mentary literary institutions. Whether such a work on such a subject is indeed practicable, we do not undertake to decide; but we should like much to see one in use, and we think the attempt ought to be made for the sake of the millions of our rising generation. But for the adult portion of our population, as a manual of moral philosophy, particularly practical ethics, in our colleges and higher seminaries of learning, we are of opinion, that nothing better on the important subjects which it discusses, will be found than the work under review; and we cannot but paint to our imagination the blessed state of society, were the rules of such a morality and piety as our author has laid down, universally followed. We believe that the general correctness of his doctrines, the power of his logic, and the solemnity of his representations, with the accompa niment of a diction well suited to the subject, cannot fail of doing extensive good. Prepared as a large mass of minds are, in an age of reformation, to be molded according to a correct system of moral goodness, we consider the present publication to be very seasonable in aiding and carrying forward such an object. The time, we trust, is passed by, when it was common, as we well recollect, to quote, for instance, the doubtful moral maxims of Pope's Essay on Man, as authority of an ethical kind. We have little need, in these times, to recur to a work which one has characterized as "a sort of moon-light vision of thin, impalpable abstractions," and which we may call a poetic version of philosophical, infidel morality. If there are some elementary truths "in remote abstraction," of which christianity is the practical form; it needs for their best elucidation, a mind which has been imbued with the holy influences of that religion, and not a sceptic, or a sceptic's imitator. That class of writers, whether in poetic or prosaic garb, which, during the last half of the eighteenth century, were employed in redeeming "the whole theory of the condition and interests of men, both in life and death, from all the explanations imposed on it by an unphilosophical revelation from heaven," have, we trust, lost much of their influence with the christian men of the present age. Works which are expected to gain the confidence of the religious public at this period, and to be received as guides in the regulation of that interior sanctuary, the heart, must be based on principles of truth, whether derived from independent investigations of nature, or from an examination of the sacred scriptures.

President Wayland has divided his work into two parts, the first of which he denominates theoretical ethics, the other practical ethics. This, it is known, is the common division of the science of ethics, and is probably the best, or the only general division that can be adopted: but we are forced to remark concerning it, in the language of Dugald Stewart, that "the words theory and practice

are not, in this instance, employed in their usual acceptations. The theory of morals does not bear, for example, the same relation to the practice of morals, that the theory of geometry bears to practical geometry. In this last science, all the practical rules are founded on theoretical principles previously established: but in the former science, the practical rules are obvious to the capacities of all mankind; the theoretical principles form one of the most difficult subjects of discussion that have exercised the ingenuity of metaphysicians."* In the former division of the author's book, the subjects which he introduces have been esteemed truly difficult and abstruse, few have been supposed to be more perplexing in themselves, or less likely to promise, even to the candid investigator, satisfactory results on every point. The writer's propositions, however, are laid down with clearness, his views are liberal and charitable, his reasonings profound, and, in general, bis conclusions follow fairly from his premises. In saying this, we would not be understood as agreeing with Pres. W. in all the doctrines which he has inculcated. We should explain some points differently from what he does: yet we give him credit for catholic feelings, and able ratiocinations. In the theory of morals, there have always been questions which have divided the opinions of mankind, and even of the wise and good. Authors of the most discordant sentiments in other respects, and of the most opposite characters, have been found ranged indiscriminately, sometimes on one side, and sometimes on the other, in regard to speculative morality.

According to the judicious writer already quoted, there are two principal questions which seem to exhaust the whole theory of morals. "First, by what principle of our constitution are we led to form the notion of moral distinctions, whether by that faculty which, in the other branches of human knowledge, perceives the distinction between truth and falsehood, or by a peculiar power of conception, (called by some the moral sense,) which is pleased with one set of qualities and displeased with another? Secondly, What is the proper object of moral approbation? or in other words, What is the common quality or qualities belonging to all the different modes of virtue? Is it benevolence, or a rational self-love, or a disposition (resulting from the ascendant of reason over passion,) to act suitably to the different relations in which we are placed?" Our author, in regard to the first of these questions, adopts the scheme of conscience, under the idea of a particular faculty, or a distinct peculiar impulsive power; and in regard to the second question, he maintains the doctrine of relations. It

may be remarked, that these are questions, as it appears to us, about which virtuous men may differ, although the right scheme, if it can be satisfactorily ascertained, would be of inestimable value, so far as the interests of truth and holiness are concerned. Pres. W. has discussed the essential principles on the subjects here stated, and that with ample and striking illustrations; although he has not adverted to the history of those questions, or pointed out the shape which the opinions of moral philosophers have from time to time assumed. Perhaps his design is better answered by omitting these historical or critical notices, thus giving to his work a compact, solid form, and a straight forward, business-like character. These notices, however, are interesting to the scholar, and, in their proper place, serve to throw light on the doctrines which are discussed.

In respect to the history, simply, of the theory of morals, particularly as it affects the question of the principle of moral approbation, we may be allowed to present it, in a very few words, to the reader. We give it principally on the authority of Stewart. While the ancient schools made the essence of virtue, or the proper object of moral approbation a favorite topic, they had little to say on the principle of moral approbation, and the little they did say was extremely confused and erratic. It had, moreover, but a slight connection with modern opinions on the subject. The question concerning the principle of moral approbation, has been chiefly agitated in modern times, beginning with Hobbes, and Cudworth his opponent; and as it was recommended to men of an inquisitive and speculative turn, it has entered into most of the discussions concerning the theory of morals since their day. Cudworth, and also Clarke, supposed that moral distinctions were apprehended by that power of the mind which judges between truth and falsehood. Against this system the philosophy of Hutcheson was leveled, and he undertook to show, that by the word right, certain agreeable qualities in action were designated, as also by the word wrong, certain qualities were expressed of an opposite kind. These he considered to be perceptible by feeling, and not through the operations of reason. To this power of perception he applied the name of moral sense. Through that, he believed, we were rendered susceptible of pleasure or of pain, as the mind contemplated either virtue or vice. On this subject, Hume and Adam Smith, for the most part, agreed with him; but they diverged from the views of Hutcheson on one important point. While the latter supposed that the moral sense is a simple and peculiar principle of our nature, of which no analysis can be given; both of the other two metaphysicians attempted to resolve it into other more general principles. Yet the systems of Hume and Smith, in respect to it, differed from each other. Ac

cording to the former, all virtuous feelings are useful, either to ourselves or others; and it is only the pleasure of utility which we derive from their contemplation. According to the latter, it is a sympathy or fellow-feeling, which, leading us "to enter into the situations of other men, and to partake with them in the passions which these situations have a tendency to excite," constitutes the basis of our moral approbations or disapprobations. Stewart himself takes the same view as Hutcheson did, of the moral distinctions which mankind are forced to make; since he says, that "the moral faculty is an original principle of our constitution, which is not resolvable into any other principle or principles more general than itself." The same opinion also is maintained by Dr. Brown, who says: "In tracing our moral feelings to an original susceptibility of the mind, we may be considered as arriving at a principle, like that which Hutcheson, after Lord Shaftesbury, has distinguished by the name of moral sense. The phrase moral sense, however, I consider as very unfortunate. But whether the feeling that attends the contemplation of certain actions, admits of being more justly classed with our sensations, or perceptions, or emotions; there is a susceptibility of this feeling, or set of feelings, original in the mind, and as essential to its very nature, as any other principle or function which we regard as universally belonging to our mental constitution,-as truly essential to the mind, indeed, as any of those senses among which Hutcheson would fix it." Pres. W. takes in amount the theory of Hutcheson, in respect to the mind's peculiar power of perception on moral subjects; and as he opposes the propriety of analyzing the moral sense into any other more comprehensive principles; he has no occasion to abet either one or the other of the systems of the two above named ingenious, but misguided philosophers, who reared on the foundation of Hutcheson a structure of error.

The important principles respecting the theory of morals, are discussed by our author under the following heads: Origin of our notion of the moral quality of action; Conscience, or the moral sense; The nature of virtue; Human happiness; Self-love; Imperfection of conscience; Necessity of some additional light; Natural religion; Relation between natural and revealed religion; The scriptures. Several of these chapters are excellent, both in matter and manner. We were particularly struck with the importance and solemnity of the representations which occur in several portions of the latter chapters. We think that in the first general head, his statements concerning the circumstances under which our moral notions arise, are more ingenious than convincing. Still the conclusion at which he arrives, that there is an immutable distinction between right and wrong, aside from the enactments of law, or that

moral obligation is founded in the relation of things, understanding this as we shall attempt to show he must do, commends itself to enlightened reason. In two or three instances, indeed, he resolves moral obligation more directly into the will of God, except perhaps as the rule of right, than is consistent with his previous statements. It is true, that the will of God can require only that which is right; but the ground or reason of the requirement is the immutability of moral distinctions. The requirement alone does not make an action right. It must be so, if at all, independently of the requirement. The divine command itself is right, because it accords with the nature and relations of things. We must believe, as Montesquieu remarks, that "it is true that before laws were made, there were relations of possible justice. To say that nothing is just or unjust but what is commanded or forbidden by positive laws, is the same as saying, that before the describing of a circle all the radii were not equal."*

We have said, that we cannot agree in the correctness of all Pres. Wayland's reasonings and conclusions. This is especially true with respect to the fourth section of Chap. I, entitled, "Whence do we derive our notion of the moral quality of actions?" We cannot but think, that he has failed in his attempt to refute the theory, that virtue is founded in utility. Our objections to his remarks here are two-fold. First: He has misapprehended or not quite correctly represented this theory. Secondly: He is selfcontradictory. We shall not now go into the discussion at length, nor is it necessary perhaps, after the various articles in which it has already come under notice; but we are unwilling to let his argument pass entirely without comment. We shall throw what we have to say into the form of strictures on Pres. Wayland's views, rather than engage in a systematic effort to defend our own. On some of the points which may deserve our attention, we would refer our readers to the article on Wardlaw's Christian Ethics, in our last number, and to that "On Self-love," in the present one. The form in which the subject under consideration is presented in the "Elements," is fallacious. It seems to be implied, that right and wrong and productiveness of happiness or otherwise, must be

*The essential distinction between right and wrong is forced upon the mind by a sort of necessity, under the circumstances in which we find ourselves placed, whatever may be our belief respecting the existence of laws, human or divine. This truth we can illustrate in no better way than by an anecdote concerning a person who absolutely denied, that the distinction exists in the universe. An atheist (as we suppose he was,) traveling in a stage-coach with a friend of ours, expressed his belief to that effect. "Is that your opinion?" said our friend to him. "Yes." "Do you think that you have a right to it?" "Certainly," said he. “Then,” replied our friend, "there is a right in the universe," to the utter silencing of the sceptic, and to the irrepressible merriment of his fel low-passengers.