with the wisdom of God. We are then to consider how the knowledge of a miraculous interposition of the Deity could be transmitted o the satisfaction of others who were not the witnesses of it.

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I The evidence of our's f our sen senses is the first, the strongest, and the source of other evidence. Next to it, comes the recollections of our memory respecting the impressions of sense. We feel ourselves compelled by the constitution of our minds to confide in it also, providing there is no ground for suspecting that its powers have been impaired. These recollections constitute our experience, and we depend upon them in the next stage. We feel assured that these impressions may be trusted to, and, therefore, we feel no hesitation in testifying to, or assuring other people of what has come under our notice. Again, in justice, still more in charity, we are bound to believe what others testify to us as the matter of their experience. This forms a source evidence by which we arrive at the knowledge of facts through the medium of other persons, namely, testi3that mony. It is liable to this that our own integrity and competence in uttering our testimony, we must satisfy ourselves of the veracity and mental soundness of others in admitting their testimony.

while we are conscious modification, however,

This depends upon our knowledge of their character.

Another effectual way of attaining this confidence is by the concurrence of one or more witnesses, without con9191 cert, testifying to the same thing, for it is next to impossible that any hallucination or source of error could occur independently, to different persons, at the same ime We may be satisfied that a given t testimony is a good source and ground of evidence in itself; it is only to be suspected when there are grounds shown for suspicion. Again, inf in the course of proceeding In our progress in this inquiry, we remark that testimony may be committed to writing, , and transmitted to distant times and places, or it may be transmitted orally, from one person or one generation to another, in which form it is called tradition. Written testimony has the advantage of tradition in being made fixed and definite; but tradition has the advantage in being susceptible of more extensive and rapid diffusion. It has this advantage sbran also, t that, being committed to th the trust of greater numbers, single person, or few, can alter it, w rit, without ber ing instantly liable to the correction of many. to Jes Where all depends upon a written document, may be only one original and authentic copy, on preservation of which, the accuracy and and authority of all the multiplied copies depend.

98098 to agota The weight of testimony, whether written or ral, as evidence, is strengthened by monuments and institutions, originated for the purpose of proving or ing the subject of the testimony geb ow has onered When all these circumstances concur in support of bate 12 any given fact or series of facts, the evidence seems perfectly decisive and satisfactory. I assert that they do so concur in support of the Bible history; in which case it is idle to allege that testimony may be falsified. Let the allegation be proven; meantime, the weight of it is entitled to our admission as good evidence of itself.

Our sceptics, however, do not give us any specific counter evidences, nor take the trouble of assailing the character of the witness. They dwell on generalities. Hume's main objection is this-that if we rely on experience, which is the ground of testimony, we have the experience of thousands to the uniformity of natural laws, and only the experience of a few in testimony of