This office, dangerous by excefs of power, being fuppreffed, the royal boroughs were left in a state of anarchy. The magiftracy, being now no longer under any check or control, was coveted by noblemen and gentlemen in the neighbourhood; who, under the name of office-bearers, laid their hands on the revenues of the borough, and converted all to their own profit. This corruption was heavily complained of in the reign of James V.; and a remedy was provided by act 26. parl. 1535, enacting, ift, That none be qualified to be provost, bailie, or alderman, but an indwelling burgefs. 2dly, "That no inhabitant purchase lordship out of

burgh, to the terror of his comburgeffes. And, 3dly, That all "provosts, bailies, and aldermen of boroughs, bring yearly to "the chequer at a day certain, the compt-books of their common good, to be feen and confidered by the Lords Auditors, giff the "fame be spended for the common well of the burgh, or not, "under the penalty of lofing their freedom. And that the faids

provofts, bailies, and aldermen, warn yearly, fifteen days be"fore their coming to the chequer, all those who are willing to come for examining the faid accounts, that they may impugn "the fame, in order that all murmur may ceafe in that behalf." And to enforce thefe regulations, a brieve was iffued from the chancery, commanding the magistrates to present their accounts to the exchequer, and fummoning the burgeffes to appear and object to the fame.

A defect in this ftatute made it lefs effectual than it was intended to be. Magistrates, to avoid the penalty, brought the countbooks of their common good to the exchequer; but they brought no rental of the common good to found a charge against them. This defect was remedied by act 28. parl. 1693, containing the following preamble. "That the royal boroughs, by the male-ad"ministration of their magiftrates, have fallen under great debts "and burdens, to the diminution of their dignity, and the difabling

"abling of them to ferve the crown and government as they "ought; and that the care, overfight, and control of the common good of boroughs, belong to their Majeflies by virtue of "their prerogative-royal; therefore, for preventing the like abufes and mifapplications in all time thereafter, their Majefties ftatute and ordain, That every burgh-royal, fhall, betwixt and "the firft of November next, bring to the Lords of Treasury and Exchequer, an exact account of charge and discharge, subscri"bed by the magistrates and town-clerk, of their whole public

good and revenues, and of the whole debts and incumbrances "that affect the fame." This completed the remedy, by putting means into the hands of the Barons of Exchequer, to control the accounts enjoined by the former ftatute to be yearly given in.

The foregoing regulations are kept in obfervance. Every year a precept iffues from the exchequer, figned by one of the Barons, addressed to the director of the chancery, requiring him to make out a brieve for every royal borough. The brieve is accordingly made out, returned to the exchequer, and fent to the feveral fheriffs, to be ferved in all the royal boroughs within their bounds, as directed by the ftatute. These brieves are accordingly fo ferved by the sheriffs; and particularly it is a constant form in most of the royal boroughs, to iffue a proclamation, fifteen days before the day named for appearance in exchequer, warning the inhabitants to repair there, in order to object to the public accounts of the town: and further, in order to give them opportunity to frame objections, the book and counts are laid open for thefe fifteen days, to be infpected by all the inhabitants.

We learn from the records of exchequer, that from the year 1660 to the year 1683, accounts were regularly given in to exchequer, in obedience to the ftatute. The town of Edinburgh only having failed for fome thort time, Captain Thomas Hamilton merchant there, by an action in exchequer, compelled the

magistrates

magistrates to produce upon oath their treasurer's accounts, which were accordingly audited. And we also learn, that from the Restoration down to the Union, a clerk to the borough-roll was appointed by the crown, whofe proper business it was to examine and audite the accounts of the boroughs.

Notwithstanding the foregoing falutary regulations, and the form constantly practised to make them effectual, the boroughs of late years have forborn to prefent their accounts in exchequer ; hoping that they would be overlooked by the English court of exchequer, established in Scotland after the Union; which accordingly happened. This neglect in the court of exchequer is greatly to be regreted, because it reduces the royal boroughs, by the male-administration of their magiftrates, to the fame miferable condition that is fo loudly complained of in the ftatutes above mentioned. It is undoubtedly in the power of the Barons to reftore good government to the boroughs, by compelling the magiftrates to account yearly in the court of exchequer, according to the foregoing regulations. And to that end no more is neceffary, but to fignify publicly that they are refolved hereafter to put thefe regulations in execution.

How beneficial that step would be to this country in general, and to the royal boroughs in particular, will appear from confidering, first, the unhappy confequences that result from suffering magistrates to difpofe of the town's revenues, without check or control; and next the good effects that must result from a regular and careful management, under the inspection of the King's judges.

any

The unhappy confequences of leaving magiftrates without any check or control, are too vifible to be disguised. The revenues of a royal borough are feldom laid out for the good of the town, but in making friends to the knot who are in poffeffion of the magiftracy; and in rioting and drunkenness, for which every pre

text is laid hold of, particularly that of hofpitality to ftrangers. Such mismanagement tends to idleness, and corruption of manners ; which accordingly are remarkable in most royal boroughs. Nor is the contagion confined within the town: it commonly fpreads all around.

Another confequence, no less fatal, of leaving magistrates to act without control, is a strong defire in strong defire in every licentious burgess, of stepping into the magiftracy, for his own fake, and for that of his friends. Hence the factions and animofities that prevail in almost all the royal boroughs; which are violently and indecently purfued, without the least regard to the good of the community.

The greatest evil of all, respects the choice of their representatives in parliament. A habit of riot and intemperance, makes them fit fubjects to be corrupted, by every adventurer who is willing to lay out money for purchasing a feat in parliament. Hence the infamous practice of bribery at elections, which tends not only to corrupt the whole mafs of the people, but, which is ftill more dreadful, tends to fill the House of Commons with men of diffolute manners, void of probity and honour.

But turning from scenes fo difmal, let us view the beautiful effects that refult, from an administration regularly carried on, as directed by the ftatutes above mentioned. The revenues of the royal boroughs are fuppofed to be above L. 40,000 yearly. And were this fum, or the half of it, prudently expended, for promoting arts and industry among the numerous inhabitants of royal boroughs, the benefit, in a country so narrow and poor as Scotland, would be immense: it would tend to population, it would greatly increase industry, manufactures, and commerce, befide augmenting the public revenue. In the next place, as there would be no temptation for designing men to convert the burden of magistracy into a benefit, faction and discord would vanish; and there would be no lefs folicitude to fhun the burden, than at

prefent

prefent is feen to obtain it. None would fubmit to the burden but the truly patriotic, men who would chearfully bestow their time, and perhaps their money, upon the public; and whofe ambition it would be to acquire a character, by promoting industry, temperance, and honesty, among their fellow-citizens.

And when the government of the royal boroughs comes to be in fo good hands, bribery, which corrupts the very vitals of our constitution, will be banished of course. And confidering the proper and constitutional dependence of the royal boroughs upon the king's judges, we may have reasonable affurance, that few representatives will be chofen, but who are friends to their country and to their fovereign.

SKETCH