ourselves a powerful check; to contrive some pause; in order that we may have leisure to enter into the feelings of those, whom we are so strongly prompted to insult. Were we to do this, the scene would be totally changed, and our minds, ere long, would be filled with sympathetic tenderness and candid indulgence.

If in such an attempt we found that our sense of some great enormities, committed by our rival, prevented our feeling sufficient compassion whilst our views were fixed only upon him, we might turn our views towards his nearest friends; particularly towards such as were most affected by his sufferings, though they had not contributed towards them, by either vice or indiscretion we might think what wounds we were about to inflict on the partner of his fortunes and his affections; on his offspring; on many who were interested in every thing that concerned him. Compassion might be thus excited, which would soften malicious triumph till it was no longer an evil; till a generous rival could bear it without pain.

20. Lastly, we ought to animate ourselves to follow all good precepts and directions by dwelling on any good examples of moderation and forbearance which may occur to our notice That of Jesus Christ is eminent above all others, both on account of its excellence and its authority: and some of his early followers seem to have caught a portion of his mild and truly great spirit. But as our Lord, though very man, was also a divine Being, some persons, more accustomed to active life than to religious researches, may, when looking up to Him, feel something of an awe obstructing the free course of their imitative faculties; therefore it may not be useless to propose, for the imitation of such persons, characters more within the limits of their observation. Those who have had no higher principle to act from than a species of honour of their own creating, have thought moderation in success and victory, a becoming virtue. It is not only after the sanguinary fierceness of national battles that animosity ceases, and the enemy changed into the convivial companion; in private war, so shocking to reason and humanity, the fallen antago

is

nist is supported, assisted, caressed, with all the assiduity and tenderness of friendship. When we see this, can we encourage malice in our own breasts, and not be ashamed to profess ourselves the advocates of religion, the supporters of virtue?

It is not easy to think in this train and not call to mind that Prince of our own Nation, who vanquished and lead captive the Monarch of our rival Kingdom. (h) In battle, the splendor of his exploits, and the wisdom of his conduct had established his renown;-but what are these when compared with the tenderness, and the respect, with which he treated his royal Captive? His words and actions expressed the same humility, the same deference and delicate veneration, as if the hapless Monarch had still retained his Army and his Crown. He refused to sit down with Majesty; and made himself an attendant on the will of his Prisoner. When such a disposition shewed itself in such a person, without affectation, in an hour of triumph and success more than human, no wonder that tears of affection and admiration should burst forth from every eye; from hardy warriors, from friends and foes promiscuously. It was a sight worthy to be contemplated by men and Angels; worthy to be remembered by all who rejoice in the honor of humanity: most worthy to be studied as a Lesson by all those who dare call themselves Christians, whilst they allow themselves to insult a fallen enemy. Let not any such say, that this conduct was only dictated by the romantic spirit of Chivalry and false refinement, and therefore is no model for them: Christian conduct is not the less Christian for being adopted into a system of liberal manners.

But if refinement is their excuse for neglecting a Christian Duty, let us again have recourse to times of the greatest simplicity: The history of the Patriarch Joseph was useful in illustrating the methods of regulating envy let it now be applied to the regulation of malice. We have seen (Part III. Art. 27) how his brethren ought to have behaved themselves towards him; let us now see how he did behave himself towards his brethren, when he might safely have

indulged any degree of malicious triumph. In the character of an Ægyptian Magistrate, unknown to them, consistency and propriety obliged him to speak roughly unto them: indeed he seems to have raised in them some groundless fears; but these were always mixed with hopes, and sweetened by favors, which might prevent any serious alarm: and they were merely sufficient to prepare the Catastrophe, and heighten that Discovery which he was impatient to make: but when his plan was ripe for execution, he threw off all disguise, and all superiority; he was merely the brother: he gave free course to his fraternal love, and indulged all those tender emotions which had laboured within him, and which he had sometimes in vain endeavoured to overcome. It was impossible for him to prevent his brethren from feeling some remorse; but he was so far from insulting them, that he ascribed the vicissitudes of fortune which he had undergone, not to their envy, but to the kind Providence of God; in these simple and unassuming words: "Now therefore be not "grieved nor angry with yourselves, that ye sold for God did send me before you to preme hither; 66 serve life." He tells them the particulars of the famine, and concludes with the same sentiment; "So now it was not you that sent me hither, but God." Gen. xlv. 5, 8.

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The man who can read this, with all the circumstances of the story upon his mind, and allow himself to torment a fallen adversary, is unworthy of the mercy of heaven; unworthy to be a partaker of human nature; and surely he must be particularly unworthy to hold any rank among the Disciples of Him, who when insulted himself, disdained to triumph over his Adversaries; though legions of Angels would have ministered unto him; though he might have overwhelmed them with shame, and sunk them into everlasting contempt.

END OF PART IV,

Malevolent Sentiments.

PART V.

RESENTMENT.

NATURAL LAW.

1. OR the sake of regularity I will again mark

sentiment is treated. We consider,

I. Its Nature.

II. Its Effects, good and evil.

III. The due regulation of it.

This method will suit Resentment, as well as Hatred, Envy, or Malice; but so many observations are common to all the malevolent sentiments, that what has been already delivered may reasonably be allowed sometimes to shorten our present disquisitions.

2. By resentment we usually mean, that sentiment which is excited in the mind when we receive an injury.

The distinction between harm and injury should be understood: a man may inflict evil upon us innocently, without intending to violate any right; this is harm; but if he inflicts evil by designedly violating a right, it

is injury. The former is natural evil, the latter is moral. If we seem frequently to feel resentment when no evil is really intended, the difficulty may perhaps be solved thus; we are so accustomed, or habituated, to suffer designed evil, that our imaginations represent most of the evil which is offered to us, as in some way designed; and when we view it in that light, we resent it as an injury. Yet there are some instances in which evil is evidently undesigned; so many, as to afford us opportunity of seeing, that mere evil, or harm perfectly clear of all suspicion of injury, does not excite Resentment. And the more orderly and rational any man's mind is, and the more calm his temper, the more instances does he find of harm which is free from injurious design. In this respect the improved mind differs considerably from the unimproved. It should be remembered, that what is done through neglect may be injurious, though not designed.

3. Resentment may be classed amongst malevolent sentiments, because that feeling which we experience on the reception of an injury, prompts us to inflict evil on the injurer in return. A wish to inflict evil is malevolence; or ill-will; for whatever ultimate purpose it may be intended. Evil inflicted in return for an injury is most usually denominated Punishment.

4. One of our methods of acquiring a clear and distinct idea of any sentiment was; to distinguish it from others, with which it is apt to be confounded: or to mark out the different modes, or species, comprehended under the same general term.

Anger, as a general term, seems to be synonymous with Resentment: though sometimes the word anger denotes the sudden emotion, and resentment the more deliberate sentiment. Inconstancy in the use of terms arises from the want of written discussions concerning them in the use of them, when men speak, circumstances, gestures, and looks determine their sense, on any particular occasion: and as men come to write more and more attentively, on moral subjects, the senses of moral terms will become more definite. (a) Pas