God, and he that has put off his allegiance, cannot expect rationally the benefits of that government which he refuses to be under. 'Tis true, the infinite goodness and clemency of God which is not eafily vanquish'd by man's ingratitude, may purfue fuch a man with repeated overtures and tenders of grace and pardon, and may leave him in the poffeffion of common benefits, fuch as health, plenty, friends, &c. but God will never confer upon him the most excellent gifts, the marks of his especial prefence and particular favour: he will withdraw from him the aids of his fpirit, and leave him to himfel, a blind, indigent, and forlorn creature: The holy Spirit of difcipline will fly deceit, and will not abide when unrighteousness comes in, Wisd. 1. Which is nothing more than that the heathen by the light of nature did affirm concerning his Genius, ἐὰν δὲ πε μαθητών δεί της ψυχήν, ανές ( αυτη καὶ ἀνεπιςάτG, Wicked fouls have no good angels fojurning with them, or prefiding over them. (Max. Tyr. Differ. 26.) Our fouls, like temples, must be prepared and confecrated to him, if we would have God dwell in them. Righteousness and holinefs are the only things that charm and captivate God; nothing else can invite him to dwell with man. This very reafon Maximus lyrius affigns for the refidence and abode of a Damon with Socrates after fo extraordinary a manner. Doft thou wonder that a prophetick Spirit fhould dwell with Socrates fo intimately united, fo friendly, fo infeparable, that he feemed only not Θαυμάζεις τι Σωκράτη συνῆν Δαιμόνιον φίλον, μαντικὸν, αεὶ παρεπό not mixt, and become one with his own mind? with Socrates, whofe purity of body, charity, and goodness of foul, ftrictness of conversation, depth of judgment, melody and perfuafiveness of Speech, religion towards God and inte ME, BY MOTOR BE THE pn aute divansu pagat vor, avogi nawape i To σώμα, αγαθώ δὲ τὴν ψυχήν, ἀκριβεῖ δὲ τὴν δια αιταν, δεινῶ δὲ φρονεῖν, μεσικῷ δὲ εἰπεῖν εἰς δι ευσεβεῖ, ἐσίῳ δὲ grity towards man, render'deity turbii, dolce $3 him worthy of Such a guest, τὰ ἀνθρώπινα. Idem ib. fuch a friend? From all which it is evident, Thirdly, What different rates we are to fet upon the different gifts of God: Every good gift, and every perfect gift comes down from above, Jam. 1. But every gift is not equally good, equally perfect; being neither equally neceffary, nor profitable. Wealth, power, friends, relations, health, ftrength, beauty, wit, difcretion, virtue, are all good, but not all equal; their value is different, and therefore the degrees of our importunity, and of our faith or reliance upon God, must be proportion'd accordingly a confident faith, and an almost impatient zeal, doth well become us, when we feek the kingdom of heaven and the righteousness thereof; when we feek of God the divine gifts of wisdom and virtue; but an humble modefty, and a moft profound fubmiffion, is the ornament and beauty of those who are petitioners for inferiour temporal bleffings: for God has promis'd the former to all that earnestly fue for them, peremptorily and without any tacit refervations: but his promifes of the latter do always imply this condition, If they fhall be for our good: for the perfections of the mind are moral and 1 and immutable beauties; but those of the body, and all the gaudy things of fortune, are like the fading beauties of a flower, the heat scorches it, the cold nips it, every little chance cracks the ftalk, and the hand of a child will serve to crop it. Nothing therefore is more acceptable to God, than the modesty of our petitions for these good things, and the fervency of them for the other; nothing more delightful to him, unless the granting of them. The things therefore that we are to beg of God, not only with the greatest importunity, but alfo in the first place, are those which Maximus Tyrius, Differt. 30. thought the fubject of Socrates's prayers: What are thefe? a virtuous mind, a quiet ftate, an unblameable life, and a chearful death, full of good hopes. of good hopes. These were the matter of his requests; not wealth, or honour, or popula "A ciul TETO LUXETO Xhale Vorro, oras BUXETO i Tois Deois οἴει τότο εὔχετο ὁ Σωκράτης όπως αυτῷ χρήματα γένοιτο, ἢ ὅπως ἄρξη Αθηναίων. αλλ' ἀρετὴν ψυχῆς καὶ ἡσυχίαν βία, καὶ ζωὴν ἄμεμπτον, καὶ ἔνελπιν θάνατον. rity. This at once brings to my thought another objection rais'd against the poffibility of attaining happiness, and inftructs me how to answer it. CHAP. CHA P. IV. Of the influence of fortune on our happiness. The independence of our happiness on fortune already cleared: and why, further confidered. Fortune, what; how far its fway extends. Fortune pretended necessary to remove the impediments of virtue. Every man the architect of his own fortune. Fondnefs for the world Springs from infidelity and fenfuality, and the folly of both. Competency, what; and the use of it with reference to our happiness. The tendency of wealth examined, with reference to the mind, the body, the outward ftate of man. The admiration of wealth arifes from falfe and gawdy appearances. A guilt of their ruin, is fortune. I might Second thing which men charge with the pass over this point flightly; because afflictions will come more properly to be confider'd in the fourth volume, where I treat of indolence: and because I have already clear'd two great truths, which are of themselves abundantly fufficient to baffle and defeat this trifling objection; namely; First, That virtue and vice, wisdom and folly, are the things, to which, generally fpeaking, we owe our temporal profperity or adverfity; and confequently that thofe, fuppofing the ordinary affiftance of God being in our power, these must be fo too. Secondly, That H we we are affur'd of the affiftance of God, even in Sed ei qui ad virtutem tendit, etiam fi multum proceffit, pus eft tamen ali qua fortune indul gentia, adhuc inter any And few exolvit, & omne vin- world, when they talk of the culum mortale. Se. neca de vit. beata. contempt of wealth, it being generally interpreted either in the laziness of an unactive and degenerous mind, or the diffimulation of one who affects to be thought to defy fortune, while he doth fecretly and inwardly repine and fret at the neglect and coldness fhe expreffes toward him. I will therefore bestow a little time on the confideration of this objection. Fortune what. What doft thou mean by fortune? if mere chance, then to envy the lot of others, or murmur at thy own, is folly; if providence, then 'tis impiety: for whatever goodness, guided by unerring wif dom, doth, muft be fo well done that it cannot be |