CHAPTER IV.

ON THE DISSOLUTION OF SLAVERY.

Section 1.-OF THE LAWS FOR THE ABOLITION OF SLAVERY. THE laws which regulate the voluntary emancipation of slaves by their masters, will form the principal subject of this chapter. But before entering upon the consideration of these, I purpose furnishing, with but little deviation from chronological order, some notice of the measures by which slavery has been abolished in many of our states.

It is well known, that negro slavery was introduced into this country by means of the African slave trade, prosecuted during the period of our colonial subjection to Great Britain. At the time of our separation from the mother country, this evil, which had taken deep root at a much earlier date, prevailed more or less in all the British American colonies. It was protected by the laws of each of these, and continued so to be, even after the Declaration of our Independence, and until the first day of March, A. D. 1780, when the first glorious effort for its abolition was made by the COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA. That day gave birth to an act of assembly, in its consequences second only to the Declaration of Independence. Its title distinctly proclaimed its object, in words few but of large import: "AN ACT FOR THE GRADUAL ABOLITION OF SLAVERY. ""

The preamble to this act contains such just and generous sentiments, depicts with so much force of truth and language the sorrows of slavery, and places the arguments for its abolition so concisely and yet so advantageously before the mind, that I cannot refuse myself the pleasure of transcribing it at length. "When we contemplate our abhorrence of that condition, to which the arms and tyranny of Great Britain were exerted to reduce us; when we look back on the variety of dangers to which we have been exposed, and how miraculously our wants in many instances have been supplied, and our deliverance wrought,

when even hope and human fortitude have become unequal to the conflict, we are unavoidably led to a serious and grateful sense of the manifold blessings which we have undeservedly received from the hand of that Being, from whom every good and perfect gift cometh. Impressed with these ideas, we conceive that it is our duty, and we rejoice that it is in our power to extend a portion of that freedom to others which hath been extended to us, and release from that state of thraldom to which we ourselves were tyrannically doomed, and from which we have now every prospect of being delivered. It is not for us to inquire why, in the creation of mankind, the inhabitants of the several parts of the earth were distinguished by a difference in feature or complexion. It is sufficient to know, that all are the work of an Almighty hand. We find in the distribution of the human species, that the most fertile as well as the most barren parts of the earth, are inhabited by men of complexions different from ours, and from each other; from whence we may reasonably as well as religiously infer, that He, who placed them in their various situations, hath extended equally his care and protection to all, and that it becometh not us to counteract his mercies. We esteem it a peculiar blessing granted to us, that we are enabled this day to add one more step to universal civilization, by removing, as much as possible, the sorrows of those who have lived in undeserved bondage, and from which, by the assumed authority* of the kings of Great Britain, no effectual relief could be obtained. Weaned by a long course of experience from those narrow prejudices and partialities we had imbibed, we find our hearts enlarged with kindness and benevolence towards men of

* The most signal effort here alluded to on the part of the General Assembly of Pennsylvania, when a colony, to prevent the importation of slaves, was by an act, which bears the title, "An act to prevent the importation of negroes and Indians into this province," passed June 7, 1712, but disallowed and accordingly repealed by Queen Anne, on the 20th February, 1713. This act, though repealed, may be found on record, in the office of the Secretary of the Commonwealth, at Harrisburgh, Book A, vol. 2, page 50. I am induced to be thus minute in this reference, since the same act is mentioned in the Memoirs of the Historical Society of Pennsylvania, vol. 1, page 370, to have been lost. The date there assigned to it is 1711-an error which has probably misled the person by whom the search was made.

all conditions and nations; and we conceive ourselves at this particular period extraordinarily called upon, by the blessings which we have received, to manifest the sincerity of our profession, and to give a substantial proof of our gratitude.

"And whereas the condition of those persons who have heretofore been denominated negro and mulatto slaves, has been attended with circumstances which not only deprived them of the common blessings that they were by nature entitled to, but has cast them into the deepest afflictions by an unnatural separation and sale of husband and wife from each other and from their children, an injury, the greatness of which can only be conceived by supposing that we were in the same unhappy case. In justice, therefore, to persons so unhappily circumstanced, and who, having no prospect before them whereon they may rest their sorrows and their hopes, have no reasonable inducement to render their service to society, which they otherwise might, and also in grateful commemoration of our own happy deliverance from that state of unconditional submission to which we were doomed by the tyranny of Britain, Be it enacted, That all persons, as well negroes and mulattoes as others, who shall be born within this state from and after the passing of this act, shall not be deemed and considered as servants for life or slaves; and that all servitude for life or slavery of children in consequence of the slavery of their mothers, in the case of all children born within this state from and after the passing of this act as aforesaid, shall be and hereby is, UTTERLY TAKEN AWAY, EX

TINGUISHED AND FOR EVER ABOLISHED.

The fourth and next section of the act relates to the children of the slaves which, according to the foregoing provisions, would be born free. It will be more properly introduced hereafter.

The fifth section made it the duty of the owner of any slave for life, &c. to cause him or her to be registered* at a place par

*

Many suits have been brought under this act, chiefly in consequence of an omission by the master to register his slaves in due time, or from some defect in the statement furnished by the master to the officer by whom the registry was directed to be made. None of them, however, possess general interest, nor are deemed of sufficient practical value, so much time having elapsed since the passing of the act, to require particular reference.

ticularly designated, (the registry to contain the name, age and sex of such slave, and the name, surname, occupation or profession of the master, and the name of the county, &c. wherein the master resided,) on or before the first day of November next ensuing the date of this act, "in order to ascertain and distinguish the slaves, &c. within this state, who should be such on the said first day of November, from all other persons," and declared, that with certain exceptions mentioned in other sections of the act, no negro or mulatto, then within the state, should, from and after the said first day of November, be deemed a slave, &c. unless his or her name, &c. should be registered as aforesaid; and in the tenth section, the latter provision of the fifth was in substance repeated, the language of which being as follows: "No man or woman of any nation or colour, except the negroes and mulattoes who shall be registered as aforesaid, shall at any time hereafter, be deemed, adjudged or holden, within the territories of this commonwealth, as slaves or servants for life, but as free men and free women, except the domestic slaves attending upon delegates in congress from the other American states, foreign ministers and consuls, and persons passing through or sojourning in this state and not becoming resident therein, and seamen employed in ships not belonging to any inhabitant of this state, nor employed in any ship owned by any such inhabitant, provided, such domestic slaves be not alienated or sold to any inhabitant, nor (except in the case of members of congress, foreign ministers and consuls) retained in this state longer than six months."*

* It has been decided in Pennsylvania, that where the owner of slaves in Maryland, leased a farm, together with his slaves to cultivate it, that the consent of such lessee that one of the slaves should be removed to Pennsylvania, and his being brought there, would not entitle him to freedom. Butler and others vs. Delaplaine, 7 Serg. & Rawle's Rep. 378. Had the owner himself consented to such removal, the decision would have been different, unless he had been within the excepted cases mentioned in this tenth section. It was also decided at the same time, that "the sojourning of a master, a citizen of another state, with his slave, in the state of Pennsylvania, would not entitle such slave to freedom, unless there was at some time a continued retaining of the slave here for six months, except perhaps, in a case of a fraudulent removal backwards and forwards."

The import of these fifth and tenth sections could not have been mistaken, had not the legislature inserted between the two,

A decision of JUDGE WASHINGTON, given at Philadelphia, in 1806, at the October term of the Circuit Court of the United States for the third circuit, &c. inasmuch as it recognises the validity of the tenth section of the abolition act of 1780, may be here introduced. It is thus reported, in the first volume of Washington's Circuit Court Reports, page 500 et seq. case of Butler vs. Hopper: "This case comes before the court on a special verdict, the material parts of which, find, that the plaintiff formerly lived in the state of South Carolina, where, as well as in Georgia, he had a valuable plantation which he cultivated, and still cultivates, by his overseers and slaves, and on which he had, and still has, a furnished house and servants. That from the year 1794 to the present time, with the exception of an annual visit to his plantations at the southward, continuing from October in each year till May or June following, he has kept a dwelling house in the city of Philadelphia, and has resided in it, with his family, consisting of several children and domestic servants, and among the latter Ben, the subject of the present suit, who was his property, as a slave, at the time of his coming into this city, and who continued with him, claimed as such, until September 1805, when he was discharged from his service, under a habeas corpus issued from the court of common pleas of this state. Whilst on his plantation in South Carolina, during these annual visits, the plaintiff kept house, always having Ben with him. From the year 1794, until the 4th of January, 1805, the plaintiff represented the state of South Carolina in congress, except for two years, between 1796 and 1800, when he was a member of the legislature of that state. Upon these facts," said Judge Washington, "the question is, whether Ben became free, by virtue of a law of this state, (Pennsylvania) passed on the first of March, 1780," (the Judge then quoted the tenth section of this act.)

After disposing of an objection which had been suggested by the plaintiff's counsel to the validity of the law, by reason of the ninth section of article first of the constitution of the United States, and showing the inapplicability to the present case of the second section of article fourth of the same instrument, he proceeded in the following words: "We come then to the consideration of this law, (act of 1780, tenth section,) and of the facts found in the special verdict. The plaintiff claims an exemption from the enacting part of the section above stated, upon two grounds: first, as a member of congres; and secondly, as a sojourner. The first will not answer his purpose, because for two years he ceased to be a member of congress, and therefore lost the privilege which that character might otherwise have conferred upon him, under the exception in the law.

"The next question then is, can the plaintiff be considered as within the other exception of the law, a sojourner during the period when he ceased to be a member of congress? But the verdict precludes all inquiry into this point, by finding, that the plaintiff, from the year 1794 to the present time, has resided