must be the best that could possibly befal us. But this is so far from being always deducible by reason from the light of nature, that, founding our opinion upon that alone, we are often ready to cry out against the dealings of the Almighty with his creature man, as cruel, and unjust. There are very many of God's dispensations of which we confess the fitness, only because we confess that they are the works of a divine agent. When we see whole towns swallowed up by earthquakes, countries devastated by pestilence, and thinned by famine, we are ready to cry out, is there a presiding Deity? and if there be, does love regulate his conduct? When we see "The lone widow and her orphans pine "In starving solitude; while luxury "In palaces, lies straining her low thought, when we behold the guiltless infant writhing with pain; "joyous youth" cut off in the midst of all that makes life desirable, health, ease, and competence ;" whilst the care-worn wretch vainly calls on death to take from him the load of existence; we are tempted to exclaim, is there an all-kind and all powerful witness of our actions, discriminating between good and evil? Meditating on scenes such as these reason confesses her impotence, and is constrained to allow that "the ways of the Lord are, indeed, very deep, and past finding out." Man cannot understand the laws by which God governs the universe; but neither is he called to know them, "such knowledge is too wonderful for him, he cannot attain unto it." Thus much however he knows, that if God be an all-just, impartial being, those laws are administered with a reference to the whole, and not to any of its parts alone. "God acts by general, not by par tial laws", and as the sway which he exercises over any particular part of his universal government, is only exercised with relation to the "stupendous whole," so man can never understand the dispensations of his Maker, till the grand, amazing scheme of general providence shall have been laid open to his view. . The inference which I would draw from the inability of human reason to understand those inflictions of providence, which, to her finite views appear cruel and unjust, is this, viz. that if there exist a book professing to come from God, to declare his acts of old time, and to reveal his will, and if this book should tell us of his having diverted things out of their common channel for the sake of punishing his creature man; of his having exterminated whole nations by miraculous means; this alone would no more warrant our disbelieving the said book, than its telling us of a pestilence by which whole nations were destroyed, would alone warrant our disbelieving any prophane history. If this book should tell us that God destroyed an army of 40,000 men in one night, this alone would no more authorize our disbelieving it, than its bearing witness of a destructive famine' which had carried off 40,000 souls, would alone authorize our disbelieving any other record. If this book should tell us that the Almighty rained fire and brimstone on certain towns, this alone would no more afford just grounds for withholding our confidence from it, than its relating the particulars of an earthquake, by which a whole town was swallowed up, would alone be sufficient cause for distrusting the document which contained such a relation. If a book such as I have been supposing, should tell us that God called on a kind father to sacrifice his only son, this alone would no more be good reason for refusing credit to it, than its describing * Its imputing these, and similar acts to the Almighty, has been de elated sufficient ground for disbelieving holy writ. the anguish which the only son of a doating father suffered from a hopeless disease, would alone sanction us in withholding our faith from the book in which this description was set forth. For what father would not (if he could be assured that no sin should be imputed to him for the act) choose rather to plunge a dagger into his son's heart, than to see him agonized by the tortures of a lingering disease, which must inevitably kill him at last? The truth is, that from the light of nature alone, we are not warranted in believing God to be full of love, and mercy; the utmost we can say is this, that he has indeed given us a being in which good preponderates, but that he has also wantonly imposed on us much un· necessary suffering. For though (allowing to the Almighty that character which the scriptures give him) it is possible to shew, by arguments which I will hereafter adduce, that none of those evils which God inflicts on human beings, capable of distinguishing right from wrong are excessive, i. e. greater than their ill-desert, and his merciful regard to general order require, yet that he should condemn infants to suffer, must ever, judging from the light of nature alone, leave his mercy most questionable." The way in which we may best get over *It may be said that the brute creation, not less unoffending than infants, is also condemned to suffer. We have every reason to believe however, that in a state of nature the sufferings of brutes are next to no thing; little more than the pang which 1obs them of life. Beasts of burden are indeed condemned to much suffering, but they undergo it not from any necessary law of their nature, but through man's corrup tion. And let us remember that when once man had introduced into. his own nature, that corruption which he could never have received from his God, to have prevented him from acting with cruelty towards his irrational fellow subjects, either the Almighty must have destroyed? his free agency, or have changed their natures. A complete change must have been made in the order of sublunary things. "All this dread order break-for whom? for thee?" this difficulty, and do away with this seeming cruelty of our Maker, is to suppose that man has effected some change in his moral nature, and transmitted it to his descendants by that law, universal so far as we can see throughout the creation, of like begetting like. The supposition I say most favourable to God's mercy, and most agreeable to analogy is this, that moral evil is transmitted from father to son as we know that physical evil is. Now we do not attribute a jot more cruelty to the Almighty by supposing that he does suffer moral evil to be thus transmitted, than we do by acknowledging that he does suffer physical evil to be thus transmitted, and by any other hypothesis we are forced to allow that God condemns his creatures to begin to suffer before they begin to be corrupt. By any other hypothesis we are forced to allow that corruption may beget incorruption. How far this doctrine of a corrupt nature got by inheritance, is founded in truth, shall be the subject of inquiry, in a future chapter. In this, I have, I trust, shewn that there is nothing more irreconcilable to perfect mercy in God's bringing sudden, than gradual destruction on his creatures; that the infliction of instantaneous punishment is not more inconsistent with the character of our Maker, than the employment of those slower modes of punishment, which we continually see him resorting to. HE CHAP. III. On Motive. E who tells us that a continual endeavour to promote what we deem the best interests of our fellow creatures, must of necessity, and for its own sake, recom mend us to God,* affirms that which it is impossible for him to draw from the light of nature, and the conduct of God's providence; and against which may be urged all the arguments before employed to shew that no action, or system of action, can, for its own sake alone, recommend us to our Maker. And the assertion involves an absurdity, for it is a virtual declaration, that the attention of a servant to what he deems the best interests of his fellow servants, must of necessity recommend him to his master, though that master's will be only a secondary consideration, or it may be, no consideration at all with him. To make one motive paramount is to make all others subservient to it, and he who sets out determined to make what he esteems the good of his fellows the leading rule of his moral conduct, sets out determined, so far as it respects that conduct, to disregard all other considerations whether they agree, or are inconsistent with this. From what I have before said, it is obviously very possible, that the will of God may be entirely contrary to what we, judging from the light of nature alone, deem the good of man. But whether it be, or be not, is a *That same party, who think the Scriptures no otherwise to be respected, than as they contain much good morality, tells us also that to will, and labour after promoting what they deem the good of their fellows must recommend them to their Maker; and that to make God's known or supposed will the sole motive and rule of their moral con. duct; to perform every act of their moral lives with an immediate refer, ence to him, is by no means necessary. 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