after death they will not vanish into nothing, yet must they needs remain in a state of insensibility and inactivity till reunited to other terrestrial bodies. Wherefore these in one sense mortal, though in another immortal. Silk-worms dying, and reviving in the form of butterflies, made an emblem of the resurrection by Christian theologers 150 But no absolute necessity, that the souls of brutes, though substantial should have a permanent subsistence after death, either in a state of activity or inactivity; because whatsoever created by God may possibly by him be annihilated. The substantiality only of the rational soul demonstrable by reason; or that it will not of itself vanish into nothing; but not that it is absolutely impossible for it to be annihilated; the assurance of this depending upon a faith in the Divine goodness. Porphyrius's assertion, that brutish souls are resolved into the life of the universe. The whole answer to this objection against the substantiality of brutish souls; that they may, notwithstanding, possibly be annihilated in the deaths of animals as well as they were created in their generations: but if they do subsist (without aërial vehicles), they must remain in a state of inactivity and insensibility 152 That this the doctrine of the ancient pagan theologers, that no life or soul generated out of dead and senseless matter; but all produced by the Deity, as well as matter; proved out of Virgil; though sundry other testimonies also might be added there unto 154 The hylozoic Atheists themselves so sensible thereof, that there must be some substantial and unmade life (from whence the lives and minds of all animals are derived), that they attribute the same to matter; and conclude, that though the modificated lives of animals and men be accidental, generated, and corrupted, yet the fundamental life of them is substantial, and incorruptible. These also asserted a knowledge before sense, and underived from sensibles 155 This hylozoic Atheism again confuted. Absurd to suppose knowledge and understanding without consciousness; as also, that the substantial and fundamental life of men and other animals should never perish, and yet their souls and personalities, vanish into nothing. That no organization can produce consciousness. These Atheists not able possibly to give an account, whence the intelligible objects and ideas of this their knowledge of matter should spring. This hylozoic Atheism nothing but the crumbling of the Deity into matter 156 Concluded, that the phenomenon of mind and understanding SECT. V. 157 THERE now remaining only the atheistic objections against Providence, their queries and arguments from interests; their first objection, from the frame of the world, as faulty: or, be- cause things are ill made, that therefore not made by a God. This directed against the sense of the ancient theologers; that God, being a perfect mind, therefore made the world after the best manner. Some modern theologers deviating from this, as if the perfection of the Deity consisted not at all in goodness, but in power and arbitrary will only. The controversy betwixt these and Atheists; but whether matter fortuitously moved, or a fortuitous will omnipotent, be the original of all things. No ground of faith in a mere arbitrarious deity. To have a will undetermined to good, no liberty nor sovereignty, but impoten- cy. God to Celsus the head or president of the righteous nature. This not only the sense of Origen, but of the ancient Christians in general. Plotinus; the will of God essentially that which ought to be. God an impartial balance weighing out heaven and earth. The Deity not servilely bound to do the best; but this the perfection of its nature. No Atheists able to prove the Not to be concluded, that whatsoever we cannot find out the reason or use of, is therefore ineptly made. For example; the intestinum cæcum, though seemingly an odd appendix, and which the generality of anatomists give little account of; yet that, with the valve at its entrance, both together, an artificial contrivance of nature, to hinder the regurgitation of the fæces 164 The first atheistic instance of the faultiness of things; in the disposition of the equator and ecliptic intersecting each other in such an angle, whereby the terrestrial globe rendered not so habitable as it might have been. This objection founded upon a false supposition, that the torrid zone uninhabitable. But this the best disposition; which being contrary to mechanic causes, therefore its continuance, together with the constant parallelism of the earth's axis, a manifest eviction of Providence; and that the rò ẞéλTIOTOV, the best, is a cause in nature. 164 Theists that all things not made for the sake of man. This at 165 Evils in general from the necessity of imperfect beings, and 167 Serviceable to free Men afflicted more from their own fancies than reality of worms. ment 167 The thirteenth; but second objection against Providence as 170 Granted, that this consideration hath too much staggered ib. Unreasonable to require that God should miraculously inter- their belief of future immortality and judgment after death. The evolution of human affairs a kind of dramatic poem, and God Almighty the skilful dramatist, who always connecteth that of ours which went before, with what of his follows after, into coherent sense. A geometrical distribution of rewards and pu That there ought to be a doubtful and cloudy state of things for the exercise of faith and the more difficult part of virtue. Had there been no monsters to subdue, there could have been no Hercules. Here we are to live by faith, and not by sight 174 But that to make a full defence of Providence would require a large volume. The reader therefore referred to others for a supplement. Only some few considerations to be here propounded, not so much for the confutation of Atheists, as satisfaction of Theists, sometimes apt to call in question the Divine goodness, though the very foundation of our Christian faith 175 First, that in judging of the works of God we ought not to consider the parts of the world alone by themselves, but in order to the whole. Were nothing made but the best, there could have been no harmony for want of variety. Plotinus, that a limner does not make all eye, nor place bright colours every where; nor a dramatist introduce only kings and heroes upon the stage stars. ib. Secondly, that we ought not to confine God's creation to the narrowness of vulgar opinion, which extends the universe but little beyond the clouds, and walls it in with a sphere of fixed The world incapable of infinity of magnitude as well as of time. Nevertheless, as the sun is much bigger than we can imagine it, so much more may the world be. The new celestial phenomena widen the corporeal universe, and make those fancied flaming walls thereof to fly away before us. Not reasonable to think that all this immense vastness should be desert and uninhabited 179 Thirdly, that we cannot make a right judgment of the ways of Providence without looking both forwards upon what is future, and backwards upon what is past, as well as upon the present. That the Platonists and Pythagoreans solved many phenomena from the rà πpoßɛßɩwμéva, things done in a pre-existent state. Our common Christianity supposeth but a kind of imputative pre-existence to solve the pravity of mankind and the evils of this state. The different fates and conditions of men VOL. IV. 2 N here in this life to be resolved into a just though occult Provi'vidence 180 The third objection against Providence, or fourteenth atheistic argument; that it is impossible for any one being to animadvert and order all things; and, if it were possible, that it would be distractious, and inconsistent with happiness. Moreover, that an irresistibly-powerful and happy being would not concern itself in the welfare of others; benevolence arising only from imbecility 182 The reply; that because ourselves have but a finite animadversion, and narrow sphere of activity; to measure the Deity accordingly, is but an idol of the cave or den. Certain, that were there nothing but what we could fully comprehend, there could be no God. Had the sun life, equally coextended with its rays, it would perceive every thing touched by them. Creatures but the rays of the Deity. Men able to manage affairs, in many distant places, without distraction. And innumerable notions lie together in our minds, without crowding one another, or any disturbance to us . ib. But for the easing the minds of weak mortals, already suggested, that there is no necessity God should himself immediately do all things: he having ministers under him, executioners of his providence; as, an artificial plastic nature (for this reason, partly before insisted on); instincts also in animals a part of that Divine fate which is the servant of Providence. Above which, other knowing and understanding ministers of the Deity appointed to preside over human affairs. But all overlooked by the watchful eye of God Almighty, who may himself extraordinarily interpose 183 Wherefore no need to confine Providence to a few greater things only, to free the Deity from distraction. Small things (upon which greater often depend) not neglected by it. Nevertheless, the chief employment of Divine Providence, in the economy of souls, by Plato reduced to this compendium; the translating of them into better or worser states, according to their demeanors. Thus may the slow wits of mortals more easily conceive Providence not to be laborious and distractious to the Deity 185 But that all benevolence arises from imbecility, and that what is perfectly happy would be troubled with no business, but enjoy its own ease; idols of the Atheists' den. These other |