ince of Rhet

oric.

CHAP. II.

Of Arguments.

§ 1.

THE finding of suitable arguments to prove a given Proper prov point, and the skilful arrangement of them, may be considered as the immediate and proper province of Rhetoric, and of that alone. The business of Logic is, as Cicero complains, to judge of arguments, not to invent them: ("in inveniendis argumentis muta nimium est; in judicandis, nimium loquax.” Cic. de Orat.) The knowledge again, in each case, of the subject in hand, is essential; but it is evidently borrowed from the science or system conversant about that subject-matter, whether Politics, Theology, Law, Ethics, or any other. The art of addressing the feelings again, does not belong exclusively to Rhetoric; since Poetry has at least as much to do with that branch. Nor are the considerations relative to Style and Elocution confined to argumentative and persuasive compositions. The art of inventing and arranging Arguments is, as has been said, the only province that Rhetoric can claim entirely and exclusively.

Various di

Arguments are divided according to several different principles; i. e. logically speaking, there are visions of several divisions of them. And these crossArguments. divisions have proved a source of endless perplexity to the Logical and Rhetorical student, because the writers on those subjects have not been aware of them. Hardly any thing perhaps has contributed so much to

lessen the interest and the utility of systems of Rhetoric, as the indistinctness hence resulting. When in any subject the members of a division are not opposed, but are in fact members of different divisions crossing each other, it is manifestly impossible to obtain any clear notion of the Species treated of; nor will any labour or ingenuity bestowed on the subject be of the least avail, till the original source of perplexity is removed; — till, in short, the cross-division is detected and explained. Arguments then may be divided,

First, into Irregular, and Regular, i. e. Syllogisms; these last into Categorical and Hypothetical; and the Categorical, into Syllogisms in the first Figure, and in the other Figures, &c. &c.

Secondly, They are frequently divided into "Moral," (or "Probable,") and "Demonstrative," (or "Necessary.")

Thirdly, into "Direct" and "Indirect," (or reductio ad absurdum,) the Deictic and Elenctic of Aristotle.

Fourthly, into Arguments from "Example," from "Testimony," from "Cause to Effect," from "Analogy," &c. &c.

It will be perceived, on attentive examination, that several of the different species just mentioned will occasionally contain each other; e. g. a Probable 'Argument may be at the same time a Categorical Argument, a Direct Argument, and an Argument from Testimony, &c.; this being the consequence of Arguments having been divided on several different principles; a circumstance so obvious the moment it is distinctly stated, that I apprehend such of my readers as have not been conversant in these studies will hardly be disposed to believe that it

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could have been (as is the fact) generally overlooked, and that eminent writers should in consequence have been involved in inextricable confusion. I need only remind them however of the anecdote of Columbus breaking the egg. That which is perfectly obvious to any man of common sense, as soon as it is mentioned, may nevertheless fail to occur, even to men of considerable ingenuity.

Division of

Forms of

It will also be readily perceived, on examining the principles of these several divisions, that the Arguments. last of them alone is properly and strictly a division of Arguments as such. The first is evidently a division of the Forms of stating them; for every one would allow that the same Argument may be either stated as an enthymeme, or brought into the strict syllogistic form; and that, either categorically or hypothetically, &c., e. g. "Whatever has a beginning has a cause; the earth had a beginning, therefore it had a cause;" or, "If the earth had a beginning, it had a cause: it had a beginning," &c. every one would call the same Argument, differently stated. This, therefore, evidently is not a division of Arguments as such.

Subject

matter of

The second is plainly a division of Arguments according to their subject-matter, whether NecesArguments. sary or Probable, certain or uncertain. In Mathematics, e. g. every proposition that can be stated is either an immutable truth, or an absurdity and selfcontradiction; while in human affairs the propositions which we assume are only true for the most part, and as general rules; and in Physics, though they must be true as long as the laws of nature remain undisturbed, the contradiction of them does not imply an absurdity; and the

conclusions of course, in each case, have the same degree and kind of certainty with the premises. This therefore is properly a division, not of Arguments as such, but of the Propositions of which they consist.

Arguments.

The third is a division of Arguments according to the purpose for which they are employed; Purposes of according to the intention of the reasoner; whether that be to establish "directly" (or "ostensively") the conclusion drawn, or ("indirectly") by means of an absurd conclusion to disprove one of the premises: (i. e. to prove its contradictory:) since the alternative proposed in every valid Argument is, either to admit the conclusion, or to deny one of the premises. Now it may so happen that in some cases, one person will choose the former, and another the latter, of these alternatives. It is probable, e. g. that many have been induced to admit the doctrine of Transubstantiation, from its clear connexion with the infallibility of the Romish Church; and many others, by the very same Argument, have surrendered their belief in that infallibility. Again, Berkeley and Reid seem to have alike admitted that the non-existence of matter was a necessary consequence of Locke's Theory of Ideas: but the former was hence led, bonâ fide, to admit and advocate that non-existence; while the latter was led by the very same Argument to reject the Ideal Theory. Thus, we see it is possible for the very same Argument to be Direct to one person, and Indirect to another; leading them to different results, according as they judge the original conclusion, or the contradictory of a premiss, to be the more probable. This, therefore, is not properly a division of Arguments as such, but a division of the purposes for which they are employed.

Dvision of Argumeuts as such.

The fourth, which alone is properly a division of Arguments as such, and accordingly will be principally treated of, is a division according to the "relation of the subject-matter of the premises to that of the conclusion." I say, " of the subject-matter," because the logical connexion between the premises and conclusion is independent of the meaning of the terms employed, and may be exhibited with letters of the alphabet substituted for the terms; but the relation I am now speaking of between the premises and conclusion, (and the varieties of which form the several species of Arguments,) is in respect of their subject-matter: as e. g. an "Argument from Cause to Effect" is so called and considered, in reference to the relation existing between the premiss, which is the Cause, and the conclusion, which is the Effect; and an "Argument from Example," in like manner, from the relation between a known and an unknown instance, both belonging to the same class. And it is plain that the present division, though it has a reference to the subject-matter of the premises, is yet not a division of propositions considered by themselves, (as in the case with the division into "probable" and "demonstrative," but of Arguments considered as such; for when we say, e. g. that the premiss is a Cause, and the conclusion the Effect, these expressions are evidently relative, and have no meaning, except in reference to each other; and so also when we say that the premiss and the conclusion are two parallel cases, that very expression denotes their relation to each other.