2. I fhall confider more particularly the goodness of God to men, which we are more especially concerned to take notice of.

I. The univerfal extent of his goodness to the whole creation; The Lord is good to all. The whole creation furnisheth us with clear evidences and demonstrations of the divine goodnefs; which way foever we caft our eyes, we are encountered with undeniable inftances of the goodness of God; and every thing that we behold, is a fenfible demonftration of it; The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament fheweth his handywork, fays the Pfalmift, Pfal. xix. 1. And again, Pfal. xxxiii. 5. The earth is full of the goodness of the Lord. The whole frame of this world, and every creature in it, and all the feveral degrees of being and perfection, which are in the creatures, and the providence of God towards them all in the prefervation of them, and providing for the happiness of all of them in fuch degrees as they are capable of it, are a plentiful demonstration of the divine goodness; which I fhall endeavour to illuftrate in these four particulars..

1. The univerfal goodness of God appears, in giving being to fo many creatures.

2. In making them all fo very good; confidering the variety, and order, and end of them.

3. In his continual prefervation of them.

4. In providing fo abundantly for the welfare and happiness of all of them, fo far as they are capable and fenfible of it..

ift, The extent of God's goodness appears, in giving being to fo many creatures. And this is a pure effect. of goodness, to impart and communicate being to any thing. Had not God been good, but of an envious, and narrow, and contracted nature, he would have confined all being to himself, and been unwilling that any thing befides himself should have been; but his goodnefs prompted him to fpread and diffufe himself, and fet his power and wifdom on work, to give being to all that variety of creatures which we fee and know to be in the world, and, probably, to infinite more than we have the knowledge of. Now, it is not imaginable that God could have any other motive to do this, but purely

the

the goodness of his nature. All the motives imaginable befides this, muft either be indigency and want, or conftraint and neceffity; but neither of these can have any place in God; and therefore it was mere goodness that moved him to give being to other things: and therefore all creatures have reafon, with the four and twenty elders in the Revelations, to caft their crowns before the throne of God, faying, Thou art worthy, O Lord, to receive glory, and honour, and power; for thou hast created all things, and for thy pleasure (that is, of mere goodnefs) they are, and were created.

1. Indigency and want can have no place in God; because he that hath all poffible perfection, hath all plenty in himself; from whence refults all-fufficiency, and compleat happiness. So that the divine nature need not look out of itself for happiness, being incapable of any addition to the happinefs and perfection it is already poffeffed of: Ipfa fuis pollens opibus, nihil indiga noftri. We make things for our ufe, houfes to fhelter us, and cloaths to keep us warm; and we propagate our kind, to perpetuate ourselves in our pofterity but all this fuppofeth imperfection, and want, and mortality; to none of which the divine nature is liable and obnoxious.

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God is

Nay, it was not want of glory which made God to make ( the world. It is true, indeed, the glory of God's goodnefs doth herein appear, and creatures endowed with understanding have reafon to take notice of it with thankfulness, praife, and admiration: but there is no happiness redounds to God from it, nor does he feed himself with any imaginary content and fatisfaction, fuch as vain-glorious perfons have, from the fluttering applaufe of their creatures and beneficiaries. really above all bleffing and praife. It is great condefcenfion and goodness in him, to accept of our acknowledgments of his benefits, of our imperfect praises, and ignorant admiration of him; and were he not as wonderfully good, as he is great and glorious, he would not fuffer us to fully his great and glorious name, by taking it into our mouths; and were it not for our advantage and happiness to own and acknowledge his benefits, for any real happiness and glory that comes to

him by it, he could well enough be without it, and difpenfe with us for ever entertaining one thought of hiin; and were it not for his goodness, might defpife. the praises of his creatures, with infinitely more reason than wife men do the applaufe of fools. There is, indeed, one text of fcripture which feems to intimate, that God made all creatures for himfelf, as if he had fome need of them, Prov. xvi. 4. The Lord hath made all things for himself; yea, even the wicked for the day of evil. Now, if by God's making all things for himself, be meant, that he aimed at and intended the manifefta-tion of his wifdom, and power, and goodness in the creation of the world, it is most true, that, in this fenfe, he made all things for himself: but if we underftand it fo, as if the goodnefs of his nature did not move him thereto, but he had fome defign to serve ends and neceffities of his own upon his creatures, this is far from him. But it is very probable, that neither of thefe are the meaning of this text, which may be rendered, with much better fenfe, and nearer to the He-> brew, thus, God hath ordained every thing to that which is fit for it, and the wicked hath he ordained for the day of evil; that is, the wisdom of God hath fitted one thing to another, punishment to fin, the evil day to the evil doers.

2. Nor can neceffity and constraint have any place in God. When there was no creature yet made, nothing in being but God himself, there could be nothing to compel him to make any thing, and to extort from him the effects of his bounty: neither are the creatures neceffary effects and emanations from the being of God, flowing from the divine effence, as water doth from a fpring, and as light ftreams from the fun if fo, this, indeed, would have been an argument of the fulness of the divine nature, but not of the bounty and goodness of it; and it would have been matter of joy to us that we are, but not a true ground of thankfulness from us to God; as we rejoice, and are glad, that the fun fhines, but we do not give it any thanks for fhining, because it fhines without any intention or defign to do us good; it doth not know that we are the better for its light, nor

did intend we should be; and therefore we have no reafon to acknowledge its goodness to us.

But God, who is a fpirit endowed with knowledge and understanding, does not act as natural and material caufes do, which act neceffarily and ignorantly; whereas he acts knowingly and voluntarily, with particular intention and defign, knowing that he does good, and intending to do fo freely, and out of choice, and when he hath no other constraint upon him but this, that his goodness inclines his will to communicate himself to do good fo that the divine nature is under no neceffity, but fuch as is confiftent with the most perfect liberty, and freeft choice.

Not but that goodness is effential to God, and a neceffary perfection of his nature, and he cannot poffibly be otherwise than good: but when he communicates his goodness, he knows what he does, and wills, and chufeth to do fo.

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And this kind of neceffity is fo far from being any impeachment of the divine goodness, that it is the great perfection and praife of it. The Stoick philofophers miftaking this, do blafphemously advance their wife and virtuous man above God himself; for they reason thus; "A wife man is good out of choice, when he may be otherwife; but God, out of neceffity of nature, and when he cannot poffibly be otherwife than good." But if they had confidered things aright, they might have known that this is an imperfection in their wife man, that he can be otherwife than good; for a power to be evil, is impotency and weakness. The highest character that ever was given of a man, is that which Velleius Paterculus gives of Cato, that he was Vir bonus, quia aliter effe non potuit; "A good man, "because he could not be otherwife :" This applied to a mortal man, is a very extravagant and undue commendation; but it fignifies thus much, that it is the highest perfection, not to be able to be otherwise than good; and this is the perfection of the divine nature, that goodness is effential to it: but the expreffions and communications of his goodness are fpontaneous and free, defigned and directed by infinite knowledge and wisdom.

This is the first: The fecond particular is, that God hath made all creatures very good, confidering the variety, and order, and end of them. But this I fhall referve to another opportunity.

MON

SERMON

The goodness of God.

CXLIV.

PSAL. cxlv. 9.

The Lord is good to all, and his tender mercies are over all his works.

I

The fecond fermon on this text.

N the handling of this argument, I proposed to do thefe four things:

Firft, To confider what is the proper notion of goodness, as it is attributed to God.

Secondly, To fhew that this perfection belongs to God.

Thirdly, To confider the effects of the divine goodnefs, together with the large extent of it, in refpect of its objects. And,

Fourthly, To answer fome objections which may feem to contradict, and bring in queftion the goodness of God.

I have confidered the two firft; and, in fpeaking to the third, I propofed the confidering these two things: I. The univerfal extent of God's goodness to all his

creatures.

II. More efpecially the goodness of God to man, which we are more efpecially concerned to take notice of, and be affected with.

The first of these appears in thefe four particulars. 1. In his giving being to fo many creatures.