Sir Astley Cooper's was the means of detecting a criminal of no ordinary type. A Mr. Blight, of Deptford, was fatally wounded by a pistol-shot in 1806, and Sir Astley was called in to see the sufferer. Proceeding to the scene of the assault, Sir Astley, from an examination of the locality and the position of the wounded man, together with the situation of the wound, came to the conclusion that the assassin must have been a left-handed man. A Mr. Patch answered to the latter description. He was near the locality at the time of the murder, and, hitherto unsuspected, he was arrested, tried and convicted for the offense, fully confessing his guilt before his execution.

The case of Bolam, who was tried at the Newcastle Summer Assizes, in 1839, for the murder of a man named Millie, presents some features worthy of note as showing the difficulties against which the medical jurist may have to contend. The circumstances of the case were altogether of a peculiar kind. Millie was killed by direct violence done to the head, and, when discovered, Bolam was found lying close by in a state of insensibility, real or pretended, while the apartment in which both were found had been set on fire. Bolam stated that he had been attacked by some person, and had been knocked down by a blow on the head. Attempting to escape, he was again thrown to the ground, and then became aware of an attempt being made to cut his throat, although by his own showing he did not use his hands to prevent the injury, and no wounds or cuts were found upon his hands. The only injury Bolam appeared to have sustained was a wound on the left side of the neck, but this wound was neither considerable in extent nor in depth; it had involved no deep tissue, and had caused but little bleeding. His coat and other garments were cut in many places, but the incisions were entirely unrepresented upon his body. The case really turned upon the nature of these injuries, and the solution of their infliction. If they were likely to have been inflicted by a third person, then this third party might have also murdered Millie. If Bolam were the self-inflictor of these wounds, the theory of the prosecution that they had been caused with the view of screening his own crime became, on the other hand, highly probable. The scientific evidence, aided by a full consideration of all the circumstances of this case, was given decidedly against the prisoner. The case terminated in a verdict of manslaughter against Bolam, who was accordingly sentenced for that crime. Equally interesting, as showing the complex nature of the cases which await solution, and of the occasionally simple fashion in which such solution may dawn upon the inves

tigators, is an instance related as having occurred at Nottingham in 1872. In this case a young man preferred a charge of assault and wounding against a person whose motives for committing such an offense were undiscoverable. As evidence the prosecutor submitted his wounded arm, his coat, and his shirt-sleeve. He showed that they had indeed been cut, but a more careful examination revealed the interesting fact that the lining of the coat-sleeve was intact. No clearer proof was required to show that the charge was false, and the accused person was at once liberated.

No more interesting details in the annals of criminal science can be presented than those which bear upon cases in which the evidence for suicide, as against homicide, has to be weighed and determined. Allusion has already been made to cases, such as those of Sellis and the wood-carver, in which a knowledge of the peculiarities of the deceased served to explain the cause of death. An historical instance, illustrating this phase of our subject, is that of the Prince of Condé, whose death occurred in 1830. On the 27th of August in that year, the Prince was found dead in his bedroom under somewhat unusual, and it may be added suspicious, circumstances. The body was suspended from the window-sash by a linen handkerchief, which was in turn attached to a cravat round the neck of the deceased. An important feature in this case, and one which certainly lent an air of mystery thereto, was found in the fact that the toes of both feet rested on the ground, the heels being elevated, and the knees bent forward. A chair stood near the deceased, and the only marks of violence discernible were a few slight abrasions on the lower limbs; such, indeed, as might have been produced by contact with the chair. It may be added that the handkerchief was attached to the window at a height of about six and a half feet above the floor. The discovery of the manner of death, added to the circumstances attending the decease, gave rise to uncomfortable suspicion that the case was one of murder. Living in unsettled times, it was contended that the Prince had been killed by assassins, and that his body had been placed in the position in which it was found in order to suggest suicide by hanging as the cause of death. The abrasions on the limbs, certain peculiarities attending the mark left by the ligature on the neck, and the fact that the feet of the deceased rested on the floor, were urged as so many facts supporting the theory of homicide. Certain other circumstances, such as a want of power in one arm, and the fact that the handkerchiefs were tied in knots of a complicated character, were duly urged in support of the latter view. But the experience of medical

science gave powerful support to the opposite conjecture that of suicide. Every medical jurist can point to cases of suicide by hanging, in which the mere position of the body at first appears strongly suggestive of its having been placed in that position with a view of simulating self-destruction. So far from persons suspending themselves in a free posture in such an act of suicide, it is comparatively rare to find their bodies in other positions than those from which it would appear they could have readily released themselves. Persons have been found dead almost in a sitting posture, and suspended in a position which at first sight would seem strongly to invalidate the theory of suicide. A man has been known to commit suicide by hanging himself from a hook in the top of a tent-bedstead, being found with his knees wellnigh resting on the bed; and one hospital patient was actually discovered resting on his knees by the side of his bed, having hanged himself from the top of the bedstead. It is, in fact, exceedingly rare to find the suicide imbued with sufficient determination to take a leap into space; and the explanation of the readiness with which death may take place under these seemingly unfavorable circumstances may be held to rest on the fact that suspension in any position, in which the weight of the body is gently thrown on the neck, induces at first a state of insensibility, which, as it gradually deepens, causes increased pressure on the windpipe, and consequent death. In some few cases, the suspicious elements in the cases before us have been strengthened by the observation that the limbs of the deceased persons have been found to be firmly secured. Not merely may the hands be secured in a case of veritable suicide, but the weight of the body may actually be intentionally increased (as was found in a case of suicide occurring in 1844 at Worcester) by the attachment of a couple of flatirons to the wrist! Thus much for the curiosities of suicide; and when it is added that the blind have been known to destroy their own lives, and that the act of suicide has been perpetrated by a boy of nine, and by a man of ninety-seven years of age, as representing the opposite extremes, little is wanting to invest the subject with more than ordinary interest in the eyes of the psychologist.

Passing somewhat from the domain of actual crime, we may find an interesting study in the details of cases relating to the "presumption of death," and to questions of "survivorship." Both subjects present some of the gravest puzzles of both science and law. In the quiet course of ordinary existence it seems hardly possible that even the "presumption of death should require to be legally established.

But

the romance of life teems with tales stranger even than that of Enoch Arden, which show that the possibilities of a person's decease may require to be duly argued and decided upon by our courts of law. "The fact of death," says that eminent authority on medical law, Dr. Alfred S. Taylor, "may be proved by presumptive as well as by direct evidence." Thus the question of decease may fail to be determined by a jury; and when the corpus delicti is not forthcoming, as in all cases of the kind referred to, "the legal presumption" is in favor of life, and the burden of proof rests on the plaintiff's case.

As most readers are aware, seven years' unexplained absence from home and friends constitutes the period at the expiry of which the presumption of death may legally be inquired into. With the caution which everywhere marks the footsteps of legal procedure, an English court once held itself incompetent to pronounce judgment confirming the presumption of death in a case in which a woman had left her father's house in 1810, and had not, for a period of thirty-four years, been seen or accounted for; and, according to Best, in his "Presumptions of Law and Fact," the Court of Queen's Bench held that it could not assume "judicially" that a person who was alive in the year 1034 was dead in the year 1827! From which statement, the non-legal mind may reasonably enough regard the “judicial" faculty as decidedly opposed both to the logical and the scientific. In the suit of Church versus Smith, tried in London in 1853, the husband of the plaintiff was proved to have been unheard of for twelve years, and the question for decision was, whether she could sue, as a widow, in her own right. The husband, however, ultimately appeared in the witness-box; but the presiding judge remarked to the jury that, in the face of the twelve years' absence, he should have directed them, but for the sudden appearance of the missing spouse, to return a verdict for the plaintiff, on the presumption that her husband was dead. Missing husbands thus occasionally crop up under awkward circumstances. Four months after marriage a husband deserted his wife, and disappeared for seven years, the woman meanwhile contracting another marriage in her maiden name. indicted for bigamy and convicted, but her conviction was quashed on appeal. In another case an application for probate was made to the Probate Court in 1858, by the relatives of a shipcaptain who had sailed from Southampton in December, 1856; arrived in Calcutta in October, 1857; and thence sailed for Port Louis, but had never reached his destination. Here, the presumption of death was strong enough to cause the Court to grant probate of the will, although

She was

a modern Robinson Crusoe or Alexander Selkirk would naturally feel rather chagrined at the course of events, on a possible return home after rescue from enforced residence abroad as a cast

away.

The subject of "presumption of death" may, in some cases, join issue with the criminal side of character. A curious and somewhat mysterious case in point was tried in London. A man had insured his life against accident for a sum of two hundred and fifty pounds on the 6th of September, 1856. This person was single, and was aged twenty-six. A week after insuring his life he took a return ticket to Brighton, leaving London on Saturday, September 13, 1856, by an evening train. The succeeding Sunday and Monday were spent in the company of his friends. He bathed in the sea on the morning of Monday (the 15th), and in the evening intended to return to London, announcing, however, to his friends, when he left at 7 P.*M., his intention of again bathing before his departure. He was traced to the sea-beach, but was not again seen alive. A suit of clothes was found on the steps of a bathing-machine, the owner of the garments being missing. The police could discover no clew to the identity of the owner, save a purse containing part of a return ticket. Ultimately, the clothes were identified as those of the intending bather, who was duly searched for and advertised for, but without success. Forty-five days after his disappearance, and on the 30th of October, a dead body, completely divested of clothing, was found on the beach at Walton-on-theNaze, in Essex, situated about one hundred and sixty miles from Brighton. The evidence of medical men showed that the body had been in the water from six to seven weeks. The features were unrecognizable, but a brother of the missing man maintained that, to the best of his belief, the body was that of the bather who had disappeared from Brighton on the 15th of September. The brother accordingly entered an action against the insurance company, who had refused payment of the policy on the ground of want of identification; and the defense also rested upon the assumption that the assured person was alive, and that, in short, the report of his death was merely a ruse to obtain money from the insurance-office. The alleged deceased, it was proved, had been declared bankrupt in 1855, and he had further effected in 1856 insurances in different offices. His will ordered that the money due under the policies should be applied to the discharge of his debts. In such a case, the conflicting features of the evidence and the uncertainty of identification resulted in the disagreement of the jury and in their consequent discharge. Clearer in all its details was the case

of Vibal Douat, a Bordeaux merchant, who insured his life in Paris for one hundred thousand francs, and was shortly thereafter declared a fraudulent bankrupt. Douat next disappeared suddenly, and his wife lodged in Paris a certificate of the death and burial of her husband in England, and claimed the payment of his policy of insurance. That the case was one of fraud, however, was clearly proved. Douat had actually ordered his own coffin, had registered his own death, and had actually attended his own funeral -or rather that of the mass of lead which was found to be inclosed in the coffin. Douat was arrested, and, in due course, convicted of the fraud.

The subject of "survivorship," in its obvious and important relations determining succession to property, presents us with features no less remarkable than those involved in the preceding topic. Some dread calamity overwhelms, it may be, an entire family circle, and it may be left to science to decide from the circumstances of the case which member probably survived the others. Such a case came before the Rolls Court in London in 1854. The circumstances of the suit in question are given by Dr. Taylor as follows: A Mr. Underwood, aged forty-three, and his wife, aged forty, being about to sail for Australia, and being each entitled to certain property, made their wills before their embarkation. By these wills each testator gave to the other, absolutely, the whole property he and she possessed respectively. Each will also declared that "if the one to whom the same was given should die in the lifetime of the donor," the property should be divided among their three children on the latter attaining their majority. It must be mentioned that the family of the testators included three children-two sons, aged fifteen and thirteen respectively, and a daughter, aged eighteen. In case all of the children died before reaching the age of twenty-one years, the wills directed that a mutual friend, a Mr. Wing, should receive the entire property. The parents and children embarked on board the ill-fated ship Dalhousie, which sailed from London on October 13, 1853, and which foundered off Beachy Head. Only one survivor, a seaman named Read, escaped; his testimony showing that the ship foundered on the morning of October 19, 1853, lay on her beam-ends for about twenty minutes, and finally disappeared in the deep. After the ship lay over, the Underwoods, with the exception of the girl, escaped through the cabin-window and clung to the side of the vessel, but while in this position a heavy sea swept them from their hold, and Read declared that they must have perished thereafter. Not a single trace of them was found. But an important addendum to this in

formation was contributed by Read, who said that not only did the daughter appear on the deck after her parents and brothers had been swept away, but also that he lashed her to a spar and cast her adrift as her sole hope of safety. He stated also that he saw Miss Underwood alive in the sea lashed to the spar. Mr. Underwood, it may be added, was described as a tall man of powerful build, and his wife as of small stature and of delicate constitution.

The suit before the Rolls Court turned on the question which of the testators-husband or wife-survived the other? The testimony of Read established the fact that the daughter had unquestionably survived her relatives. The Master of the Rolls inclined to believe that death was simultaneous in the case of the parents and brothers, and the result of his decision was that the property must pass to the next of kin of the daughter. Mr. Wing, the mutual friend who was entitled to succeed, had thus no claim, owing to the simultaneous death of the testators, and judgment was accordingly given for the plaintiff Underwood as next of kin.

The case was taken on appeal to the Lord Chancellor's court, and was finally carried to the House of Lords. Medical evidence was now sought to substantiate the appellant's case. All the children having died under the age of twentyone years, the case of the daughter's survival was not made a part of the pleadings. The question submitted for consideration to the medical experts related to the probabilities of the husband having survived the wife, it might be even for a very brief period of time. As the stronger of the two, the appellant contended Mr. Underwood should be held to have survived his wife, in which case Mr. Wing would claim the property of deceased under the terms of the will. Even if the latter had survived her husband-the more unlikely alternative-Mr. Wing would in that event also gain his case. Medical and physiological evidence went to show that, in face of the facts that Mr. Underwood was known to be a good swimmer, and that he was a strong and powerfully built man, the probability was that he survived his wife. The difference in age, sex, and strength, said the experts, rendered it highly improbable that death by drowning or asphyxia, depending on cessation of the heart's action among other things, would take place exactly at the same moment, and in this view the more robust subject would therefore in all probability be the longest liver. The medical testimony was thus clearly in favor of Wing. Upon technical grounds the Lord Chancellor, in February, 1855, affirmed the judgment of the Master of the Rolls, and the House of Lords confirmed these decisions, one of the judges dissenting. Dr. Taylor's

remarks upon this case are so apt and interesting that they may bear quotation by way of commentary on this singular case. This authority remarks: "The difficulty was created by the legal rule which threw the onus of proof on the claimant (Wing) under the two wills. The case of the next of kin, who was not mentioned in the will, was that the husband and wife died at the same instant of time; but this was a physiological impossibility; and had the proof of this been thrown upon the plaintiff (Underwood) the case must have failed. The contention of the defendant was, that the testator and testatrix could not have died at the same instant. This negative proposition could not of course be proved by direct evidence; it simply became a medical inference; but when the law declares that in the absence of evidence the property shall go in the same way as if the parties had expired at the same instant—i. e., as if they had died intestate

this is deciding such questions by a rule which is as arbitrary in its operation as that of the Code Napoleon. In Underwood versus Wing," concludes Dr. Taylor, "this rule of law practically affirmed that an event took place which was physiologically impossible, and upon that event the wills of husband and wife were set aside, and the property was handed to one whose name was intentionally excluded from the wills of both."

An analogous case tried in November, 1856, in the Rolls Court, presents the melancholy interest of having arisen out of the untoward fate of Sir John Franklin's expedition to the polar seas in 1845. The issue depended upon the determination of the survivorship of a father (James Couch) or son (Edward Couch). It was not disputed that the father died at home, in January, 1850. Edward Couch went as mate of the Erebus in August, 1845, and it had to be determined whether Edward had predeceased his father, or had survived him. Dr. Rae deposed that in 1854 some Esquimaux informed him that in April or May, 1850, a party of white men were seen dragging a boat across the ice, and that these men killed birds which were never found in those regions before the month of May. Of course no evidence was at hand to show that Edward Couch was one of these survivors of 1850; but the law in this case declared for the probability of the son's survival; this course being adopted with a view to avoid further litigation.

A somewhat notorious case occurred in London, in 1870, which gave rise to the question of survivorship, complicated with the additional interest of criminal procedure. A person named Huelin had made a bequest to his housekeeper, with whom he lived at Brompton. In May, 1870, both were murdered by a man named Millar, who was tried for the crime. The body of Huelin

was buried by way of concealment; that of the woman was packed by the prisoner in a box, which he requested a carrier to rope and cord. During the performance of his task, the carrier noticed that blood was oozing from the box, and this circumstance excited suspicion, and led to the discovery of the crime. In 1871 a suit was raised to decide the disposal of Huelin's belongings. If the housekeeper were proved to have survived the master, then the bequest to her would take effect; while, assuming the opposite view, the heirs of Huelin would claim the entire property. Here medical evidence assisted the decision of the Vice-Chancellor's court, by declaring that the signs of death were more recent in the case of the woman than in that of Huelin; and circumstantial evidence lent its aid toward substantiating that of the experts. The court decided in favor of the heirs of the unfortunate housekeeper. A case has also been related in

which, during a quarrel between husband and wife, the latter in an ungovernable passion rushed from the house across a lawn and flung herself into a pond. Her husband tried to rescue her, but both were drowned. Evidence failed to elicit any satisfactory details regarding the priority of death, and the suit which had been entered into was compromised accordingly.

Little need exists for expatiation on the curious nature of such studies in the shady paths of life, or on the singular blending of fact and romance in certain phases of human existence. But one idea may be fairly expressed by way of conclusion: namely, that science and law together, while often achieving veritable triumphs in the patient pursuit and discovery of the truth, are yet unable to save humanity from one of its worst enemies-its contorted and debased self. All the Year Round.

[We have from the Count de Lesseps a reply to the article in our last number on the SUEZ CANAL, which we subjoin. That article, as M. de Lesseps suspects, was written by Judge Philip H. Morgan, lately member of the "Tribunal de Première Instance" of Egypt, and recently appointed Minister from this country to Mexico.]

To the Editor of Appletons' Journal.

SIR: In your April number I find an article entitled "The Suez Canal: a History," and signed P. H. M., which initials I understand are those of Judge Philip H. Morgan, of the United States; and, deeply sensible of the falseness of the accusations he has made against the Suez Canal Company, of which I was and am president and managing director, I feel it a duty to myself and to those so long associated with me to send you the following article in reply to his charges.

On November 30, 1854, M. de Lesseps was empowered to form an Egyptian and Universal Company, by virtue of the concession which was given him to open a ship-canal between the Mediterranean and the Red Seas. At the same time the Viceroy, Saïd Pasha, decreed the building of the railroad between Cairo and Suez in order to please the English, who were clamorous for it. The railroad had to be built at the expense of Egypt, while the Suez Canal was to be constructed without any subvention, at the expense of the company, which was to call upon

VOL. VIII.-30

all countries to take part in the work without any government aid. M. de Lesseps, with his family and friends, got together the first money necessary to begin the preliminary studies. A rough plan was drawn up by two of the Viceroy's engineers, Messrs. Mougel Bey and Linaut Bey. A superior committee, composed of twelve famous engineers selected from England, France, Hol land, Austria, Germany, Italy, and Spain, examined the rough plan, and sent a sub-committee to Egypt and published its final report. As the result of this publication, the Viceroy, Saïd Pasha, renewed in January, 1856, his concession of 1854, but, as the policy of Lord Palmerston threatened Egypt with serious complications on account of the canal, the Viceroy thought it best to put off seeking subscriptions to form the company. He then undertook to furnish himself a monthly sum of 30,000 francs, in order to have control of the enterprise until he should judge it advisable to apply for capital. M. de Lesseps, on his part, agreed to give him back the concession without any indemnity if political events should prevent him from carrying it out. The preliminary work was continued until the end of 1858. The time was then considered favorable to ask for a subscription of 200,000,000 francs, the sum fixed by the superior international committee, but the Viceroy requested M. de Lesseps not to have all the stock taken by France alone, but to reserve a part for other countries, holding