When the occasion was favourable, they let themselves loose like generous hounds, and after having given them a taste of victory by way of reward, they called them off, contented with their courage and alacrity. The principal glory of their success, and this wise conduct was due to Pelopidas. The engagement at Tegyra, which was a kind of prelude to the battle of Leuctra, added much to his reputation. Having failed in his enterprize against Orchomenos, which had joined the Lacedæmonians, at his return he found the enemy posted to intercept him near Tegyra. As soon as the Thebans perceived them from the defiles, somebody ran in all haste to Pelopidas, and told him, "we are fallen into the enemy's hands." "Ah!" replied he, "why should we not rather say, that they "are fallen into 86 ours!" At the same time he ordered his cavalry, which were his rear guard, to advance to the front, that they might begin the fight. He was assured that his foot, which were only 300, and were called the sacred battalion, would break through the enemy wherever they charged, though superior in number as they were by at least two thirds. The assault began where the generals of each party were posted, and was very rude. The two generals of the Lacedæmonians, who had charged Pelopidas, were presently killed; all that were with them being either slain or dispersed. The rest of the Lacedæmonian troops were so daunted, that they opened a passage for the Thebans, who might have marched on to save themselves if they had thought fit: but Pelopidas, disdaining to make use of that opening for his retreat, advanced against those who were still drawn up in battle, and made so great a slaughter of them, that they were all dismayed and fled in disorder. The Thebans did not pursue them far, lest they should be surprized. They contented themselves with having broken them, and with making a glorious retreat not inferior to a victory, because through the enemy dispersed and defeated. This little encounter, for it can be called no more, was in a manner the source of the great actions and events we are about to treat of. It had never happened till then in any war, either against the barbarians or Greeks, that the Lacedæmonians had been defeated with the superiority of number on their side, nor even in equal forces in battle array. For which reason they were insupportably proud, and their reputation alone kept their enemies in awe, who never durst show themselves in the field before them, unless superior in number. They now lost that glory, and the Thebans in their turn became the terror and dread even of those who had rendered themselves so universally formidable. The enterprize of Artaxerxes Mnemon against Egypt,* and the death of Evagoras king of Cyprus, should naturally come in here. But I shall defer those articles to avoid breaking in upon the Theban affairs. SECTION IV. NEW TROUBLES IN GREECE. THE LACEDÆMONIANS AGAINST THEBES. DECLARE WAR WHILST the Persians were engaged in the Egyptian war, great troubles arose in Greece. In that interval the Thebans, having taken Platæa, and afterwards Thespiæ, entirely demolished those cities, and expelled the inhabitants. The Platæans retired to Athens with their wives * A. M. 3627. Ant. J. C. 377. † A. M. 3633. Ant. J. C. 871. Diod. l. li. p. 361, 562. Platæa, a city of Beotia. Thespiæ of Achaia. VOL. II. 58 and children, where they were received with the utmost favour and adopted into the number of the citizens. * Artaxerxes being informed of the state of the Grecian affairs, sent a new embassy thither to persuade the several cities and republics at war to lay down their arms, and accommodate their differences upon the plan of the treaty of Antalcides. By that peace, as has been observed in its place, it was concluded, that all the cities of Greece should enjoy their liberty, and be governed by their own laws. In virtue of this article, the Lacedæmonians pressed the Thebans to restore their liberty to all the cities of Bootia, to rebuild Platea and Thespia which they had demolished, and to restore them with their dependances to their ancient inhabitants. The Thebans on their side insisted also, that the Lacedæmonians should give liberty to all those of Laconia, and that the city of Messene should be restored to its ancient possessors. This was what equity required; but the Lacedæmonians, believing themselves much superior to the Thebans, were for imposing a law upon them which they would not submit to themselves. All Greece being weary of a war, which had already lasted several campaigns, and had no other end than the aggrandizing of that state, was seriously intent upon a general peace, and, with that view, had sent deputies to Lacedæmon, to concert together the means of attaining so desirable an effect. Among those deputies Epaminondas was of the first rank. He was at that time celebrated for his great erudition and profound knowledge in philosophy; but he had not yet given any very distinguished proofs of his great capacity for the command of armies, and the administration of public affairs. Seeing that all the deputies, out of respect for Agesilaus, who declared openly for the war, were afraid to contradict him or to differ from his opinion in any thing, a very common effect of too imperious a power on one side, and too servile a submission on the other; he was the only one that spoke with a wise and noble boldness, as became a statesman who had no other view but the public good. He made a speech, not for the Thebans alone, but for Greece in general; in which he proved, that the war augmented only the power of Sparta, whilst the rest of Greece was reduced and ruined by it. He insisted principally upon the necessity of establishing the peace in equality and justice, because no peace could be solid and of long duration but that wherein all parties should find an equal advantage. A discourse like this, founded evidently upon reason and justice, and pronounced with a grave and serious tone, never fails of making impression. Agesilaus plainly distinguished from the attention and silence with which it was heard, that the deputies were extremely affected with it, and would not fail to act conformably to his opinion. To prevent that effect, he demanded of Epaminondas, "whether be thought it just and reasonable "that Boeotia should be free and independent?" That is to say, whether he agreed that the cities of Boeotia should depend no longer upon Thebes Epaminondas immediately asked in his turn with great vivacity, whether "he thought it just and reasonable, that Laconia should enjoy the same independence and liberty?" Upon which Agesilaus rising from his seat in great rage, insisted upon his declaring plainly, "whether he would consent that Boeotia should be free?" Epaminondas retorted this question again, and asked, "whether on his side, he would consent that Laconis 66 Xenoph. Hist. Græc. l. vi. p. 590-593. Dion. p. 365, S65. "should be free?" Agesilaus who wanted only a pretext for breaking with the Thebans, struck them directly out of the treaty of alliance, which they were about to conclude. The rest of the allies signed it, less out of inclination, than not to offend the Lacedæmonians, whose power they dreaded. * In consequence of this treaty, all the troops in the field were to be disbanded. Cleobrotus, one of the kings of Sparta, was then at Phocis, at the head of the army. He wrote to the ephori to know the republic's res olutions. Prothous, one of the principal senators, represented, that there was no room for deliberations, for that Sparta, by the late agreement, had made the recal of the troops indispensable; Agesilaus was of a very different opinion. Angry with the Thebans, and particularly with Epami nondas, he was absolutely bent on the war for an opportunity of revenge; and the present seemed most favourable, when all Greece was free and united, and only the Thebans excluded the treaty of peace. The advice of Prothous was therefore rejected by the whole council, who treated him as an honest well meaning dotard, that knew nothing of the matter; the Divinity, from thenceforth, as Xenophon observes, promoting their downfall. The ephori wrote immediately to Cleombrotus, to march against the Thebans with his troops, and sent orders at the same time to all their allies to assemble their forces, who were averse to this war, and did not join in it but with great reluctance, and out of fear of contradicting the Lacedæmonians, whom they did not yet dare to disobey. Though no happy consequences could be expected from a war, visibly undertaken contrary to all reason and justice, and from the sole motive of resentment and revenge the Lacedæmonians, however, from the superiority of their numbers, assured themselves of success, and imagined that the Thebans, abandoned by their allies, were in no condition to oppose them. The Thebans were much alarmed at first. They saw themselves alone, without allies to support, whilst all Greece looked upon them as utterly lost; not knowing that in a single man they had more than armies. This was Epaminondas. He was appointed general, and had several colleagues joined in commission with him. He immediately raised all the troops he could, and began his march. His army did not amount to 6000 men, and the enemy had above four times that number. As several bad omens were told him to prevent his setting out, he replied only by a verse of Homer, of which the sense is, "there is but one good omen to fight for one's country." However, to reassure the soldiers, by nature superstitious, and whom he observed to be discouraged, he instructed several persons to come from different places, and report auguries and omens in his favour, which revived the spirit and hopes of the troops. Pelopidas was not then in office, but commanded the sacred battalion. When he left his house to go to the army, his wife, in taking her last adieu, conjured him with a flood of tears to take care of himself: That," "said he," should be recommended to young people; but for generals, they "have no occasion for such advice; the care of others should be recom"mended to them." Epaminondas had wisely taken care to secure a pass, by which Cleombrotus might have shortened his march considerably. The latter after * Xenoph. I. vi. p. 593-597. Diod. l. xv. p. S65—371. Plut. in Ages. p. 611, 612. Id. in Pelop. p. 288, 289. † A M. 3634 Ant. J. C. 370. Η Εις οιωνός άριτος, αμυνεσθαι περί πάτρης. Iliad. xi. v. 423. having taken a large compass, arrived at Leuctra, a small town of Boeotia, between Plataa and Thespiæ. Both parties consulted whether they should give battle; which Cleombrotus resolved by the advice of all his officers, who represented to him, that if he declined fighting with such a superiority of troops, it would confirm the current report, that he secretly favoured the Thebans. The latter had an essential reason for hastening a battle before the arrival of the troops, which the enemy daily expected. However, the six generals, who formed the council of war, differed in their sentiments. The seventh, who was Epaminondas, came in very good time to join the three that were for fighting, and his opinion carrying the question, the battle was resolved upon. This was in the second year of the 102d Olympiad. The two armies were very unequal in number. That of the Lacedæmonians, as has been said, consisted of 24,000 foot, and 1600 horse. The Thebans had only 6000 foot and 400 horse; but all of them choice troops, animated by their experience of the war, and determined to conquer or die. The Lacedæmonian cavalry, composed of men picked up by chance, without valour, and ill disciplined, was as much inferior to their enemies in courage, as superior in number. The infantry could not be depended on, except the Lacedæmonians; the allies, as has been said, having engaged in the war with reluctance, because they did not approve the motive of it, and were besides dissatisfied with the Lacedæmonians. The ability of the generals on either side supplied the place of numerous armies, especially of the Theban, who was the most accomplished captain of his time. He was supported by Pelopidas at the head of the sacred battalion, composed of 300 Thebans, united in a strict friendship and affection, and engaged under a particular oath never to fly, but to defend each other to the last drop of their blood. Upon the day of battle the two armies drew up on a plain, Cleombrotus was upon the right, consisting of Lacedæmonians, on whom he confided most, and whose files were twelve deep. To take the advantage which his superiority of horse gave him in an open country, he posted them in the front of his Lacedæmonians. Archidamus, Agesilaus' son, was at the head of the allies, who formed the left wing. Epaminondas, who resolved to charge with his left, which he commanded in person, strengthened it with the choice of his heavy armed troops, whom he drew up 50 deep. The sacred battalion was upon his left, and closed the wing. The rest of his infantry were posted upon his right in an oblique line, which, the farther it extended, was the more distant from the enemy. By this uncommon disposition, his design was to cover his flank on the right, to keep off his right wing as a kind of reserved body, that he might not hazard the event of the battle upon the weakest part of his army; and to begin the action with his left wing, where his best troops were posted, to turn the whole weight of the battle upon king Cleombrotus, and the Spartans. He was assured, that if he could penetrate the Lacedæmonian phalanx, the rest of the army would soon be put to the route. As for his horse, he disposed them after the enemy's example in the front of his left. The action began by the cavalry. As that of the Thebans were better mounted, and braver troops than the Lacedæmonian horse, the latter were not long before they were broke, and driven upon the infantry, which they put into some confusion. Epaminondas following his horse close, marched swiftly up to Cleombrotus, and fell upon his phalanx with all the weight of his heavy battalion. The latter, to make a diversion, detached a body of troops with orders to take Epaminondas in flank, and to surround him. Pelopidas, upon the sight of that movement, advanced with incredible speed and boldness at the head of the sacred battalion to prevent the enemy's design, and flanked Cleombrotus himself, who, by that sudden and unexpected attack, was put into disorder. The battle was very rude and obstinate, and whilst Cleombrotus could act, the victory continued in suspense, and declared for neither party. When he fell dead with his wounds, the Thebans, to complete the victory, and the Lacedæmonians, to avoid the shame of abandoning the body of their king, redoubled their efforts, and a great slaughter ensued on both sides. The Spartans fought with so much fury about the body, that at length they gained their point and carried it off. Animated by so glorious an advantage, they prepared to return to the charge, which would perhaps have proved successful, had the allies seconded their ardour. But the left wing, seeing the Lacedæmonian phalanx had been broke, and believing all lost, especially when they heard that the king was dead, took to flight, and drew off the rest of the army along with them. Epaminondas followed them vigorously, and killed a great number in the pursuit. The Thebans remained masters of the field of battle, erected a trophy, and permitted the enemy to bury their dead. The Lacedæmonians had never received such a blow. The most bloody defeats till then had scarce ever cost them more than 400 or 500 of their citizens. They had been seen, however animated, or rather violently incensed, against Athens, to ransom, by a truce of 50 years, about 800 of their citizens, who had suffered themselves to be shut up in the little island of Sphacteria. Here they lost 4000 men, of whom 1000 were Lacedæmonians, and 400 Spartans, * out of 700 who were in the battle. The Thebans had only 300 men killed, among whom were few of their citizens. The city of Sparta celebrated at that time the gymnastic games, and was full of strangers, whom curiosity had brought thither. When the couriers arrived from Leuctra with the terrible news of their defeat, the ephori, though perfectly sensible of all the consequences, and that the Spartan empire had received a mortal wound, would not permit the representations of the theatre to be suspended, nor any changes in the celebration of the festival. They sent to every family the names of their relations who were killed, and staid in the theatre to see that the dances and games were continued without interruption to the end. The next day in the morning the loss of each family being known, the fathers and relations of those who had died in the battle, met in the public place, and saluted and embraced each other with great joy and serenity in their looks; whilst the others kept themselves close in their houses, or if necessity obliged them to go abroad, it was with a sadness and dejection of aspect, which sensibly expressed their profound anguish and affliction. That difference was still more remarkable in the women. Grief, silence, tears, distinguished those who expected the return of their sons; but such as had lost their sons were seen hurrying to the temples to thank the gods, and congratulating each other upon their glory and good fortune. It cannot be denied, but such sentiments argue great courage and resolution ; but I would not have them entirely extinguish natural tenderness, and should have been better pleased, had there been less ferocity in them. *Those were properly called Spartans who inhabited Sparta; the Lacedæ monians were settled in the country. |