more piety and resignation than cutting your throat to escape them? Mr. Hume is of a different opinion.

Page 13. "To you it belongs to repine at Providence, who foolishly imagine that you have no such power, and who must still prolong a hated life, though loaded with pain and sickness, with shame and poverty."

Pardon me, sir; the accents of a Christian in such circumstances are very different indeed: "Thou hast sent me sickness, and I have borne it with patience, without murmuring; great losses, and I have blessed thy holy name; calamities and afflictions, and I have received them with thanksgiving."

Page 13. "Do not you teach that, when any ill befalls me, though by the malice of mine enemies, I ought to be resigned to Providence, and that the actions of men are the operations of the Almighty as much as the actions of inanimate beings?"

Certainly they are all under his direction; and now again for the inference:

"When I fall upon my own sword, THEREFORE, I receive my death equally from the hands of the Deity, as if it had proceeded from a lion, a precipice, or a fever."

That is, because I must be resigned to God's providence, when, in the course of his dispensations, my life is taken from me, therefore I may kill myself. This is an argal that would have disgraced the grave-digger in Hamlet. In the one instance we employ our utmost exertions to preserve life; in the other, we ourselves destroy it. But it is said,

Page 13. "If my life be not my own, it were criminal for me to put it in danger, as well as to dispose of it."

When it pleases God to call for life in the way of duty, it must willingly be sacrificed. But suicide never lies in the way of duty. And no two cases can be more essentially different, than that of the hero who dies in the cause of his country, his king, or his God, and that of the wretch, who through pride, impatience, and cowardice, lays violent hands upon himself. Attempt not, for the credit of philosophy, to confound the two characters; for heaven and hell are not farther asunder.

Page 14. "There is no being-which by ever so irregular an action can encroach upon the plan of the Creator's

providence, or disorder the universe. Its operations are his works equally with that chain of events which it invades, and whichever principle prevails, we may for that very reason conclude it to be most favoured by him."

Rare news for pickpockets, profligates, and cut-throats! A lady has paid a visit to a neighbour, and in the evening is returning to her home, which, according to the natural "chain of events," she should reach in peace and quietness. But a man, "exercising the powers with which his Creator has invested him," ravishes, robs, and murders her. This is the "irregular action, which invades the chain." Be of good courage, my boy! "Its operations are equally the works of God with the chain of events invaded by it, and whichever principle prevails, we may for that very reason conclude it to be the most favoured by him.' "God sees no sin in his elect," says the fanatic: but according to the new philosophy, God sees no sin (for if this mode of reasoning be just, there neither is nor can be sin) in any man.

Page 14. "When the horror of pain prevails over the love of life; when a voluntary action anticipates the effects of blind causes, it is only in consequence of those powers and principles which he (the supreme Creator) has implanted in his creatures."

Does not the argument prove too much? May not the same be said of numberless desires which arise in the heart of man, as at present circumstanced, and which, according to all the rules of true philosophy as well as true religion, ought to be controlled and overruled by a superior principle? Will not the same plea be as valid in the case of him who finds himself strongly excited to revenge, to intemperance, to lust, &c. &c. &c. as of him who is tempted to destroy himself? All, it may be said, happens" in consequence of those powers and principles implanted in us." The truth is, that human actions must be directed, because they will be judged, by other measures than our pains or our pleasures. On one side is my propensity; on the other, the law of God. Can it be a matter of indifference, which of the two prevails? According to these arguments, as Rousseau has justly observed, "there can be no crimes. which may not be justified by the temptation to perpetrate them; and as soon as the impetuosity of passion shall pre

vail over the horror of guilt, a disposition to do evil shall be considered as a right to do it." See Eloisa, Lett. cxv. Page 15. "Divine providence is still inviolate, and placed far beyond the reach of human injuries."

Certainly. When Judas betrayed his Master, it was foreseen that he would do so, and all things were ordered accordingly. "Providence was still inviolate;" but Judas was not therefore guiltless.

Page 15. It is affirmed, that "to divert rivers from their course, to inoculate for the small-pox, to put a period to our own life, to build houses, cultivate the ground, or sail upon the ocean, are actions equally innocent or equally criminal." Why? Because " in all of them we employ our powers of mind and body, to produce some innovation. in the course of nature; and in none of them do we any

more."

1st. As to the actions of " diverting rivers, building houses, cultivating the ground, and sailing upon the ocean," there is no occasion to discuss their legality.

2dly. The intention of inoculation is to preserve life, that of suicide can be only to destroy it; so that there is a material difference between them.

3dly. No one ever rested the morality of human actions merely on the circumstance here stated, of " producing some innovation in the course of nature." Otherwise, one might argue, after the manner of Mr. Hume; "Jack kills a hog, and Dick kills a man. They must be equally innocent, or equally criminal. Jack employs his powers to produce some innovation in the course of nature; and Dick does no more. Each turns a few ounces of blood out of their natural channel; and the blood of a hog makes as good puddings as that of a man.”

Page 15. "But you are placed by Providence, like a sentinel, in a particular station; and when you desert it without being recalled, you are equally guilty of rebellion against your Almighty Sovereign, and have incurred his displeasure."

This is an argument urged against suicide by Heathen as well as Christian writers. How does Mr. Hume overthrow it?

Page 16. "I ask, Why do you conclude that Providence has placed me in this station? For my part, I find that

I owe my birth to a long chain of causes, of which many depended on the voluntary actions of men."

Here we should answer, but that Mr. Hume, like the mother of Sisera, returns answer to himself.

Page 16. "But Providence guided all these causes, and nothing happens in the universe without its consent and co-operation."

Now comes Mr. Hume's reply.

"If so, then neither does my death, however voluntary, happen without its consent."

If by consent Mr. Hume means permission, all the evil ever perpetrated on earth has been perpetrated by God's permission; for otherwise it could not have been perpetrated at all. But if he means approbation, we must deny the proposition. Many things are permitted, which are not approved. Of his approbation or disapprobation, we have other rules by which to judge.

Page 16." And whenever pain or sorrow so far overcome my patience, as to make me tired of life, I may conclude that I am recalled from my station in the clearest and most express terms."

Then may every man put an end to his own life when he thinks proper. The "patience" of some people is soon "overcome;" and perhaps there are few Englishmen, who have not found themselves " tired of life," in one part or other of the month of November; but, happily prevented from hanging themselves by a sense of higher obligation, they have returned to business, and done excellent service to their country, in the month of January. The station of a sentinel is not, nor is it supposed to be, a station of ease, but of duty. A good soldier endures hardship; and a good Christian must do the same. Affliction is" a call, in the most clear and express terms," not to sullenness and suicide, but to the exercise of patience, resignation, and fortitude. "For even hereunto are we called;" and our commander himself has set us the example. Let us follow him with alacrity and cheerfulness, and we shall one day sit down with him at the right hand of the Majesty in the heavens-This is a philosophy that has some comfort in it, and is worth cultivating.

Page 16. ""Tis Providence surely that has placed me at this present in this chamber: but may I not leave it

when I think proper, without being liable to the imputation of having deserted my post or station?"

Is there no difference, then, between your walking out of life, and your walking out of one room into another?

Page 16. "When I shall be dead, the principles of which I am composed will still perform their part in the universe, and will be equally useful in the grand fabric, as when they composed this individual creature."

They may be so.

may stop a bunghole.

Your clay, like that of Alexander,

"The difference to the whole will be no greater than betwixt my being in a chamber and the open air. The one change is of more importance to me than the other; but not more so to the universe."

This is the old argument, that "the life of a man is of no greater importance to the universe than that of an oyster."

As far as this argument goes, then, there would be no harm done, if the whole species were to take arms, and, like Bayes's troops in the Rehearsal, "all kill one another." But we know that the life of man is no insignificant matter in the eye of God; and Mr. Hume himself seems to think it of some importance to the person concerned.

LETTER VI.

We are next to inquire, whether suicide be any breach of our duty towards our neighbour.

Page 17. "How does it appear that the Almighty_is displeased with those actions which disturb society? By the principles which he has implanted in human nature; and which inspire us with a sentiment of remorse if we ourselves have been guilty of such actions, and with that of blame and disapprobation, if we ever observe them in others. Let us now examine whether suicide be of this kind of actions."

Before we enter upon the examination here proposed, it is obvious to remark, that there is no instinct, or "principle implanted" in human nature, which seems to be more