CHAPTER III. THE WAR OF PELOPONNESUS. THE Peloponnesian war,* which I am now entering upon, began about the end of the first year of the 87th Olympiad, and lasted 27 years. Thucydides has written the history of it to the 21st year inclusively. He gives us an accurate account of the several transactions of every year, which he divides into campaigns and winter-quarters. However, I shall not be so minute, and shall only extract such parts of it as appear most entertaining and instructive. Plutarch and Diodorus Siculus, will also be of great assistance to me on this occasion. SECTION I. THE SIEGE OF PLATEA BY THE THEBANS, &c. &c. THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR. THE first act of hostility by which the war began,† was committed by the Thebans who besieged Platea, a city of Boeotia, in alliance with Athens. They were introduced into it by treachery; but the citizens falling upon them in the night, killed them, about 200 excepted, who were taken prisoners, and who a little after were put to death. The Athenians, as soon as the news was brought of the action at Platæa, sent succours and provisions thither, and cleared the city of all persons who were incapable of bearing arms. The truce being evidently broke, both sides prepared openly for war; and ambassadors were sent to all places to strengthen themselves by the alliance of the Greeks and barbarians. Every part of Greece was in motion, some few states and cities excepted, which continued neuter, till they should see the event of the war. The majority were for the Lacdæmonians, as being the deliverers of Greece, and espoused their interest very warmly, because the Athenians, forgetting that the moderation and gentleness with which they commanded over others had procured them many allies, had afterwards alienated the greatest part of them by their pride and the severity of their government, and incurred the hatred, not only of those who were then subject to them, but of all such as were apprehensive of becoming their dependants. In this temper of mind were the Greeks at that time. The confederates of each of those states were as follow: All Peloponnesus, Argos excepted, which stood neuter had declared for Lacedæmonia. The Achaians, the inhabitants of Peilene excepted, had also joined them; but the latter also engaged insensibly in that war. Out of Peloponnesus were the people of Megara, Locris, Boeotia, Phocis, Ambracia, Lencadia, and Anactorium. The confederates of the Athenians were, the people of Chios, Lesbos, Platea, the Messenians of Naupactus; the greatest part of the Acarnanians, Corcyrans, Cephalenians, and Zacynthians: besides the several tributary countries as maritime Caria, Doria, which lies near it, Ionia, the Hellespont; and the cities of Thrace, Chalcis, and Potidea excepted; all the * A. M. 3573. Ant. J. C. 431. Thucyd. 1. ii. p. 98-122. Diod. 1. xii. p. 97-100. Plut. in Pericl. p. 170. islands between Crete and Peloponnesus, eastward; and the Cyclades, Melos and Thera excepted. Immediately after the attempt on Platea, the Lacedæmonians had ordered forces to be levied both within and without Peloponnesus, and made all the preparations necessary for entering the enemy's country. All things being ready, two thirds of the troops marched to the isthmus of Corinth, and the rest were left to guard the country. Archidamus, king of Lacedæmonia, who commanded the army, assembled the generals and chief officers, and calling up the remembrance of the great actions performed by their ancestors, and those they themselves had done, or been eye witnesses to, he exhorted them to support with the utmost efforts of their valour, the pristine glory of their respective cities, as well as their own fame. He declared that the eyes of all Greece were upon them; and that in expectation of the issue of a war which would determine its fate, they were incessantly addressing heaven in favour of a people who were as dear to them as the Athenians were become odious: that, however, he could not deny but that they were going to march against an enemy, who though greatly inferior to them in numbers and in strength, were nevertheless very powerful, warlike, and daring, and whose courage would doubtless be still more inflamed by the sight of danger, and the laying waste of their territories that therefore they must exert themselves to the utmost to spread an immediate terror in the country they were going to enter, and to inspire the allies with new vigour. The whole army answered in the loudest acclamations of joy, and assured their generals that they would do their duty. The assembly breaking up, Archidamus, still zealous for the welfare of Greece, and meditating how he might best prevent a rupture, the dreadful consequences of which he foresaw, sent a Spartan to Athens, to endeavour, before they should come to hostilities, to prevail, if possible, with the Athenians to lay aside their designs, since otherwise an army would soon march into Attica. But the Athenians, so far from admitting him to audience, or hearing his reasons, would not so much as suffer him to come into their city; Pericles having prevailed with the people to make an order, that no herald or ambassador should be received from the Lacedæmonians till they had first laid down their arms. In consequence of this, the Spartan was commanded to leave the country that very day; and an escort was sent to guard him to the frontiers, and to prevent his speaking to any person by the way. At his taking leave of the Athenians, he told them, that from that day great calamities would ensue to all Greece. Archidamus seeing no hopes of a reconciliation, marched for Attica, at the head of 60,000 chosen forces. Pericles before the Lacedæmonians had entered this country, declared to the Athenians, that should Archidamus, when he was laying waste their territories, spare his (Pericles) lands, either on account of the right of hospitality which subsisted between them, or to furnish his enemies, and those who envied him, with a handle to slander him, as holding intelligence with him, he declared that from that day he made over all his lands and houses to the city of Athens. He remonstrated to the Athenians, that it was their interest to consume the enemy's troops, by protracting the war; and that, for this purpose, they must immediately remove all their effects out of the country, retire to the city, and shut themselves up in it without ever hazarding a battle. The Athenians, indeed, had not forces * Gnarus primis eventibus metum aut fiduciam gigni, Tacit. Ann. I. xiii, c. 31. enough to take the field and oppose the enemy. Their troops, exclusive of those in garrison, amounted but to 13,000 heavy armed soldiers, and 16,000 inhabitants, including young and old, the citizens as well as others, who were appointed to defend Athens: and besides these, 1200 troopers, including the archers who rode on horseback, and 1600 foot archers. This was the whole army of the Athenians. But their chief strength consisted in a fleet of 300 galleys, part of which were ordered to lay waste the enemy's country, and the rest to awe the allies, on whom contributions were levied, without which the Athenians could not defray the expences of the war. The Athenians, animated by the warm exhortations of Pericles, brought from the country their wives, their children, their moveables, and all their effects, after which they pulled down their houses, and even carried off the timber of them. With regard to the cattle of all kinds, they conveyed them into the island of Euboea and the neighbouring isles. However, they were deeply afflicted at the sad and precipitate migration, and it even forced tears from their eyes. From the time the Persians left their country, that is, for near 50 years, they had enjoyed the sweets of peace, wholly employed in cultivating their lands, and feeding their flocks. But now, sad fate of war! they were obliged to abandon every thing. They took up their habitations in the city, as conveniently as they could, in the midst of such confusion; retiring either to their relations or friends; and some withdrew even to the temples and other public places. In the mean time the Lacedæmonians, being set out upon their march, entered the country, and encamped at Enoe, which is the first fortress towards Boeotia. They employed a long time in preparing the attack, and raising the batteries; for which reason complaints were made against Archidamus, as if he carried on the war indolently, because he had not approved of it. He was accused of being too slow in his marches, and of encamping too long near Corinth. He was also charged with having been too dilatory in raising the army, and having desired to give the Athenians opportunity to carry off all their effects out of the country; whereas, they said, had he marched speedily into it, all they had might have been plundered and destroyed. His design, however, was to engage the Athenians, by these delays, to agree to an accommodation, and to prevent a rupture, the consequences of which he foresaw would be pernicious to all Greece. Finding, after making several assaults, that it would be impossible for him to take the city, he raised the siege, and entered Attica in the midst of the harvest. Having laid waste the whole country, he advanced as far as Acharnæ, one of the greatest towns near Athens, and but 1500 paces from the city. He there pitched his camp, in hopes that the Athenians, exasperated to see him advanced so near, would sally out to defend their country, and give him an opportunity of coming to a battle. It indeed was a great mortification to the Athenians, haughty and imperious, to be braved and insulted in this manner by an enemy, whom they did not think superior to themselves in courage. They were eyewitnesses of the dreadful havoc made of their lands, and saw all their houses and farms in a blaze. This sad spectacle was now so shocking, that they could not bear it any longer, and therefore demanded fiercely to be led out against the Lacedæmonians, be the consequence what it would. Pericles saw plainly, that the Atheniaus would thereby hazard every thing, and expose their city to certain destruction, should they march out to engage, under the walls of their city, an army of 60,000 fighting men, composed of the choicest troops at that time in Bocotia and Peloponnesus. Besides, he had made it his chief maxim to spare the blood of the citizens, since that was an irreparable loss. Pursuing inflexibly therefore the plan he had laid down, and studious of nothing but how he might check the impatience and ardour of the Athenians, he was particularly careful not to assemble either the senate or the people, lest they should form some fatal resolution, in spite of all the opposition in his power. His friends used all the entreaties imaginable to make him change his conduct. His enemies, on the other side, endeavoured to stagger him by their menaces and slanderous discourses. They strove to rouse him by songs and satires, in which they aspersed him as a man of a cowardly, insensible cast of mind, who basely gave up his country to the sword of the enemy. But no man showed so much rancour against Pericles as Cleon.* He was the son of a currier, and also followed that trade. He had raised himself by faction, and probably by a species of merit which those must possess who would rise in popular governments. He had a thundering, and at the same time a specious voice; and besides he possessed, in a wonderful manner, the art of gaining the people, and bringing them over to his interest. It was he who enacted a law, that three oboli, not two as before, should be given to each of the 6000 judges. The characteristics which more immediately distinguished him were, an insupportably vain opinion of his own abilities, a ridiculous persuasion of his uncommon merit, and a boldness of speech, which he carried to so high a pitch of insolence as to spare no man. But none of these things could move Pericles. † His great strength of mind raised him above low vulgar clamours. Like a good pilot in a raging storm, who after he has given out the proper orders, and taken all the precautions necessary, is studious of nothing but how to make the best use of his art, without suffering himself to be moved by the tears or entreaties of those whom fear has distracted; Pericles, in like manner, after having put the city in a good posture of defence, and posted guards in all places to prevent a surprise, followed those counsels which his prudence suggested, entirely regardless of the complaints, the taunts, and licentious discourses of the citizens; from a firm persuasion, that he knew much better than they in what manner they were to be governed. It then appeared evidently, says Plutarch, that Pericles was absolute master of the minds of the Athenians, since he prevailed so far, at such a juncture as this as | to keep them from sallying out of the city, as if he had kept the keys of the city in his own possession, and fixed on their arms the seal of his authority, to forbid their making use of them. Things happened exactly as Pericles had foretold; for the enemy, finding the Athenians were determined not to stir out of their city, and having advice that the enemy's fleet carried fire and sword into their territories, they raised their camp, and after making dreadful havoc in the whole country through which they marched, they returned to Peloponnesus, and returned to their several homes. It might here be asked, why Pericles acted on this occasion in a quite different manner from what Themistocles had done about 50 years before, when, at Xerxes' approach, he made the Athenians march out of their city, and abandon it to the enemy. But a little reflection will show that the circumstances differed widely. Themistocles being invaded by all the for * It is he whom Aristides has inveighed so much against, in several of his comedies. + Spernendis rumoribus validus. Tacit. 1 Plot. An Seni ger, sit ye | Διεκώλυε μόνον δ' τα όπλα τε δήμε και τας κλεις των πυλων αποσφραγισάμενος. ces of the East, justly concluded that it would be impossible for him to withstand, in a single city, those millions of barbarians, who would have poured upon it like a deluge, and deprived him of all hopes of being succoured by his allies. This is the reason given by Cicero. Fluctum enim totius barbariæ ferre urbs una non poterat. It was therefore prudent in him to retire for some time, and to let the confused multitude of barbarians consume and destroy one another. But Pericles was not engaged in so formidable and oppressive a war. The odds were not very great, and he foresaw it would allow him time to breathe. Thus, like a judicious man and an able politician, he kept close in Athens, and could not be moved either by the remonstrances or murmurs of the citizens. Cicero, * writing to his friend Atticus, condemns absolutely the resolution which Pompey formed and executed, to abandon Rome to Cæsar; whereas he ought, in imitation of Pericles, to have shut himself up in it with the senate, the magistrates, and the worthiest of the citizens who had declared in his fa vour. After the Lacedæmonians were retired, the Athenians put troops into all the important posts both by sea and land, pursuant to the plan they intended to follow as long as the war continued. They also came to a resolution, to keep always 1000 talents in reserve, and 100 galleys; and never to use them except the enemy should invade Attica by sea; at the same time making it death for any man to propose the employing them any other way. The galleys which had been sent into Peloponnesus made dreadful havoc there, which consoled the Athenians in some measure for the losses they had sustained. One day as the forces were going on board, and Pericles was entering his own ship, a sudden and total eclipse of the sun ensued, and the earth was overspread with the deepest gloom. This phenomenon filled the minds of the Athenians with the utmost terror; superstition, and the ignorance of natural causes, making them consider such events as fatal Pericles seeing the pilot who was on board his ship astonished, and incapable of managing the helm, threw his cloak over his face, and asked him whether he saw the pilot answering, that the cloak took away all objects from his sight, Pericles then gave him to understand, that a like cause, viz. the interposition of the vast body of the moon between his eyes and the sun, prevented his seeing its splendour. omens. The first year of the war of Peloponnesus being now elapsed, the Athenians, during the winter solemnized public funerals, according to ancient custom; a practice truly humane and expressive of a just gratitude, in honour of those who had lost their lives in that campaign, a ceremony they observed during the whole course of the war. For this purpose they set up, three days before, a tent, in which the bones of the deceased citi zens were exposed, and every person strewed flowers, incense, perfumes, and things of the same kind, upon those remains. They afterwards were put on a kind of chariots, in coffins made of cypress wood, every tribe having its particular coffin and chariot; but in one of the latter a large empty coffin was carried, in honour of those whose bodies had not been found. The procession marched with a grave, majestic, and religious pomp; a great number of inhabitants, both citizens and foreigners, assisted at this mournful solemnity. The relations of the deceased officers and soldiers stood weeping at the sepulchre. These bones were carried to a public monument, in the finest suburb of the city, called the Ceramicus; where * Lib. vii. Epist. 11. VOL. II. 17 These are called Cenotaphia, |