laxation to it, has the effect upon the mind which the body would experience from like treatment. It is likewise true, that without exercise and culture, the mind, like the body, will remain torpid and feeble; that healthy digestion and muscular elasticity, are necessary to a due degree of mental spring and buoyancy. All these are facts, and facts too, well understood. The schools and colleges of every civilized country would seem to show, that men have been aware, that mental growth depends on exercise. We ask, too, whether the intermissions for relaxation, and the graduation of tasks imposed, do not also show them to have known, that the mind could not be overtasked, and that it needs a healthful body. If there is any doubt here, we refer our readers to the opinions quoted in Mr. Weld's Manual Labor Report, from almost every prominent instructor of youth in the country. It has been common, "time whereof the memory of man runneth not the contrary," for instructors to have in view the mysterious influence of the body on the mind, as the condition of its development.

But the phrenologists not only claim all this to be true,though they incline to talk, as if they were the first to bring it to light, but they profess to have made discoveries. From the whole, then, we gather, that their idea is this: The mind is not only conditioned in its actings, by the organ through which it works, but it is, in its essential nature, subject to the laws of that organ. Not only is the breath which passes into the clarion dependent on the configuration of the clarion, for the sort of music which it discourses; but respiration itself is of the same nature, and under the same laws, as the medium which articulates it into melody. In short, mind is under much the same law as organic matter, of which substance the brain is composed. Thus, man feels, wills, and even knows, in any particular way, impelled by a blind instinct so to feel, will, and know. He is a compound of instincts, like irrational and irresponsible animals, instead of being endued with any responsible power of intelligence and selfcontrol. But let them speak for themselves.

'Man is not less a bundle of instincts, than were the fasces which were carried before the Roman consuls, a bundle of twigs.' Chenevix, p. 74.

'Will is no more a fundamental power, than the instinct of animals: it is only the effect of every primitive faculty of the mind, and synonymous with desire; each faculty being active, produces an inclination, a desire, a kind of will.' Spurzheim, vol. ii. p. 41.

Thus, so far as we can see, Mr. Chenevix and his coadjutors, although they set forth a nominal distinction between the animal faculties on the one hand, and the moral and intellectual on the other, point us to no real ground of difference. They say, in

deed, with a sort of rhetorical vagueness, that the moral are higher and nobler than the animal. "What distinguishes man, is the number, the extent, the elevation of his faculties," says Mr. Chenevix. But, should this superiority be denied, it does not appear that, as metaphysicians, they could make any genuine difference in the essential qualities of each. Does not the horse thus differ from the orang-outang? They seem to forget, that man, in order to have a moral, must also have a spiritual nature; that, since matter is merely passive, and only acts as it is acted upon, it cannot be responsible for those acts, that is, it cannot be moral; that it is a quality of spirit to act self-prompted, without any extraneous compulsion; that man, in virtue of his being spirit, as well as body, is master of his own actions, and therefore responsible for them. Failing to see or make account of this groundtruth in metaphysics, they build all their conclusions on false foundations, and with a grievous want of proportion and symmetry. They practically consider man's moral, not less than his corporeal being, as consisting of a set of physical instincts, which work well or ill, according as the exciting external causes brought to bear upon them are such as, by the law of cause and effect, will infallibly procure the intended result.

The last principle on mental science which they put forth, belongs to the same family. Since the different modes of mental operation are products of different agents, the improvement and culture of any one of them does not improve its coadjutors. Thus the various functions of the mind seem not so much different branches of the same trunk, as separate plants in a common nursery; not so much different members of the same body, as a community of bodies or persons. Hence, though culture and development be given to one, the others are not affected. To awaken veneration, for instance, would have no more to do with rousing conscientiousness, than teaching one child in a nursery will expand the minds of its companions. Either Mr. Simpson means this, in the extract below, or the " practical disbelief," of which he speaks, is a gratuitous calumny.

It is another vital truth, forming a corollary to the last, that the exercise of one faculty will only improve that faculty, and is not adapted to improve any other. Nothing has more retarded education, than ignorance, or disregard of this great principle. It would be as reasonable to attempt to sharpen the hearing, by exercising the eyes, or the touch by the smell, as to improve reflection by simple observation, or either, by learning languages. Simpson, p. 87.

Just as if exercising the arms did not diffuse vigor and elasticity through the whole frame. Does not any sort of mental application impart strength to the mind? No one can pretend otherwise.

It is true, that some sorts of labor draw forth the mind in certain directions, and will throw its whole strength into those channels. So the continual exercise of the hands transfers the main strength of the body to the hands. Does it destroy bodily vigor? No doubt a sufficient variety of exercise should be given to the mind, to develop it equally in all directions. Will Mr. Simpson have the presumption to pretend, that he, or Combe, or Spurzheim, were the first to know, to make known, and to act upon, this idea? Some exercises are peculiarly suited to draw forth the varied functions of the mind in proper harmony and proportion. Among these, is the study of the ancient languages, which the phrenologists laugh to scorn, in despite of the wisdom and experience of ages.

According to Mr. Chenevix, indorsed by Dr. Spurzheim, "phrenologists entirely reject the hum-drum faculties of perception, memory, imagination, which mental philosophers have been so long discussing." The powers of association, judgment, taste, etc., which were formerly matters of interest to philosophers, are put under the same ban. How do they explain them? They call them modes of the activity of the thirty-five fundamental faculties. Amativeness, veneration, combativeness, etc., love, judge, perceive, and the like. What did old philosophers think on this point? They supposed the mind did all these things,-that they were modes of the activity of one mind, instead of thirty-five fundamental faculties. Need we ask, which is the more philosophical of the two?

The phrenological achievements in the philosophy of mind, then, may be reduced to three heads. 1st. They have done much to elucidate the reciprocal influence of the mind and body,-a subject which was before but vaguely understood, and more closely related to medical than mental science. 2dly. They have needlessly multiplied our primitive faculties. 3dly. They have advanced many truisms, as old as the flood, with the air of new discoveries. This last remark characterizes their pretensions in every department. They make the most obvious and unquestioned truths minister to their vanity, and set them forth as their own exclusive possession. They argue for them most lustily, as if some one disputed or was ignorant of them. They thus keep up a shadow-fight, never once suspecting but that they are doing valorous battle. We find no fault with them, for urging old and admitted truths: this every good man will do, all his life long, and will make all new discoveries subservient to the work. Their treating them as newly discovered treasures, is the object of our censures. All this applies with special force to their manner of talking about exercise, as requisite to mental development; their harmony of the natural and moral laws; their idea, that the observation of one.

law does not save from the penalties of violating another. Fo example: That a man who obeys the moral law, will drown in th water. The necessity of giving the supremacy to moral and re ligious sentiments, in order to man's highest good. Will they pu their finger on the divine or moralist, who has not in substance, a occasion permitted, urged home all these things?

The second great point on which the phrenologists pique them selves, is, large improvements in education,-intellectual, moral and religious.

This comprehends instruction both for the head and heart,knowledge and duty. How much then are we indebted to them on each score? 1st. What improvements in the training of the intellect, and the communication of knowledge, have they given us? Here they found their claim to merit on two grounds: the nature of the studies to be pursued, and the method of enforcing order and diligence. This last point we shall reserve to be discussed under the head of moral education, confining our present remarks only to the former,-the nature of the studies to be pursued. They mean to erase from the catalogue of studies the dead languages, and indeed, if we understand them, all language, as such. Language is to be learned, when the things represented by it are studied and understood. We will quote their plea in behalf of this innovation.

'Whilst it must be admitted that a knowledge of our vernacular tongue is of the highest importance, yet we deem it possible to acquire it without the usual drudgery of poring over a grammar. Let a child know the names of all things it sees, and how we express their qualities and modes of existence, and this plan, combined with a free intercourse with intelligent adults, will practically point out the natural mode of arranging words to give the order of our ideas.' Levison, p. 82.

When the perceptive faculties command an extensive range of objects, the individual may be said to be constantly gaining fresh and valuable information; and such is the intrinsic worth of his acquisitions, that they do not interfere with his previous knowledge, but, on the contrary, rather enhance it. It must therefore appear, that a positive injury is done to by far the greater number of persons who, according to a narrow-minded system which is unfortunately too prevalent, are compelled to devote themselves to the study of languages; particularly if we reflect on the grievous sacrifice of time required to obtain a respectable acquaintance with the classics. The mind becomes in some measure cramped, and many of the most useful faculties remain in a state of comparative inactivity; whilst verbal memory, like an especial favorite, engrosses all attention to itself.' p. 209.

As languages, Greek and Latin, exercise but one faculty,-verbal memory; their advocates who argue that they communicate a store of ideas, forget that these are as distinct from the languages themselves,

"as is the swimmer from the flood," and that there are better, because more natural modes of obtaining them. modes much more entitled to the name of intellectual discipline.' Simpson, p. 51.

The meaning of all this, we apprehend, is: The phrenologists think, that man has several faculties of perception; one for perceiving events, another for perceiving places, etc.; and among the rest, one for perceiving language as distinct from the objects thus designated. Large and projecting eyes constitute this organ. They further believe, that the cultivation of one faculty has no tendency to improve any other. "Putting this and this together," the conclusion is, that the study of language relates to signs merely, and gives no real knowledge. They propose, therefore, to surround the pupil with a world of objects, just such as neither he nor the New-Hollander can avoid being encompassed with. They would set him to examining the fibers of every piece of wood or flesh which he meets with, and direct him to mark its dimensions, uses, and various qualities. In short, through the whole routine of the sciences, they would first put into his hands the objects to which they relate, and lead him to observe their qualities. To learn them from books, is eminently absurd. Memory is but the continued exercise of other faculties. If then the faculties themselves have not been exercised, nothing but the presence of their appropriate objects can rouse them. The study of books will merely give play to the faculty of words. It will confer no real knowledge.

We were on the point of saying, that all this looks quite plausible; but we will not so much expose ourselves, as even to surmise, that persons in the habit of being caught with plausible things, will be led astray by it. If this scheme be true, our graduates, who have been shut up to books in their studies, and away from things, should take lessons a while of the plowman, who has meantime been surrounded by real objects.

But the error of these men grows out of a misconception of the true purpose of education. It is no less than the egregious blunder of supposing, that the accumulation of facts is the great work of mental discipline. Now the eye of an European, and the eye of the Hottentot,-of man and beast, opens upon essentially the same great facts. How then do they differ? In proportion as they are more intelligent, they see these facts more in their relations, causes and laws. Two men in a stage,-say the driver, and a philosopher who had never had any thing to do with a horse, may fall to talking about the horse. The driver has had experience of all the facts relating to him; the philosopher, of scarcely a circumstance. Will any person present have a doubt which is the educated man? No. Why not? Because every word spoVOL. VII.

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