When Alcibiades was reproached with having little inclination to music he thought fit to make this excuse: "it is for Thebans* to sing as they do, "who know not how to speak." Pindar and Plutarch, who had very little of the soil in them, and who are proofs that genius is of all nations, do themselves condemn the stupidity of their countrymen. Epaminondas did honour to his country, not only by the greatness of his military exploits, but by that sort of merit which results from elevation of genius and the study of science.

I shall conclude his portrait and character with a circumstance that gives place in nothing to all his other excellencies, and which may in some sense be preferred to them, as it expresses a good heart, and a tender and sensible spirit; qualities very rare amongst the great, but infinitely more estimable than all those splendid attributes, which the vulgar of mankind commonly gaze at with admiration, and seem almost the only objects worthy either of being imitated or envied. The victory at Leuctra had drawn the eyes and admiration of all the neighbouring people upon Epaminondas, who looked upon him as the support and restorer of Thebes, as the triumphant conqueror of Sparta, as the deliverer of all Greece; in a word as the greatest man, and the most excellent captain that ever was in the world. In the midst of this universal applause so capable of making the general of an army forget the man for the victor, Epaminondas, little sensible to so affecting and so deserved a glory, "+my joy," said he, "arises from my sense of that which the news of my victory will give my "father and my mother."

Nothing in history seems so valuable to me as such sentiments which do honour to human nature, and proceed from a heart, which neither false glory nor false greatness have corrupted. I confess it is with grief I see these noble sentiments daily expire amongst us, especially in persons whose birth and rank raise them above others, who, too frequently, are neither good fathers, good sons, good husbands, nor good friends, and who would think it a disgrace to them to express for a father and mother the tender regard, of which we have here so fine an example from a pagan.

Until Epaminondas' time, two cities had exercised alternately a kind of empire over all Greece. The justice and moderation of Sparta had at first acquired it a distinguished pre-eminence, which the pride and haughtiness of its generals, and especially of Pausanias, soon lost it. The Athenians, until the Peloponnesian war, held the first rank, but in a manner scarce discernible in any other respect, than their care in acquitting themselves worthily, and in giving their inferiors just reason to believe themselves their equals. They judged at that time and very justly, that the true method of commanding and of continuing their power, was to evidence their superiority only by services and benefactions. Those times, so glorious for Athens, were of about 45 years continuance, and they retained a part of that pre-eminence during the 27 years of the Peloponnesian war, which make in all the 72 or 73 years, which Demosthenes gives to the duration of their empire: but for this latter space of time, the Greeks, disgusted by the haughtiness of Athens, received no laws from that city without reluctance. Hence the Lacedæmonians became again the arbiters of Greece, and continued so from the time Lysander made himself master of Athens, until the first war undertaken by the Athenians,

* They were great musicians.

Plut. in Coriol. p. 215.

Demost. Philip. iii. p. 89.

after their re-establishment by Conon, to withdraw themselves and the rest of the Greeks from the tyranny of Sparta, which was now grown more insolent than ever. At length Thebes disputed the supremacy, and by the exalted merit of a single man, saw itself at the head of all Greece. But that glorious condition was of no long continuance; and the death of Epaminondas, as we have already observed, plunged it again into the obscurity in which he found it.

Demosthenes remarks, in the passage above cited, that the pre-eminence granted voluntarily either to Sparta or Athens, was a pre-eminence of honour, not of dominion, and that the intent of Greece was to preserve a kind of equality and independence in the other cities. Hence, says he, when the governing city attempted to ascribe to itself what did not belong to it, and aimed at any innovations contrary to the rules of justice and established customs, all the Greeks thought themselves obliged to have recourse to arms, and without any motive of personal discontent, to espouse with ardour the cause of the injured.

I shall add here another very judicious reflection from Polybius.* He attributes the wise conduct of the Athenians, in the times I speak of, to the ability of the generals who were then at the head of their affairs; and he makes use of a comparison which explains, not unhappily the character of that people. A vessel without a master, says he, is exposed to great dangers, when every one insists upon its being steered according to his opinion, and will comply with no other measures. If then a rude storm attacks it, the common danger conciliates and unites them; they abandon themselves to the pilɔt's skill, and all the rowers doing their duty, the ship is saved, and in a state of security. But if the tempest ceases, and when the weather grows calm again, the discord of the mariners revives; if they will hearken no longer to the pilot, and some are for continuing their voyage, whilst others resolve to stop in the midst of their course; if on one side they loose their sails, and furl them on the other; it often happens, that after having escaped the most violent storms, they are shipwrecked even in the port. This, says Polybius, is a natural image of the Athenian republic. As long as it suffered itself to be guided by the wise counsels of an Aristides, a Themistocles, a Pericles, it came off victorious from the greatest dangers. But prosperity blinded and ruined it; following no longer any thing but caprice, and being become too insolent to be advised or governed, it plunged itself into the greatest misfortunes.

SECTION VIII.

DEATH OF EVAGORAS, KING OF SALAMIN.-ADMIRABLE CHARACTER OF THAT PRINCE.

THE third year of the 101st Olympiad, † soon after the Thebans had destroyed Platea and Thespiæ, as has been observed before, Evagoras, king of Salamin, in the isle of Cyprus, of whom much has been already said, was assassinated by one of his eunuchs. His son Nicocles succeeded him. He had a fine model before him in the person of his father; and he seemed to make it his duty to be entirely intent upon treading in his steps.t When he took possession of the throne, he found the public

*Polyb. 1. vii. p. 482.

†A. M. 3850. Ant. J. C. 374. Diod. I. xv. p. 363.

Isocrat. ad Nicoc.

treasures entirely exhausted, by the great expences his father had been obliged to be at in the long war between him and the king of Persia. He knew that the generality of princes, upon like occasions, thought every means just for the re-establishment of their affairs; but for him he acted upon different principles. In his reign there was no talk of banishment, taxes, and confiscation of estates. The public felicity was his sole object, and justice his favourite virtue. He discharged the debts of the state gradually, not by crushing the people with excessive imposts, but by retrenching all unnecessary expences, and by using a wise economy in the administration of his revenue. "I am assured *,” said he, "that no cit"izen can complain that I have done him the least wrong; and I have the "satisfaction to know that I have enriched many with an unsparing hand.” He believed this kind of vanity, if it be vanity, might be permitted in a prince, and that it was glorious for him to have it in his power to make his subjects such a defiance.

† He piqued himself also in particular upon another virtue, which is the more admirable in princes, as very uncommon in their fortune; I mean temperance. It is most amiable, but very difficult, in an age and a fortune, to which every thing is lawful, and wherein pleasure, armed with all her arts and attractions, is continually lying in ambush for a young prince, and preventing his desires, to make a long resistance against the violence and insinuation of her soft assaults. Nicocles gloried in having never known any woman besides his wife during his reign, and was amazed that all other contracts of civil society should be treated with due regard, whilst that of marriage, the most sacred and inviolable of obligations, was broke through with impunity, and that men should not blush to commit an infidelity in respect to their wives, of which, should their wives be guilty, it would throw them into the utmost anguish and despair. What I have said of the justice and temperance of Nicocles, Isocrates puts into that prince's own mouth; and it is not probable that he should make him speak in such a manner if his conduct had not agreed with such sentiments. It is in a discourse, supposed to be addressed by that king to his people, wherein he describes to them the duties of subjects to their princes; love, respect, obedience, fidelity, and devotion to their service; and to engage them more effectually to the discharge of those duties, he does not disdain to give them an account of his own conduct and sentiments.

In another discourse, which precedes this, Isocrates explains to Nicocles all the duties of the sovereignty, and makes excellent reflections upon that subject, of which I can repeat here only a very small part. He begins by telling him, that the virtue of private persons is much better supported than his own, by the mediocrity of their condition, by the employments and cares inseparable from it, by the misfortunes to which they are frequently exposed, by their distance from pleasures and luxury, and particularly, by the liberty which their friends and relations have of giv ing them advice; whereas the generality of princes have none of these advantages. He adds, that a king, who would make himself capable of governing well, ought to avoid an idle and inactive life, should set apart a proper time for business and the public affairs, should form his council of the most able and experienced persons in his kingdom, should endeavour to make himself as much superior to others by his merit and wisdom,

as he is by his dignity, and especially acquire the love of his subjects, and for that purpose love them sincerely, and look upon himself as their common father. "Persist," said he," "in the religion you have received from your forefathers; but be assured that the most grateful adoration and sac"rifice that you can offer to the Divinity, is that of the heart, in rendering "yourself good and just. Show, upon all occasions, so high a regard for "truth, that a single word from you may be more confided in than the "oath of others. Be a warrior, by your ability in military affairs, and by such a warlike provision as may intimidate your enemies: but "let your inclinations be pacific, and be rigidly exact in never pretending "to, or undertaking any thing unjustly. The only certain proof that you "have reigned well, will be the power of bearing this testimony to your"self; that your people are become both more happy, and more wise, "under your government.”"

What seems to me most remarkable in this discourse, is that the advice which Isocrates gives the king is neither attended with praises, nor with those studied reservations and artificial turns, without which fearful and modest truth dares not venture to approach the throne. This is most worthy of applause, and more for the prince's than the writer's praise. Nicoles far from being offended at these counsels, received them with joy, and to express his gratitude to Isocrates, made him a present of 20 talents, that is to say 20,000 crowns.

*

SECTION IX.

ARTAXERXES MNEMON UNDERTAKES THE REDUCTION OF EGYPT.

ARTAXERXES,† after having given his people a relaxation of several years, had formed the design of reducing Egypt, which had shaken off the Persian yoke long before, and made great preparations for war for that purpose. Achoris, who then reigned in Egypt, and had given Evagoras powerful aid against the Persians, foreseeing the storm, raised abundance of troops of his own subjects, and took into his pay a great body of Greeks, and other auxiliary soldiers, of whom Chabrias had the command. He had accepted that office without the authority of the republic.

Pharnabasus, having been charged with this war, sent to Athens to complain that Chabrias had engaged himself to serve against his master, and threatened the republic with the king's resentment, if he was not immediately recalled. He demanded at the same time Iphicrates, another Athenian, who was looked upon as one of the most excellent captains of his time, to give him the command of the body of Greek troops in the service of his master. The Athenians who had a great interest in the continuance of the king's friendship, recalled Chabrias, and ordered him upon pain of death, to repair to Athens by a certain day. Iphicrates was sent to the Persian army.

The preparations of the Persians went on so slowly, that two whole years elapsed before they entered upon action. Achoris, king of Egypt, died in that time, and was succeeded by Psammuthis, who reigned but a year. Nephretitus was the next; and four months after, Nectanebis, who reigned 10 or 12 years.

*Plut. in vit. Isoc. p. 838.

+ A. M. 5627. Ant. J. C. 377. Diod. l. xv. p. 328, et 357.

↑ Cor. Nep. in Chab. et in Iphic.

Euseb. in Chron.

*Artaxerxes, to draw more troops out of Greece, sent ambassadors thither, to declare to the several states that the king's intent was they should all live in peace with each other, conformably to the treaty of Antalcides, that all garrisons should be withdrawn, and all the cities suffered to enjoy their liberty under their respective laws. All Greece received this declaration with pleasure, except the Thebans, who refused to conform to it.

At length, every thing being in readiness for the invasion of Egypt, a camp was formed at Acæ, since called Ptolemias, in Palestine, the place appointed for the general rendezvous. In a review there, the army was found to consist of 200,000 Persians, under the command of Pharnabasus, and 20,000 Greeks under Iphicrates. The forces at sea were in proportion to those at land; their fleet consisting of 300 galleys, besides 200 vessels of 30 oars, and a prodigious number of barks, to transport the necessary provisions for the fleet and army.

The army and fleet began to move at the same time, and that they might act in concert, they separated from each other as little as possible. This war was to open with the siege of Pelusium; but so much time had been given the Egyptians, that Nectanebis had rendered the approach to it impracticable both by sea and land. The fleet, therefore, instead of making a descent, as had been projected, sailed forwards and entered the mouth of the Nile called Mendesium. The Nile at that time emptied itself into the sea by seven different channels, of which only two remain at this day; and at each of those mouths there was a fort with a good garrison to defend the entrance. The Mendesium not being so well fortified as that of Pelusium, where the enemy was expected to land, the descent was made with no great difficulty. The fort was carried sword in hand, and no quarter given to those who were found in it.

After this signal action, Iphicrates thought it advisable to re-embark upon the Nile without loss of time, and to attack Memphis the capital of Egypt. If that opinion had been followed before the Egyptians had recovered the panic into which so formidable an invasion, and the blow already received, had thrown them, they had found the capital without any defence, it had inevitably fallen into their hands, and all Egypt been re-conquered. But the gross of the army not being arrived, Pharnabasus believed it necessary to wait its coming up, and would undertake nothing till he bad reassembled all his troops, under pretext that they would then be invincible, and that there would be no obstacle capable of withstanding them.

Iphicrates, who knew that in affairs of war especially, there are certain favourable and decisive moments, which it is absolutely proper to seize, judged quite differently, and in despair to see an opportunity suffered to escape, that might never be retrieved, he made pressing instances for permission to go at least with the 20,000 men under his command. Pharnabasus refused to comply with that demand, out of abject jealousy; apprehending that if the enterprise succeeded, the whole glory of the war would redound to Iphicrates. This delay gave the Egyptians time to look about them. They drew all their troops together into a body, put a good garrison into Memphis, and with the rest of their army kept the field, and harassed the Persians in such a manner that they prevented their advancing further into the country. After which came on the inundation of the Nile, which laying all Egypt under water, the Persians were obliged to

* A. M. 3630. Ant. J. C. 374. Diod. 1. xv. p. 355.

Ibid. p. 358. 359.

+ Damietta and Rosettą.