not directly imply it. There can be no plan of moral government that is not built upon it, and every thing that a philosopher understands by the terms accountableness, praise and blame, reward and punishment, &c. neceffarily supposes it, and nothing that refpects` the difcipline of the mind can have any meaning without it. But though, fpeculatively confidered, the doctrine of neceffity must make a part of every general system that is founded on truth, yet, at the fame time, the doctrine of this particular difcourfe is no more neceffarian than every thing that we can preach and inculcate for the moral good of men is fo; and therefore those who are not neceffarians will find no greater difficulty in admitting the doctrine of this discourse in confistency with their peculiar principles, than any other tenet in religion or morals. With much more justice might it be faid, that the doctrine of divine prescience is a neceffarian doctrine, which, however, all who pretend to piety, and especially all who believe the fcriptures, must maintain; and A 4 the the embarrassment they will be under on that subject cannot but be much greater than any that can arise in this cafe. Whatever notion men may entertain of divine and human agency, there must be fomething to which they will give the appellation of the usual, or established course of nature, and, in some sense or other, they must ascribe this to God; for though the decifion of the will be fuppofed to be independent of him, the acting in confequence of it cannot be fo. He muft at least permit, when he might prevent, if he does not directly appoint, whatever comes to pafs. Indeed, according to the doctrine of philofophical liberty, this course of nature must be a thing more evidently diftin&t from the direct interpofition of the deity than upon the doctrine of neceffity, which ultimately ascribes all to God. It must, therefore, be perfectly consistent with the principles of those who are advocates for what they call liberty, to maintain, with me, that the work of converfion and refore reformation is something that takes place according to the usual course of nature, whatever that be, and that it is not to be ascribed to any thing out of it; and they are at liberty to ascribe the opening of the heart of Lydia, and the hardening the heart of Pharaoh, to the former, rather than to the latter of these causes, as much as myself; and accordingly many of them have done fo. Though, believing, as they do, that there are certain precincts, within which the human mind. naturally acts without the control of the deity, they may be inclined to think that his actual interference may be fometimes necesfary; and therefore they will be more easily reconciled to the notion of pretty frequent cccafional, but properly fupernatural influences, than the neceffarian (who, as such, believes that nothing is without the sphere of a properly divine, though regular and constant influence) will chufe to have recourse to. All that the advocates for philofophical liberty can really object to me on this occafion is, the fufficiency of the distinction be tween tween the ordinary and the extraordinary ope ration of the divine being, which is a thing altogether foreign to the proper fubject of this difcourfe, and therefore does not require to be difcuffed in this place. I think I have confidered it sufficiently elsewhere. I may also be thought to have had in my eye, and to have alluded to, the doctrine of neceffity, in some parts of this discourse. This, I own, is very poffible, and, unknown to myself, it may be the cafe with my other writings, even thofe that are the most foreign to the fubject; because it is a doctrine that I wish always to keep in view, and what I would not willingly ever lofe fight of. But this cannot be a material objection to any thing that I have advanced. The candid will find no difficulty in interpreting fuch incidental expreffions (which the more sharp-fighted may think to look that way) according to their own fentiments, or fubftitute others in their places. Had not this objection been actually made to the discourse, I own I should have been far from thinking it neceffary to have have faid any thing on the fubject in this preface. The doctrine of this difcourfe, in common with other great truths, and especially that of the doctrine of neceffity, will probably never be within the clear comprehenfion of the vulgar, so that it will always be unpopular; and, as in all other fuch cases, it must also be expected, that the contrary doctrine will be maintained by fome who rank with the fpeculative and the learned. In particular, bishop Warburton, in his Treatise on Grace, or the office and operation of the Holy Spirit, though he combats what he calls fanatical pretences to divine influence, yet takes it for granted, that the spirit of God abides with the church for ever, "in his office of "Comforter, both in fupporting the will, "and in his office of enlightening or di"recting the understanding"; meaning, no doubt, fome immediate agency of the deity on the mind. This alfo feems to be the general opinion of chriftians, who acquiefce in the most obvious meaning of fcripture lan guage, |