the only benefits that can be offered to palliate the destruction of these antique societies. In our Indian Empire we have openly undertaken the business of civilisation; but in Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan the European protectorate is upholding, for its own purposes, an irresponsible internal despotism; and the increasing pressure from without upon China, the competition and reciprocal counteraction of the Powers that are now enveloping her, are likely to reduce her before long to a similar condition. Her outlying territories may be pared off by gradual encroachment; and the central mass will then be placed under a joint guarantee of inde'pendence and integrity,' which is becoming the formula that signifies the supremacy of Europe over all the sovereignties of Asia. With a state under this system the next step is usually to accept large loans from the European moneymarket, for the developement of its resources and the reform of its armament, upon an assignment of revenues or a concession of special privileges to the most influential among its protectors; and all such operations are important politically: they disturb the balance of power among the guarantors. But when an Oriental ruler has dealt largely with European financiers he is like an Indian ryot among moneylenders; his lands are mortgaged until his independence becomes nominal; it exists through the sufferance of powerful creditors, none of whom will allow any one of them to enter into possession. The only state in Central Asia that has still preserved real internal independence is Afghanistan. Nepal might be added; but in the great field of world-politics this highland principality, shut in between India and Tibet, is of no account. The Afghan Amir has no foreign debt; he permits no kind of interference in his administration; he can be cruel and oppressive at his pleasure, because the English subsidy enables him to keep up an army that would stifle any resistance. Yet full sovereignty he does not possess ; for our support of his dynasty, and our guarantee of his territory, are given conditionally on his leaving the control of his foreign relations to the British Government. Our policy has thus far succeeded in consolidating between Russia and India a substantial kingdom, formidable within its own mountains, out of a country distracted by incessant civil wars and tribal unruliness-a kingdom not to be lightly overawed or meddled with from either side. The Afghan people, fanatically united in religion, and not seriously divided by race or language, are perhaps nearer the form of what in Europe is termed a nationality than the subjects of any other Asiatic state. But in proportion as their Amir has increased his military strength and riveted his authority, he has naturally become less amenable to English influence or advice; the yoke of our protectorate begins to gall him; and his people, with two occupations of Kabul by an Indian army fresh in their memories, are dangerously suspicious of any close dealings between their ruler and the infidels. We thus find ourselves pledged to the protection, and responsible for the good behaviour, of an ignorant and intractable rulership, whose frontiers on the north-west are in contact with the dominions of Russia, on a line where the lowlands along the Oxus offer no obstacle to an invader, and where a Russian military station has been posted within striking distance of Herat. The situation is evidently insecure, for we stand pledged to the defence of the Amir's territory, yet we are nevertheless unable to exercise an immediate superintendence over his actions. The external relations of Afghanistan are understood to be under our control; but to direct them without a British representative at the seat of government is exceedingly difficult, and to the admission of such an agency neither the Amir nor his people are likely to consent; they regard it as the first step towards foreign subjugation. The consequences are that the Amir is the only independent ruler in the world at whose capital there is no diplomatic resident, and that the English Government is left without influence or even information regarding the course of affairs which might be of great importance. Moreover, although we may have consented to this exclusion in deference to Afghan susceptibilities, the Russians are troubled by no such considerations, nor can they be expected to neglect an opportunity of adding to our embarrassments. So recently as in August last a Russian newspaper was insisting upon the urgent necessity for abrogating certain clauses of the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1873 that prevent direct and regular intercourse between the Transcaspian province and Afghanistan, declaring that the establishment of Russian consular agencies in the latter country had become indispensable for the developement of Russian trade in Central Asia, and asserting confidently that the Government at St. Petersburg had taken up the question. We have here an ominous note of warning that may recall to us the demand, in 1870, for the abrogation of the Black Sea clause in the treaty of Paris; and though the Amir must be equally averse to the admission of any European representative, he has neither strength to resist nor jurisdiction to decide; for the demand would be addressed to England, and by England it must be answered. To conclude. As the focus of our disputes with Russia in Europe throughout the nineteenth century has been at Constantinople, so in Afghanistan lies the knot of all the complications that have entangled the relations of the two Governments in Central Asia. The Turkish and the Afghan questions exhibit varieties of the same problem, with a fundamental similarity in the conditions and main features. The Ottoman Sultan and the Amir of Kabul are the two most important Mahomedan rulers in Asia; they keep the strongholds of Islam, and derive their internal strength from their command over a warlike population whom they are training and arming for modern warfare; they can rely on its fanatical enthusiasm and instinctive resistance to foreign civilisation. Yet in both instances the existence of their kingdoms really depends on the balancing of the European Powers that press upon their frontiers; and this equilibrium has hitherto preserved them, because both the Sultan and the Amir occupy positions, strategical and political, on the world's map of such importance that no single European Power can be permitted to eject them, while a partition could only be contemplated, at least by England, as the last resource for terminating a hazardous war. In these circumstances the Turkish question seems at the present moment likely to be quiescent, so long as the present stationary aspect of international affairs in Europe continues; but Afghanistan has a new Amir, whose character and capacity are as yet untried, while the Russian Government appears inclined to raise a discussion that may bring up again the very delicate subject of his foreign relations. In political settlements everywhere there is no finality, and in the climate of Asia they are apt to be particularly short-lived; nor is it a matter for surprise that awkward points have a tendency to reappear. Yet it is greatly to the interests of both European Governments that a friendly attitude should be preserved in regard to the Afghan frontier, for the tranquillity of all Asia depends upon a good understanding between England and Russia at its centre. No. CCCCIII. will be published in January, 1903. 569 INDEX. A. Albanian Question, The, review of books concerning, 55-Albania B. Bagehot, W., review of his book on First Edinburgh Reviewers,' 275. C. Cockburn, Lord, his 'Life and Letters of Lord Jeffrey' reviewed, 275. D. Darwin, F., his 'Life and Letters of Charles Darwin' reviewed, 366. |