§ 4.

Character of

From what has been said of the speaker's recommendation of himself to the audience, and estabopponent. lishment of his authority with them, sufficient rules may readily be deduced for the analogous process, the depreciation of an opponent. Both of these, and especially the latter, under the offensive title of personality, are by many indiscriminately decried as unfair Rhetorical artifices; and doubtless they are, in the majority of cases, sophistically employed; and by none more effectually than by those who are perpetually declaiming against such Fallacies; the unthinking hearers not being prepared to expect any from those who represent themselves as holding them in such abhorrence. But surely it is not in itself an unfair topic of argument, in cases not admitting of decisive and unquestionable proof, to urge that the one party deserves the hearers' confidence, or that the other is justly an object of their distrust. "If the measure is a good one," it has been said, "will it become bad because it is supported by a bad man? if it is bad, will it become good, because supported by a good man? If the measure be really inexpedient, why not at once shew that it is so? Your producing these irrelevant and inconclusive arguments, in lieu of direct ones, though not sufficient to prove that the measure you thus oppose is a good one, contributes to prove that you yourself regard it as a good one." Now to take thus for granted, that in every case, decisive arguments to prove a measure bad or good, independent of all consideration of the character of its advocates, could be found, and could be made clear to the persons addressed, is a manifest petitio principii. There is no

doubt that the generality of men are too much disposed to consider more, who proposes a measure, than what it is that is proposed; and probably would continue to do so, even under a system of annual Parliaments and universal suffrage; and if a warning be given against an excessive tendency to this way of judging, it is reasonable, and may be useful; nor should any one escape censure who confines himself to these topics, or dwells principally on them, in cases where "direct" arguments are to be expected; but they are not to be condemned in toto as "irrelevant and inconclusive," because they are only probable, and not in themselves decisive; it is only in matters of strict science, and that too, in arguing to scientific men,* that the character of the advisers (as well as all other probable Arguments) should be wholly put out of the question.

And it is remarkable that the necessity of allowing some weight to this consideration, in political matters, increases in proportion as any country enjoys a free government. If all the power be in the hands of a few of the higher orders, who have the opportunity at least of obtaining education, it is conceivable, whether probable or not, that they may be brought to try each proposed measure exclusively on its intrinsic merits, by abstract arguments; but can any man, in his senses, really believe that the great mass of the people, or even any considerable portion of them, can ever possess so much political knowledge, patience in investigation, and sound Logic, (to say nothing of candour,) as to be able

* Qu. Is every one chargeable with weakness or absurdity who believes that the earth moves round the Sun, on the authority of Astronomers, without having himself scientifically demonstrated it?

and willing to judge, and to judge correctly, of every proposed political measure, in the abstract, without any regard to their opinion of the persons who propose it? And it is evident that in every case in which the hearers are not completely competent judges, they not only will, but must, take into consideration the characters of those who propose, support, or dissuade any measure; - the persons they are connected with,—the designs they may be supposed to entertain, &c.; though, undoubtedly, an excessive and exclusive regard to Persons rather than Arguments, is one of the chief Fallacies against which men ought to be cautioned.

But if the opposite mode of judging in every case were to be adopted without limitation, it is plain that children could not be educated. Indeed, happily for the world, most of them, who were allowed to proceed on this plan, would in consequence perish in childhood. A pious Christian again has the same implicit reliance on his God, even where unable to judge of the reasonableness of his commands and dispensations, as a dutiful and affectionate child has on a tender parent. Now though such a man is of course regarded by an Atheist as weak and absurd, it is surely on account of his belief, not of his consequent conduct, that he is so regarded. Even Atheists would in general admit that he is acting reasonably, on the supposition that there is a God, who has revealed himself to man.

§ 5.

In no way, perhaps, are men, not bigoted to party, more likely to be misled by their favourable Authority or unfavourable judgment of their advisers, than in what relates to the authority derived experience.

derived from

from Experience. Not that Experience ought not to be allowed to have great weight; but that men are apt not to consider with sufficient attention, what it is that constitutes Experience, in each point: so that frequently one man shall have credit for much Experience, in what relates to the matter in hand, and another, who, perhaps, possesses as much, or more, shall be underrated as wanting it. The vulgar, of all ranks, need to be warned first, that time alone does not constitute Experience; so that many years may have passed over a man's head, without his even having had the same opportunities of acquiring it, as another, much younger : secondly, that the longest practice in conducting any business in one way, does not necessarily confer any Experience in conducting it in a different way; e. g. an experienced Husbandman, or Minister of State, in Persia, would be much at a loss in Europe and if they had some things less to learn than an entire novice, on the other hand they would have much to unlearn: and, thirdly, that merely being conversant about a certain class of subjects, does not confer Experience in a case where the Operations, and the End proposed, are different. It is said that there was an Amsterdam merchant, who had dealt largely in corn all his life, who had never seen a field of wheat growing; this man had doubtless acquired, by Experience, an accurate judgment of the qualities of each description of corn,—of the best methods of storing it,—of the arts of buying and selling it at proper times, &c.; but he would have been greatly at a loss in its cultivation; though he had been, in a certain way, long conversant about corn. Nearly similar is the Experience of a practised Lawyer, (supposing him to be nothing more,) in a

case of Legislation; because he has been long conver sant about Law, the unreflecting attribute great weight to his judgment; whereas his constant habits of fixing his thoughts on what the law is, and withdrawing it from the irrelevant question of what the law ought to be;his careful observance of a multitude of rules, (which afford the more scope for the display of his skill, in proportion as they are arbitrary, unreasonable, and unaccountable,) with a studied indifference as to that which is foreign from his business, the convenience or inconvenience of those Rules,-may be expected to operate unfavourably on his judgment in questions of Legislation: and are likely to counterbalance the advantages of his superior knowledge, even in such points as do bear on the question.

In matters connected with Political-economy, the experience of practical men is often appealed to in opposition to those who are called Theorists; even though the latter perhaps are deducing conclusions from a wide induction of facts, while the experience of the others will often be found only to amount to their having been long conversant with the details of office, and having all that time gone on in a certain beaten track, from which they never tried, or witnessed, or even imagined, a deviation.

So also the authority derived from experience of a practical Miner, i. e. one who has wrought all his life in one mine, will sometimes delude a speculator into a vain search for metal or coal, against the opinion perhaps of Theorists, i. e. persons of extensive geological observa

tion.

The consideration then of the character of the speaker, and of his opponent, being of so much importance,