CHAPTER IV.

HUMAN HAPPINESS.

We have already, on several occasions, alluded to the fact that God has created every thing double; a world without us, and a corresponding world within us. He has made light without, and the eye within; beauty without, and taste within; moral qualities in actions, and conscience to judge of them; and so of every other case. By means of this correspondence, our communication with the external world exists.

These internal powers are called into exercise, by the presence of their corresponding external objects. Thus, the organ of vision is excited by the presence of light, the sense of smell by odors, the faculty of taste by beauty or deformity, and so of the rest.

The first effect of this exercise of these faculties is, tha twe are conscious of the existence and qualities of surrounding objects. Thus, by sight, we become conscious of the existence and colors of visible objects, by hearing of the existence and sound of audible objects, &c.

But, it is manifest, that this knowledge of the existence. and qualities of external objects, is far from being all the intercourse which we are capable of holding with them. This knowledge of their existence and qualities, is, most frequently, attended with pleasure or pain, desire or aversion.

Sometimes the mere perception itself is immediately pleasing; in other cases, it is merely the sign of some other quality which has the power of pleasing us. In the first case, the perception produces gratification, in the other, it awakens desire.

That is, we stand in such relations to the external world, that certain objects, besides being capable of being perceived, are also capable of giving us pleasure, and certain other objects besides being perceived are capable of giving us pain. Or, to state the same truth, in the other form, we are so made, as to be capable, not only of perceiving, but, also, of being pleased with, or pained by, the various objects by which we are surrounded.

This general power of being pleased or pained, may be, and I think frequently is, termed sensitiveness.

This sensitiveness, or the power of being made happy, by surrounding objects, is intimately connected with the exer cise of our various faculties. Thus, the pleasure of vision cannot be enjoyed in any other manner, than by the exercise of the faculty of sight. The pleasure of knowledge can be enjoyed in no other way, than by the exercise of the intellectual powers. The pleasure of beauty can be enjoyed in no other mannner, than by the exercise of the faculty of taste, and of the other subordinate faculties, on which this faculty depends. And, thus, in general, our sensitiveness derives pleasure from the exercise of those powers which are made necessary for our existence and well-being in our present state.

Now, I think that we can have no other idea of happiness, than the exercise of this sensitiveness upon its corresponding objects and qualities. It is the gratification of desire; the enjoyment of what we love; or, as Dr. Johnson remarks: "Happiness consists in the multiplication of agreeable consciousness."

It seems, moreover, evident, that this very constitution is, to us, an indication of the will of our Creator; that is, inasmuch as he has created us, with these capacities for happiness, and has also created objects around us precisely adapted to these capacities, he meant that the one should be exercised upon the other; that is, that we should be made happy in this manner.

And, this is more evident, from considering that this happiness is intimately connected with the exercise of those faculties, the employment of which is necessary to our existence, and our well-being. It thus becomes the incitement to, or the reward of, certain courses of conduct, which, it is necessary to our own welfare, or to that of society, that we should pursue.

And, thus, we arrive at the general principle that our desire for a particular object, and the existence of the object adapted to this desire, is, in itself, a reason why we should enjoy that object, in the same manner as our aversion to another object is a reason why we should avoid it. There may be, it is true, other reasons to the contrary, which may be more authoritative than that emananating from this desire or aversion, and these may and ought to control it; but this does not show that the desire is not a reason, and a sufficient one, if no better reason can be shown to the contrary.

But, if we consider the subject a little more minutely, we shall find that the simple gratification of desire, in the manner above stated, is not the only conditition on which our happiness depends.

We find, by experience, that a desire or appetite may be so gratified as forever afterwards to destroy its power of producing happiness. Thus, a certain kind of food is pleasant to me, this is a reason why I should partake of it. But, I may eat of it to excess, so as to loathe it forever after

wards, and thus annihilate, in my constitution, this mode of gratification. Now, the same reasoning which proves that God intended me to partake of this food, namely, because it will promote my happiness, also proves that he did not intend me to partake of it after this manner, for, by so doing, I have diminished, by this whole amount, my capacity for happiness, and thus defeated, in so far, the very end of my constitution. Or, again, though I may not destroy my desire for a particular kind of food, by a particular manner of gratification, yet, I may so derange my system that the eating of it shall produce pain and distress, so that it ceases to be to me a source of happiness upon the whole. In this case, I equally defeat the design of my constitution. The result equally shows, that, although he means that I should eat it he does not mean that I should eat it in this manner.

Again, every man is created with various and dissimilar forms of desire, corresponding with the different external objects disigned to promote his happiness. Now, it is found that one form of desire may be gratified in such a manner, as to destroy the power of receiving happiness from another; or, on the contrary, the first may be so gratified as to leave the other powers of receiving happiness unimpaired. Since then, it is granted, that these were all given us for the same end, namely, to promote our happiness, if, by one manner of gratification, we destroy another power of gratification, while, by another manner of gratification, we leave this first power of gratification uninjured, it is, evidently, the design of our Creator that we should limit ourselves to this latter mode of gratification.

Thus, I am so formed, that food is pleasant to me. This, if there were no necessity for eating, is a reason why I should eat it. But I am also formed with a desire for knowledge. This is a reason why I should study, in order to obtain it. That is, God intended me to derive happiness from both of these sources of gratification. If, then, I eat in