restore the breach made in the nuptial bond. It was far from my intention to deny this privilege, or to shut the door of reconciliation on repentance to the guilty party: and therefore with respect to the conflicting sentiments of the early writers on this particular, some pleading, on the score of charity, for the restoration of the faulty party to forgiveness and affection, and others declaring it to be the part of a weak and even a base mind to put up with the injury, I conceive that these cases must be measured by their circumstances; by the sincerity evinced of their repentance, or the various grounds of palliation which it may be fit for the reasonable and the welldisposed to consider and admit"." But are these considerations compatible with the dissolution of the bond of marriage? Are they not founded on the supposition that the bond is not dissolved, and that time and space are allowed for the reunion of the parties, for repentance on the one hand, and reconciliation on the other, after that great example which rejected not an apostate Church, but waited for its return to pardon and peace?

What then, if adultery be intended in the clause of exception, is the extent of the divorce allowed by our Lord? Embarrassed and perplexed as it is under the common interpretation in respect of the dissolution of the bond of marriage, and the application of the clause of exception, it is a law founded on the denunciation of the remedial divorces of the Jews, and in its own nature merely permissive, restricted, unless the law of exception be interpolated, to the

1 Chr. Remembr. vol. ii. p. 752.

use of the husband proving his wife guilty of adultery, without excuse or temptation from his example, operating in the mere avoidance of consequences which would otherwise ensue, and only by the avoidance of those consequences conveying to the husband the privilege of marrying another woman without imputation of adultery.

But it has been again and again contended, that adultery is not the only cause of divorce. The origin and progress of this opinion will be hereafter detailed but it is obvious to remark, that when our Lord was correcting the facilities of divorce, which had grown out of the misinterpretation and abuse of the law of Moses, it is not probable that he should have used a general ambiguity of expression, by which the force of his own law would be evaded. He was asked, whether a man might divorce his wife for every cause. In his answer to this question, and in his voluntary interpretation of the ancient law, he denied this licence and latitude of divorce, and made adultery, with one only specified exception, to be the natural, necessary, and unavoidable consequence of divorce. Was this particular exception of so general and unlimited a nature as to admit all equivalent offences, or was it not rather a distinct and specific offence, of which, whatever be its present difficulties, the title was at the time familiar to the Jews, and such that they who heard him could entertain no doubt of its meaning and intent? Whatever was the offence, it was an offence which must be interpreted with reference to the divine institution and rule of marriage, and by the fault of which God had not joined the parties to

gether, or man was at liberty to put them asun der.

It is nevertheless maintained with considerable plausibility, that Saint Paul admits idolatry to be a ground of separation; and it is inferred, that if idolatry be admitted by the apostle among the grounds of divorce which are restricted by our Lord to fornication, other offences of the same class may be admitted. But before any inference is drawn from this statement let there be a clear understanding both of the words of Saint Paul and the words of our Lord, and let all the difficulties, accumulated upon those which have been already stated in the received doctrine of divorce for adultery, be taken into consideration. This consideration will involve the doctrine, that marriage rightly contracted is, without any exception or reserve, indissoluble: and that there is not under any circumstances a law or licence of divorce authorizing the second marriage of parties properly married, of parties whose marriage is not null and void from the beginning, during the life of each other. The argument is offered to candid and serious consideration, with less aid of authority than might be desired, and therefore with humble diffidence, but not without mature deliberation, or a gradual but full conviction of mind, that the word fornication in the clause of exception does not signify, and cannot be proved to signify, adultery; and that, in the necessity of resorting to another interpretation, new harmony and consistency may be introduced into the Christian law of divorce.

a 1 Cor. vii. 15.

SECTION III.

Objections to the received interpretation of the clause of exception in the law of divorce, and attempt to recover the original and primitive signification.

THE chief authority for the received interpretation of the clause of exception in the law of divorce delivered by our Lord is, the current of tradition for the last fifteen centuries, in which it has been explained of adultery and the argument which has been constructed chiefly upon other passages of Scripture, and fastened upon this interpretation, is, that the essential unity of marriage is destroyed by the adulterous intercourse; and that in adultery there is such a violation of the mutual fidelity of marriage, such a renunciation of the proper consort, such a transfer of the person and the affections, as amount to a virtual act of divorce. An attempt has been already made to obviate this argument in favour of divorce upon proof of adultery: and whatever may be the strength of the prescriptive authority of fifteen centuries, it will be opposed by the doctrine of the three preceding centuries, in which the doctrine of divorce for adultery was unknown, and in which the principal term in the clause of exception was interpreted in a very different sense.

The received doctrine is nevertheless so ancient, and has been so universally received, as almost to justify the implicit belief of its truth and scriptural authenticity and the opposite doctrine, that mar

riage is permanent and indissoluble in such sense, that there are no circumstances under which a marriage, properly contracted, can be dissolved, is so contrary to the received opinions of commentators, and to the undisputed practice of almost all ages and all countries, as to excite a suspicion of singular presumption, of wanton innovation, and love of paradox, in any man that shall attempt to sustain it. There is a strong prepossession in the public mind, which nothing but stronger arguments can overcome, and which nothing but a firm conviction of the truth should venture to disturb. It is not without deep and serious reflexion that objections have been entertained and suffered to prevail in the mind, against the received interpretation of the clause of exception, which is the principal authority from which the permissive law of divorce has been collected. In assuming the right of divorce upon proof of adultery, it is conceived that five capital objections are overlooked; and that these objections cannot be removed, unless it can be shewn, 1. that the word #ogveiα, translated fornication in the clause of exception, does mean adultery: 2. that the clause of exception ought indeed and of necessity to be understood in the texts in which it is not inserted: 3. that the right and privilege of divorce can be fully collected from the clause of exception: 4. that the doctrine can be reconciled with the tenor of our Lord's discourse: and, 5. that it can be made to harmonize with the doctrine of Saint Paul, in arguing with the Corinthians upon marriage and divorce.

1. The first objection relates to the interpretation