liberty; and restrained its future operations to the single case of fornication. He did not directly permit or command divorce in any case; but he briefly mentioned a particular case, in which consequences otherwise unavoidable would not attach. He did not, in reference to any circumstances, say imperatively, Put away your wives; or let them be put away his doctrine was, that they could not be put away for any cause but fornication, without hazard of adultery and hence the utmost inference which can be drawn is, that for fornication they may be put away, without incurring the imputation of adultery.

Four different cases of divorce are proposed by our Lord, and they embrace the chief varieties of illegitimate divorce; 1. the case of a man divorcing his wife: Whosoever shall put away his wife, and marry another, committeth adultery". 2. The case of a woman divorcing her husband: If a woman shall put away her husband, and marry another, she committeth adultery. 3. The case of a man marrying a woman divorced: Whoso marrieth her that is put away, doth commit adultery. 4. The case of a woman divorced, but not marrying again: Whosoever shall put away his wife, saving for the cause of fornication, causeth her to commit adultery', i. e. if she avails herself of the permission which he gives, and throws her into temptation if she does not marry. It is certain that our Lord gave no law or liberty of divorce, but by acquitting the divorce

under peculiar circumstances, of the charge of adultery, which would otherwise ensue for where the exception operates, the consequences are removed; where the exception does not operate, the consequences remain: and therefore it was rightly judged by Tertullian; If a man marries a woman unlawfully divorced, supposing her to be divorced, he is an adulterer: for the matrimony remains which is not duly dissolved; and while the marriage remains, the woman cannot marry without adultery".

The word fornication, in the clause of exception, is ordinarily interpreted of adultery, which is conceived to be the only fornication of which married persons can be guilty. This exposition is received too generally and on too high authority to be treated with any disrespect, or to allow a hasty transition to the interpretation which it is intended to propose, without a mature consideration and a distinct assertion of the restrictive conclusions which may be drawn even from the common hypothesis.

It is usual with writers who insist upon the lawfulness of divorce for adultery, to understand the clause of exception in the several sentences in which it is not expressed, and to conclude that they all denote a divorce which is lawful, as well as a divorce which is not lawful. The licence of divorce is thus extended to several more cases than are admitted under a more rigorous interpretation, which allows immunity and redress to none but the injured husband. But before the usual interpretation is implicitly admitted, it is of importance to observe, that

in Adv. Marcion, l. iv. s. 34.

there is but one case in which the clause of exception is expressed, and that is the case of a man divorcing his wife: Whosoever shall put away his wife, saving for the cause of fornication, causeth her to commit adultery: Whosoever shall put away his wife, except it be for fornication, and shall marry another, committeth adultery. If he puts away his wife for any other cause, he causes her to commit adultery, by exposing her to temptation, and putting her into a condition to marry again: and if he marries himself, he actually commits adultery. In either case the guilt or hazard of adultery is incurred; because, notwithstanding the pretended divorce, the obligation of the original marriage continues, and cannot be violated without adultery: it is only when fornication is the ground of divorce that this consequence is avoided.

In all the other sentences divorce is forbidden absolutely, and without any reservation expressed: and it is necessary to enquire, whether there is any peculiarity in the case to which the clause is applied, which appropriates and restricts the exception; and whether there is any deficiency in the statement of the other cases which needs to be supplied. In the first sentence in which the clause is inserted, the restrictive exception is indispensable: Whosoever shall put away his wife, saving for the cause of fornication, causeth her to commit adultery: but if he puts her away for fornication, and if fornication means adultery, the divorce is obviously not the cause of the guilt, which is the occasion of the divorce. In respect also of the other text, in which the clause is inserted, it has been justly argued, that

"there is no opposition between the language of Saint Matthew and the other evangelists. Putting away one's wife is absolutely forbidden in all the passages. The exception for the cause of adultery does not allow it. For by the Mosaic law nobody was put away for adultery. The adulterous parties were not put away by divorce, but were put to death. There was no divorce for adultery. The interpretation of the passages in Saint Matthew appears to have been embarrassed by applying to the second clause, the exception which Christ confines to the first: Whosoever shall put away his wife, except it be for fornication, and shall marry another, committeth adultery: (the case of fornication was excepted, because the adulterous wife having suffered death, the husband who married again was not guilty of adultery against her :) and whoso marrieth her which is put away, (except for adultery,) committeth adultery. The exception is inapplicable here, because it implies that a wife could be put away for adultery .... and that after being put away she might marry again, which the law precluded by her death. The misapplication of the exception to the second clause, seems to have led to an inference, that by the law of Christ a man may put away his wife, in the ordinary sense of the term, for adultery; though the exception, as made by Christ in the first charge, which derives its whole force from the death of the adulterous party, requires the very reverse of this inference"."

"Greek Original of the New Testament asserted by Bishop Burgess, p. xxxii.

If in the clause of exception our Lord intended any allusion to adultery, and especially to the capital punishment of adultery, the clause must necessarily be restricted to the first sentence, and can have no application to the second, which relates to the marriage of a divorced woman. All the other sentences, if there be no forcible insertion of the clause of exception, will be found to amount in perfect harmony to a general prohibition of divorce, and there will be no deficiency which demands the least interpolation. The express authority of Saint Matthew will govern the only case of exception, and the remaining sentences are perfect and complete in themselves. Let the sentences be all read, without the clause of exception, as general prohibitions and interdicts of divorce: Whosoever putteth away his wife causeth her to commit adultery: if he marries he commits adultery: the man who marries a divorced woman commits adultery: the woman who puts away her husband and marries another commits adultery. These are all propositions corresponding in universality of extent with each other: they are all suited to the occasion, directly replying to the question of the pharisees, which related not to divorce for adultery, but to divorce for every cause: they all coincide with the indissoluble unity of the conjugal relation, and with the unlimited rule; What God hath joined together, let not man put asunder.This interpretation is also agreeable to the use of the earliest fathers, who recite the clause in referring to the texts in which it is expressed, and not only omit it in adverting to the texts in which it is not found, but digress from the texts in which it is