תמונות בעמוד
PDF
ePub

down their eyes, and kept a profound silence. Agesilaus, who observed it, replied almost in these terms: "Lord Pharnabasus, you are not igno"rant that war often arms the best friends against each other for the de"fence of their country. Whilst we were such to the king your master, we treated him as a friend; but as we are become his enemies, we make "open war against him, as it is just we should, and endeavour to hurt "him by what we act against you. However, from the instant you shall "think fit to throw off the yoke of bondage, and prefer being called the "the friend and ally of the Greeks, before the name of the king of Persia's "slave, you may reckon that all the troops you see before your eyes, our "arms, our ships, our persons, to the last man of us, are only here to de"fend your possessions, and secure your liberty, which of all blessings is "the most precious and desirable."

Pharnabasus answered, that if the king sent another general in his place, and subjected him to the new comer, he should very willingly accept his of fer; that otherwise he would not depart from the faith he had sworn to him, nor quit his service. Agesilaus then taking him by the hand, and rising with him, replied, "That it were the pleasure of the gods, lord Phar"nabasus, with such noble sentiments, that you were rather our friend than "our enemy!" He promised to withdraw from his government, and never return into it, whilst he could subsist elsewhere.

SECTION IV.

AGESILAUS RECALLED BY THE EPHORI TO DEFEND HIS COUNTRY.

AGESILAUS had been two years at the head of the army,* and had already made the most remote provinces of Asia tremble at his name, and resound with the fame of his great wisdom, disinterestedness, moderation, intrepid valour in the greatest dangers, and invincible patience in supporting the rudest fatigues. Of so many thousand soldiers under his command, not one was worse provided, or lay harder than himself. He was so indifferent as to heat or cold, that he seemed† formed only to support the most rigorous seasons, and such as it pleased God to send: which are Plutarch's express words.

The most agreeable of all sights to the Greeks settled in Asia, was to see the lieutenants of the great king, his satraps, and other great lords, who were formerly so haughty and untractable, soften their note in the presence of a man meanly clad, and at his single word, however short and laconic, change their language and conduct, and in a manner transform themselves into different creatures. Deputies from all parts were sent by the people to form alliances with him, and his army increased every day by the troops of the barbarians that came to join him.

All Asia was already in motion, and most of the provinces ready to revolt. Agesilaus had already restored order and tranquility in all the cities, had reinstated them in the possession of their liberty under reasonable modifications, not only without shedding of blood, but even without banishing a single person. Not content with such a progress, he had formed the design of attacking the king of Persia in the heart of his dominions, to put him in fear of his own person, and the tranquility he enjoyed in

* A. M. 3610. Ant. J. C. 394. Plut. in Agesil. p. 603, 694. Xen. in Agesil. p.

657.

† Ωσπερ μόνος αει χρησθαι ταις υπο θες κεκραμέναις ωραίς πεφυκώς.

Ecbatana and Susa, and to find him so much business as should make it impracticable for him to embroil all Greece from his cabinet, by corrupting the orators and persons of greatest authority in its cities with his presents.

* Tithraustes, who commanded for the king in Asia, seeing the tendency of Agesilaus' designs, and desiring to prevent their effects, had sent Timocrates of Rhodes into Greece, with great sums of money to corrupt the principal persons in the cities, and by their means occasion defections against Sparta. He knew that the haughtiness of the Lacedæmonians, (for all their generals did not resemble Agesilaus) and the imperious manner with which they treated their neighbours and allies, especially since they considered themselves as the masters of Greece, had universally disgusted the people, and excited a jealousy that waited only an occasion to break out against them. This severity of governing had a natural cause in their education. Accustomed from their infancy to obey without delay or reply, first to their tutors, and afterwards to their magistrates, they exacted a like submission from the cities in their dependance, were easily incensed by the least opposition, and by this excessive severity rendered them selves insupportable.

Tithraustes therefore did not find it difficult to draw off the allies from their party. Thebes, Argos, Corinth, entered into his measures: the deputy did not go to Athens. These three cities, influenced by those that governed them, made a league against the Lacedæmonians, who on their side prepared vigorously for the war. The Thebans at the same time sent deputies to the Athenians, to implore their aid, and that they would enter into the alliance. The deputies, after having slightly passed over their ancient divisions, insisted strongly upon the considerable service they had rendered Athens, in refusing to join its enemies when they endeavoured its final destruction. They represented to them the favourable opportunity that of fered for reinstating themselves in their ancient power, and to deprive the Lacedæmonians of the empire of Greece: that all the allies of Sparta, either without or within Greece, were weary of their severe and unjust sway, and waited only the signal to revolt: that the moment the Athenians should declare themselves, all the cities would rouse up at the sound of their arms, and that the king of Persia, who had sworn the ruin of Sparta, would aid them with his forces both by sea and land.

Thrasybulus, whom the Thebans had supplied with arms and money, when he undertook the re-establishment of the Athenian liberty, seconded their demand with great vigour, and the aid was unanimously resolved. The Lacedæmonians on their side took the field without loss of time, and entered Phocis. Lysander wrote to Pausanias, who commanded one of the two armies, to give him notice to march early the next day to Haliartus, which he designed to besiege, and that he should be there himself by sun-rise. The letter was intercepted. Lysander, after having waited his coming up a great while, was obliged to engage, and was killed in the batle. Pausanias received this bad news on his way; but however continued his march to Haliartus, and called a council of war to consider upon a second battle. He did not think it consistent with prudence to hazard it, and contented himself with making a truce to remove the bodies of those who had fallen in the former fight. Upon his return to Sparta, he was cited to give an account of his conduct, and refusing to appear, was condemned to die. But he avoided the execution of that sentence by flight,

Xenoph. Hist. Græc. 1. iii. p. 502-507. Plut. in Lysand. p. 449-451.

and retired to Tegæum, where he passed the remainder of his life under the shelter and protection of Minerva, to whom he had rendered himself a suppliant, and died of disease.

Lysander's poverty having been discovered after his death, did great honour to his memory; when it was known, that of all the gold and riches which had passed through his hands, of a power so extensive as his had been, of so many cities under his government, and which made their court to him, in a word, of that kind of dominion and sovereignty always exercised by him, he had made no manner of advantage for the advancement and enriching of his house.

Some days before his death, two of the principal citizens of Sparta had contracted themselves to his two daughters; but when they knew in what condition he had left his affairs, they refused to marry them. The republic did not suffer so sordid a baseness to go unpunished, nor Lysander's poverty, which was the strongest proof of his justice and virtue, to be treated as an obstacle to allying into his family. They were fined in a great sum, publicly disgraced, and exposed to the contempt of all persons of honour for at Sparta there were penalties established, not only for such as refused to marry, or married too late, but also for those who married amiss ; and those especially were reckoned of this number, who instead of allying into houses of virtue, and with their own relations, had no other motive but wealth and lucre in marriage. An admirable law, and highly tending to perpetuate probity and honour in families, which an impure mixture of blood" and manners," seldom fails to alter and efface!

It must be owned that a generous disinterestedness in the midst of all that could inflame and gratify the lust of gain, is very rare, and well worthy of admiration: but in Lysander, it was attended with great defects which entirely obscure its lustre. Without speaking of his imprudence in introducing gold and silver into Sparta, which he despised himself, though he rendered it estimable to his country, and thereby occasioned its ruin, what opinion can we have of a man, brave indeed, well read in men, skilful in affairs, and of great ability in the arts of government, and what is commonly called policy, but who regards probity and justice as nothing; to whom falsehood, fraud, and perfidy, appear legal methods for the attainment of his ends; who does not fear for the advancement of his friends, and the augmenting of his creatures, to commit the most flagrant injustice and oppressions, and is not ashamed to profane whatever is most sacred in religion, even to the corrupting of priests, and forging of oracles, to satiate the empty ambition of being equal to a king, and of ascending the throne ?

When Agesilaus was upon the point of leading his troops into Persia, the Spartan Epicydidas arrived to let him know that Sparta was threatened with a furious war; that the Ephori recalled him, and ordered him to return immediately for the defence of his country. Agesilaus did not deliberate a moment, but returned this answer immediately to the Ephori, which Plutarch has transmitted to us. "† Agesilaus to the Ephori, greeting. We have reduced part of Asia, put the barbarians to flight, and "inade great preparations for war in Ionia: but as you order me to return, "I am not far behind this letter, and should prevent it if possible. I re"ceived the command, not for myself, but my country and its allies. I

[ocr errors]

*Xenoph. hist. Græc. l. iv. p. 513,

603, 604.

Plut. in Apoph. Laconic. p. 211.

66

Idem in Agesil. p. 657. Plat. in Agesil. p.

"know that a general does not deserve, or possess that name really, "but as he submits to the laws and the Ephori, and obeys the magis"trates."

This ready obedience of Agesilaus has been much admired and applauded, and not without reason. Hannibal, though depressed with misfortunes, and driven almost entirely out of Italy, obeyed the citizens with great reluctance, when they recalled him to deliver Carthage from the dangers that threatened it. Here a victorious prince, ready to enter the enemy's country, and to attack the king of Persia even upon his throne, almost assured of the success of his arms, on the first order of the Ephori, renounces the most soothing hopes, and the most exalted expectations. He demonstrates the truth of what was said, "That at Sparta the laws ruled men, and not "men the laws."

On his departure he said, "That 30,000 of the king's archers drove him out of Asia;" alluding in these words to a species of Persian coin, which had on one side the figure of an archer, 30,000 of which pieces of money had been dispersed in Greece to corrupt the orators and persons of greatest power in the cities.

[ocr errors]

Agesilaus in quitting Asia, where he was regretted as the common father of the people, appointed Euxenes his lieutenant, and gave him 4000 men for the defence of the country. Xenophon went with him. He left at Ephesus, with Megabysus the guardian of Diana's temple, half the gold he had brought with him from his expedition into Persia with Cyrus, to keep it for him in trust, and in case of death, to consecrate it to the goddess.

In the mean time the Lacedæmonians had raised an army, and given the command of it to Aristodemus, tutor to king Agesipolis, then an infant. Their enemies assembled to concert the operations of the war. Timolaus of Corinth said, the Lacedæmonians were like a river that grew larger as it removed from its source; or to a swarm of bees, which it is easy to burn in their hive, but disperse themselves a great way when they fly abroad, and become formidable by their stings. He was therefore of opinion, that it was proper to attack them in their capital; which was approved and resolved. But the Lacedæmonians did not give them time. They took the field and found the enemy near Nemæa, a city not very remote from Corinth, where a rude battle ensued. The Lacedæmonians had the advantage, which was very considerable. Agesilaus having received this news at Amphipolis, as he was hastening to the relief of his country, sent it directly to the cities of Asia for their encouragement, and to give them hopes of his speedy return, if the success of affairs would admit it.

When the approach of Agesilaus was known at Sparta, the Lacedæmonians who remained in the city, to do him honour for the ready obedience he had paid to their orders, caused proclamations to be made by sound of trumpet, that all young persons who were willing to aid their king might come and list themselves for that purpose. Not one of them failed to enter himself immediately with the utmost joy. But the Ephori chose only 50 of the bravest and most robust, whom they sent to him, and desired that he would enter Bootia with the utmost expedition; which he accordingly did.

About the same time the two flects came up with each other near Cni

M Xenoph. hist. Græc. I. iv. p. 515.
Xenoph. p. 514--517.

Xenoph. Hist. Græc. l. iv. p. 518.

Xenoph. de exped. Cyr. 1. v. p. 350.

I Plut. in Agesil. p. 605.

Diod. 1. xiv. p. 302. Justin. 1. vi. c. 2. et 5.

dos, a city of Caria. That of the Lacedæmonians was commanded by Pisander, Agesilaus' brother in law, and that of the Persians by Pharnabasus and Conon the Athenian. The latter observing that the king of Persia's supplies came slowly, and occasioned the loss of many opportunities, had resolved to go in person to the court, to solicit the king's assistance. As he would not prostrate himself before him, according to the Persian custom, he could not explain himself but by the intervention of others. He represented to him, with a force and spirit seldom pardoned in those who treat with princes, that it was equally shameful and astonishing, that his ministers, contrary to his intention, should suffer his affairs to be disconcerted and ruined for want of the necessary expences; that the richest king in the world should give place to his enemies in the very point he was so infinitely superior to them, that is in riches; and that for want of remitting the sums his service required to his generals, all their designs were rendered abortive. These remonstrances were free, but just and solid. The king received them perfectly well, and showed, by his example, that truth may often be spoken to princes with success, if courage were not wanting. Conon obtained all he demanded, and the king made him admiral of his fleet.

It was composed of more than 90 galleys, to which the enemy's was somewhat inferior in number. They came in view of each other near Cnidos, a maritime city of Asia Minor. Conon, who had in some measure occasioned the taking of Athens by the loss of the sea fight near Ægospotamos, used extraordinary efforts in this to retrieve his misfortune, and to obliterate by a glorious victory the disgrace of his former defeat. *He had this advantage, that in the battle he was going to give, the Persians would be at the whole expence, and bear all the loss themselves; whereas the entire fruits of the victory would redound to the Athenians, without hazarding any thing of their own. Pisander had also strong motives to show his valour upon this occasion, that he might not degenerate from the glory of his brother in law, and to justify the choice he had made in appointing him admiral. In effect, he behaved with extreme valour, and had at first some advantage; but the battle growing warm, and the allies of Sparta betaking themselves to flight, he could not resolve to follow them, and died sword in hand. Conon took 50 galleys, and the rest escaped to Cnidos. The consequence of this victory was the revolt of almost all the allies of Sparta, several of whom declared for the Athenians, and the rest resumed their ancient liberty. After this battle the affairs of the Lacedæmonians daily declined. All their actions in Asia were no more than the feeble efforts of an expiring power, till the defeats of Leuctra and Mantinea completed their downfall.

+ Isocrates makes a very just reflection upon the revolutions of Sparta and Athens, which had always their source and origin in the insolent prosperity of both those republics. The Lacedæmonians, who were at first acknowledged masters of Greece, without opposition, fell from their authority only by their enormous abuse of it. The Athenians succeeded them in power, and at the same time in pride; and we have seen into what an abyss of misfortunes it precipitated them. Sparta having gained the superiority by the defeat of the Athenians in Sicily, and the taking of their city, might have improved in their measures from the double expe

*Eo speciosius quod ne ipsorum quidem Atheniensium, sed alieni imperii viriBus dimicet, pugnaturus periculo regis, victurus præmio patriæ. Justin. 1soc. in Orat. Areop. p. 278-230.

VOL. II.

37

« הקודםהמשך »