Divinity infinitely transcends his humanity, and yet could not suffer, but was infinitely happy while Christ hung on the cross, his sufferings were the sufferings of mere humanity; a part of Christ which, compared with the whole of him, was as a drop to the ocean. This objection assumes first, that the validity of the atonement depends upon the amount and intensity of Christ's sufferings; and, secondly, that humanity could not suffer as much even while connected with Divinity, as an exalted creature could without such connection. Neither of these positions is tenable.

1. Christ never suffered, in amount, what the law demanded as the punishment of sin; for this would have consigned him to indescribable torments to all eternity; and, on the principle that "he died for all," all must have been saved; as the loss of one soul would have involved double punishment, and stamped the Divine administration with injustice. There would then have been no such thing as pardon, as the punishment would only have been changed from the guilty to the innocent.

The penalty due to sin is endless suffering. Christ did not suffer this, therefore he did not suffer in amount the desert of sin: and the atonement does not depend upon the amount of suffering.

The sacrifice of Christ was such as God could accept, consistently with the claims of Divine justice; and with that satisfaction "he could be just, and yet the justifier of him that believeth in Jesus." Hence it did not make the salvation of all a necessary result of the atonement, but merely a possible consequence.

Though the Scriptures lay some stress upon the sufferings of Christ, they are far from making these alone the ground of our justification. They attri

bute our redemption to the blood of Christ as well as to his sufferings. "We are made nigh by the blood of Christ"—"him that hath loved us, and hath washed us from our sins in his own blood""set forth to be a propitiation through faith in his blood""we have redemption through his blood, and remission of sins"-peace was made "through the blood of his cross"'-we are redeemed not with corruptible things, but "with the precious blood of Christ"

It was not the sufferings of the sacrifice that made an atonement under the Levitical law, but the blood; and so with Christ; "the Lamb of God that taketh away the sin of the world." The saved in heaven do not attribute their salvation to Christ's sufferings, but addressing the "Lamb," they say, "Thou wast slain, and hast redeemed us to God by thy blood."

It is an unscriptural objection, therefore, that makes the validity of the atonement to depend upon the amount and intensity of Christ's sufferings.

2. It is equally preposterous and fallacious to attempt to measure the sufferings of Christ, as they are measured and limited by this objection. We have no evidence that any being in the universe is capable of more intense suffering than the human spirit. The sufferings of lost souls in hell are greater, judging from the language used in describing them, than those of the fallen angels. Now, by what authority is it assumed that humanity is capable of but limited suffering? Have human spirits less sensibility or immortality than angels ? It is probable that we have but a mere specimen of our capability to suffer, in the most extreme sufferings of the present life.

But it may be said that if humanity only suffered,

a small amount of suffering would produce death, with which all suffering must end. This also is fallacious. Life does not remain or become extinct, according as our sufferings rise to, or keep below, a certain point. Some who live, suffer far more than others who die; and many die who suffer comparatively little.

Hitherto we have defended the orthodox view of atonement, as if there was nothing peculiar in the sufferings and death of Christ. It has been shown that if he were only a man like one of us, it would be impossible to invalidate the atonement for want of suffering. But this was not the case. He was not only man, and perfectly holy, but "in him dwelt all the fulness of the Godhead bodily." There was a union of soul, and body, and Divinity; and had it not been for the support of the Divine Nature, no doubt Christ would have given up the ghost long before he came to the Cross. What merely human being ever suffered so as to sweat 66 great drops of blood," and yet lived? Christ had not yet felt the nails or the soldier's spear; and yet, such was his "agony," even before he was betrayed, that the blood gushed from every pore, "falling down to the ground!" In the midst of this intense suffering, "there appeared an angel unto him from heaven, strengthening him," as if for the time being to render the sufferer immortal, and strengthen the ties of dissolving nature, as soul and body were parting. And yet with all these circumstances, rendering him capable of untold suffering; and with all the evidences of distress that attended him in the garden and on the cross; it is objected that, according to our system, Christ was no sufferer!

But look for a moment at the opposite theory. Arians tell us that Christ is a creature, and has but

one nature; and that he had no union with a proper Divinity. Now we ask, can one intelligent creature suffer more than another may? If Christ is "the first creature that was born into existence,' as Mr. Kinkade says, is there any proof that he could suffer any more than a man? And could not a creature united with and sustained by the Divine Nature, suffer far more than one who had not that union and peculiar support? It is perfectly certain, that if either system diminishes the sufferings of Christ, it is that of the Arians.

We have now considered all the objections that we ever knew urged against the doctrine of the Trinity; and the reader must judge whether the answers given are candid and scriptural or not. But we have not done yet. Our opponents claim the right to state objections, and demand answers to all their queries. Of course, then, they will allow us carefully to examine their system, before we abandon ours; and if, in the examination, we discover untempered mortar, hay, wood, and stubble, they will not consider it uncourteous in us, if we state our fears and our reasons for them. We shall proceed, then, in the next Chapter, to state some objections to the Arian theory.

CHAPTER XI.

OBJECTIONS TO ARIANISM STATED AND URGED.

It is but too common a practice, in stating objections, to caricature and distort the system opposed, in order to render it odious, and to create the greater number of objectionable features. This is always

unfair, and, in respect to the present controversy, wholly unnecessary. Arianism is quite bad enough as it really is, without any misrepresentations; and our main difficulty will be, not in finding reasonable objections, but in making a judicious selection from the vast number that might be urged. We have, therefore, no possible motive for producing an overwrought picture of modern Arianism. It has often been the case, that when it has been fairly unveiled to the world, its avowed friends have disowned it, and pronounced the disclosure a misrepresentation. In anticipation of this we have made a free use of names and quotations in the preceding pages, that we might do no injustice to the Arian theory.

After having read their books and periodicals for a number of years; after holding a number of public discussions both oral and written, and conversing with private individuals of the Arian school; we do positively know that the sentiments we oppose are, in truth and verity, the sentiments of the great body of modern Arians; and we here challenge any man to point out a single doctrine which we have charged upon them, which is not clearly expressed or necessarily implied in their writings. With these remarks we proceed to the work before us.

1. Arianism is of SUSPICIOUS ORIGIN. Mr. Watson says "The source of this ancient error appears to have been a philosophical one. Both in the Oriental and Greek schools, it was a favorite notion, that whatsoever was joined to matter, was necessarly contaminated by it, and that the highest perfection of this life was abstraction from material things, and, in another, a total and final separation from the body." This, he says, was "one of the chief