is but one God, we may be certain that whether in one part of bis universe or another, causes have similar relations to their effects. I do not think, therefore, that there are any valid reasons in proof of a future life, in the doctrine which teaches such life to be necessary for rewarding the good and punishing the evil.

C: THE PRESUMPTION THAT MIND IS NOT A MERE MODE NOR RESULT OF MATERIAL ACTION:

Aristotle says:

σε Φανερον ότι το γεννων τοιουτον μεν διον το γεννωμένον, ου μεντοι το αυτό γε, ουδ' εν τῳ αριθμῳ αλλα ειδει, διον εν τοις φυσιο κοις: ανθρωπος γαρ ανθρωπον γεννα, αν μη τι παρα φυσιν γεννεται, διον ἵππος ἡμιονον It is evident that what is begotten is like that which begets, not indeed the same, nor is it one in number, but in kind, as in physical things: man begets man, and nothing contrary to the nature of the thing begetting is begotten; the horse cannot beget the donkey." (Meta. VI, 8, 8).

This law is universally accepted as expressing a general truth; nor is it in conflict with any law of Evolution. The latter has reference only to infinitesimal variations in the same nature or organism, and the fact that these variations may and do receive in descent constant increments and finally result in new orders, classes, or even genera. But no Evolutionist will admit that out of one organism there may be evolved another which differs in nature from the producing or evolving organism. This law being uni

has, I would say "the fact that you do not believe this, is conclusive proof of your ignorance of those laws; therefore, study them more." Moreover, we should not forget that a passive punishment is no less a punishment than an active one. Whether we know it or not, it is certain that deprivation of any pleasure is partial death. Deprived of one sense, one mode of consciousness, man is partly dead; deprived of all the senses, all modes of consciousness, man is wholly dead. If man's own act has brought upon him the loss, or the inability to appreciate, any pleasurable sensation, such loss or inability is clearly the natural result of a violation of law. A man fails to cultivate his sense of harmony, color, order, or devotion; he finally wakes up to the consciousness that to all these sensations he is dead. He that prays much, in this sense lives much; he that prays little, in this sense lives little; he that prays not at all, in this sense is dead. Such is the natural punishment of his transgression. Is not such a soul, therefore, punished even though of such punishment unconscious? To this question no thoughtful mind can answer other than affirmatively. The harvest is no more a natural result of sowing and cultivating, than are punishment and reward the natural results of our own doing. Were this truth taught a great change would come over human conduct. He who fears not a hell located in some shadowy realm, can but have a horror of the same when fixed in this world as a certain consequent of wrong doing. I, therefore, do not believe that a future life is necessary to reward the good or to punish the evil; the future life, whatever it may be, will have its

is but one God, we may be certain that whether in one part of his universe or another, causes have similar relations to their effects. I do not think, therefore, that there are any valid reasons in proof of a future life, in the doctrine which teaches such life to be necessary for rewarding the good and punishing the evil.

C:

THE PRESUMPTION THAT MIND IS NOT A
MERE MODE NOR RESULT OF MATERIAL
ACTION:

Aristotle says:

σε Φανερον ότι το γεννων τοιουτον μεν διον το γεννωμένον, ου μεντοι το αυτό γε, ουδ' εν τῳ αριθμῳ αλλα ειδει, διον εν τοις φυσικοις: ανθρωπος γαρ ανθρωπον γεννα, αν μη τι παρα φυσιν γεννεται, διον ἵππος ἡμονον It is evident that what is begotten is like that which begets, not indeed the same, nor is it one in number, but in kind, as in physical things: man begets man, and nothing contrary to the nature of the thing begetting is begotten; the horse cannot beget the donkey." (Meta. VI, 8, 8).

This law is universally accepted as expressing a general truth; nor is it in conflict with any law of Evolution. The latter has reference only to infinitesimal variations in the same nature or organism, and the fact that these variations may and do receive in descent constant increments and finally result in new orders, classes, or even genera. But no Evolutionist will admit that out of one organism there may be evolved another which differs in nature from the producing or evolving organism. This law being uni

us one might reasonably hold that in it we have conclusive. proof that so-called mind cannot be a result nor a mode of so-called matter; but it does not follow from this law that mind and matter are not different sides of the same thing, different manifestations or phenomena of the same essence. The admission of the truth of this law, does not, therefore, preclude us from holding that both mind and matter are modes or results of the same and One Universal Essence. There are many philosophers who hold that matter and mind. are essentially different; there are not less but probably many more who hold that the essences of matter and mind' are one. The former are called dualists; the latter, monists. A monist may be either materialistic or spiritualistic; the latter believing that the essences of all things are mind, the former believing that the essences of all things are matter.. The reasons given for dualism are to my mind very unsatis-factory, the reasons given for monism are quite convincing. That the principles of monism are laying hold of the world. of thought, and that they have on their side the weight of philosophic reason, I myself have no doubt whatever. In: accepting dualism a man may find an escape from a few dif-ficulties which follow from the principles of monism; but the new difficulties which arise will be incomparably more than those he escapes. Philosophical researches lead us to unity in all directions, and not less to unity in the substance, than in the cause, of the universes of so-called mind and matter. Says Maxwell: "The total energy of any body or system of bodies is a quantity which can neither be increased nor diminished by any mutual action of such bodies, though.

energy is susceptible." Says Huxley: "The investigation of the phenomena of life in general shows that the physical and chemical changes which take place in the living body are of the same order as those which take place out of it; and that whatever energy is exerted in producing such phenomena, is derived from the common stock of energy in the universe." Says Spencer: "All material substances are divisible into so-called elementary substances, composed of molecular particles of the same nature as themselves; but these molecular particles are complicated structures consisting of congregations of truly elementary atoms identical in nature and differing only in position, arrangement, motion, etc., and the molecules of chemical atoms are produced from the true or physical atoms by processes of evolution under conditions which chemistry has not been able yet to produce." Says Huxley, speaking of the same thing: "I cannot discover that any contemporary physicist or chemist believes in the real indivisibility of the atoms. Is it not probable - the evolution of our elements from a primary undifferentiated form of matter? If all kinds of matter are modifications of one kind, and if all modes of motion are derived from the same energy, the orderly evolution of physical nature out of one substance and one energy, implies that the rules of action of that energy should be fixed and definite."

(The Reign of Queen Victoria, II, 346).

A little knowledge may enable a man to observe the differences between things; much knowledge enables him to observe their similarities or sameness. All the various forms of the so-called organic and inorganic worlds, are all caused