1

is

of the night, even a Li Lou 1 cannot see a great mountainforest, but in the clear morning light, with the brilliant sun, he can distinguish the flying birds above, and below he can see an autumn hair, for the vision of the eye dependent on the power of the sun. When the highest condition of power (shih) is reached, things are arranged without a multitude of officials and are made fitting by expounding the system. But nowadays, reliance is placed on a multitude of offices and a host of civil servants, and in the official bureaux assistants and controllers3 are appointed. Now the idea of appointing these assistants and controllers is, indeed, to prevent men from making profit, but these assistants and controllers themselves also desire to make profit, how then can they prevent others from doing so! Therefore, if one relies on assistants and controllers for one's administration, then will it be an administration that can barely maintain itself.

It is not thus, if one understands "system"; one separates their power (shih) and puts checks on their conduct.5 Therefore is it said: "If the conditions of power (shih) are such that it is difficult to conceal anything, then even a man like Chih does no wrong." Therefore, the early kings

1 Cf. par. 9, p. 243.

2 Cf. note 2, p 318.

3

; the ch'eng were assistants to the prefects; by the chien may be meant officials like the, chien-yü-shih "superintendent", who under the Ch'in dynasty seems to have had controlling power over the governor of a chün B. Cf. Chavannes, Mem. Hist., ii, pp. 531-2.

4i.e. the other officials.

5

#should, I believe, be so rendered here.

6 Cf. par. 18, p. 288.

或 should be 故

9

66

prized power (shih). Some say: A ruler of men holds a nominal right of consent, post factum,1 then things are controlled and examined, and by this control wickedness is discovered." I do not think that this is right. For officials exert sole authority and take decisions a thousand li away (from the ruler). In the twelfth month, to confirm it, they make a report, in which the affairs of the whole year have separate entries, but as the ruler gives but one hearing, although he sees doubtful cases, he cannot determine whether an official is capable or otherwise.2

4

For example, if objects come near, the eye cannot but see them; if words are insistent,3 the ear cannot but hear them, for if objects approach they alter in appearance, and if words draw near they form coherent speech. So with the organization in a well-governed state, people cannot escape punishment any more than the eyes can hide from the mind what they see. But in the disorderly states of the present time, it is not thus: reliance is placed on a multitude of offices and a host of civil servants, but however numerous the civil servants may be, their affairs 5 are the same and they belong to one body. Now those whose affairs are the same and

工人主執虛後以應 is difficult. I think that my translation renders the sense. Cf. the expression, given in Couvreur, Dictionnaire, S.V.: 1, "faire par manière d'acquit une chose qu'on traite comme une vieillerie."

4 For one should perhaps read the homophonous # or "to be distinguished".

5 With Sun I insert the character; also in the following sentence.

But

who belong to one body, cannot control1 one another. by making their interests different and their disadvantages dissimilar, the early kings created guarantees. Therefore, in a condition of complete good government, husband and wife and friends cannot abandon each other's evil, cover up wrong-doing and not cause harm to relatives, nor can the men from the people mutually conceal each other from their b superiors and government servants. That is because, although their affairs are connected, their interests are different. But nowadays a Tsou and a Yü3 cannot control each other, because their business is the same and their interests are also similar1... Suppose that horses could speak,5 then a Tsou and a Yü would have no chance of escaping what they find hateful; that is because their interests would be different. When interests are connected and what they hate is the same, then a father cannot reprimand his son, nor a prince his minister. The relation of government servants to other government servants is this, that their interests are connected and what they

3

1 Again with Sun I insert after, in accordance with the same phrase further down.

2 Cf. par. 18, p. 291.

2seem to have been officials of the imperial stables. The two characters also occur in the Chou-li, ch. 15, p. 6b, and in the Shih-ching, i, 2 (14), Legge's ed., p. 36, where they have often been explained as the name of a wild animal.

• With Yü I alter into, in accordance with the sense of the context. Here the text is corrupt, 16 characters being left blank.

5 Yen's ed. reads, which gives no sense. Wang's ed. has E⇓⇓ œ. Yü suggests that the character

should be omitted.

i.e. the interests of the horses and of these officials are different, so that the horses, could they but speak, would denounce their faults.

Y

hate is the same. Now, the early kings made it a principle that those whose business was connected, should have different interests. Though the people may hide things from their ruler, there is no harm done in thus covering them up, nor can there be advantage in having virtuous men or harm in having worthless ones. The system, therefore, of good government is to neglect the virtuous and to abolish the wise.

PARAGRAPH 25

ATTENTION TO LAW

Generally, there is no one in the world, who does not base order on the causes of disorder. Therefore, to a limited degree of order corresponds a limited degree of disorder, and to a great degree of order corresponds a great degree of 10a disorder. There is no ruler of men who can give order to his people for all time, nor is there a country in the world that has not known disorder. What do I mean by saying that one bases order on the causes of disorder? Raising virtuous and capable men is the cause of bringing order into the world, but it is also the cause of order becoming disorder. Those, whom the world calls virtuous, are men whose words are upright. The reason why they are regarded as upright in words,1 is due to their partizans. Hearing their words, one takes them to be capable, and on asking their partizans, one thinks that they are indeed so. Therefore, one prizes them without waiting for them to acquire actual merit, or one punishes them without waiting for them to commit crimes. In these circumstances, vile officials are given precisely the

1 Wang alters into and into

opportunity to accomplish their wicked and dangerous acts, and small-minded men have an opportunity to apply their dexterous and crafty tricks.1 If in the beginning, a basis for wickedness and craftiness is provided for officials and people, then, if finally one tries to make them correct and guileless, even (a great sage like) Yü could not succeed in causing as many as ten men to be like that, how then could an ordinary ruler manage the people of the whole country in this way?

Those people who form parties with others do not need Us 2 for obtaining success, and, if superiors pull one way with the people, then the latter will turn their backs on the ruler's position and will turn towards private connections. When this is the case, the prince will be weak and his ministers strong, and if the ruler does not understand this, then, if the country is not annexed by the feudal lords, it will be robbed by the 10b people.3

Both stupid and wise will, alike, try to acquire that power of eloquence, and if scholars study with those eloquent speakers, then people will lose touch with reality and will recite empty

1 The idea is that, if people are to be promoted on account of the reputations they have, there would be much room for the arbitrary acts of bad officials.

2 A figure of speech, meaning the ruler.

3 Cf. Kuan-tzů, ch. 21, par. 67, p. 420:

能,則臣離上而下比周矣.以黨舉官,則民 務佼而不求用矣

"If the ruler relaxes the law, in order to promote capable men because of their reputation, then ministers will become estranged from their ruler and will form cabals with their inferiors; if officials are chosen for their party connections, then people will be concerned about clever tricks and will not strive to be of use."