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orders all things for the sake of Good; and whatsoever doth otherwise, was, according to them, not Nous, but Avota, not Mens, but Dementia, and consequently no god. And thus does Celsus in Origen declare the nature of God, οὐ γὰρ τῆς πλημμελούς ορέξεως, οὐδὲ τῆς πεπλανημένης ἀκοσμίας, ἀλλὰ τῆς ὀρθῆς καὶ δικαίας φύσεως Θεός ἐστιν ἀρχηγέτης. God is not the president or head of irregular and irrational lust or appetite, and of loose erratic disorderliness, but of the just and righteous nature. And though this were there misapplied by him against the Christian doctrine of the resurrection (not understood), yet is the passage highly approved by Origen; he adding further, in confirmation thereof, and that as the general sense of Christians too, φαμὲν ὅτι οὐ δύναται αἰσχρὰ ὁ Θεὸς, ἐπεὶ ἔσται ὁ Θεὸς δυνάμενος μὴ εἶναι Θεός, εἰ γὰρ αἰσχρόν τι δρᾷ ὁ Θεὸς, οὐκ ἔστι Θεός. We Christians (who hold the resurrection) say as well as you, that God can do nothing, which is in itself evil, inept, or absurd; no more than he is able not to be God. For if God do any 247. ἀλλὰ καὶ evil, he is no God.And again, οὐδὲν οἷός τε παράλο· μὴ πρέπον ἑαυτῷ ὁ Θεὸς βούλεται, ἀναιρετικὸν ἑαυτὸν ἔργα. τυγχάνον τοῦ εἶναι αὐτὸν Θεόν, God willeth Accord nothing unbecoming himself, or what is ing to us also, truly indecorous; forasmuch as this is thing, that is inconsistent with his Godship.-And to absurd.gr the same purpose Plotinus,* ποιεῖ τὸ θεῖον ως πέφυκε, πέφυκε δὲ κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ οὐσίαν, ἡ Provid. En- τὸ καλὸν ἐν ταῖς ἐνεργείαις αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον συνεκφέρει, εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἐκεῖ ταῦτα, που ἂν εἴη, The Deity acteth according to its own [Ennead. vi nature and essence; and its nature and

So likewise, p.

καθ ̓ ἡμᾶς οὐδὲν

γον οὔτε παρ'

σασθαί ἐστιν ὁ

God can do no

or be

sides reason.

* Ρ. 265. [Libro de

nead. iii.

Lib. ii. cap.

xiii.]

P. 743.

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essence displayeth goodness and justice: lib. viii. for if these things be not there, where capix.] should they else be found?-And again, elsewhere, Θεὸς ὅπερ ἔχρην εἶναι, οὐ τοίνυν οὕτω συνέβη, ἀλλ ̓ ἔδει οὕτω· τὸ δ' ἔδει τοῦτο, ἀρχὴ τῶν ὅσα ἔδει. God is essentially that, which ought to be; and therefore he did not happen to be such as he is: and this first ought to be is the principle of all things whatsoever, that ought to be.-Wherefore the Deity is not to be conceived, as mere arbitrariness, humour, or irrational will and appetite omnipotent (which would indeed be but omnipotent chance), but as an overflowing fountain of love and goodness, justly and wisely dispensing itself, and omnipotently reaching all things. The will of God is goodness, justice, and wisdom; or decorousness, fitness, and ought itself, willing; so that the To BeλTigrov, that, which is absolutely the best, is νόμος απαράβατος, an indispensable law to it, because its very essence God is μέτρον πάντων, an impartial balance,-lying even, equal and indifferent to all things, and weighing out heaven and earth, and all the things therein, in the most just and exact proportions, and not a grain too much or too little of any thing. Nor is the Deity therefore bound or obliged to do the best, in any way of servility (as men fondly imagine this to be contrary to his liberty), much less by the law and command of any superior (which is a contradiction), but only by the perfection of its own nature, which it cannot possibly deviate from, no more than ungod itself. In conclusion, therefore, we acknowledge the Atheist's argument to be thus far good; that if there be a God, then of necessity must all things be well made, and as

they should be; et vice versa. But no Atheist will ever be able to prove, that either the whole system of the world could have been better made, or that so much as any one thing therein is made ineptly.

There are indeed many things in the frame of nature, which we cannot reach to the reasons of, they being made by a knowledge far superior and transcendent to that of ours, and our experience and ratiocination but slowly discovering the intrigues and contrivances of Providence therein; witness the circulation of the blood, the milky and lymphatic vessels, and other things (without which the mechanic structure of the bodies of animals cannot be understood), all but so lately brought to light; wherefore we must not conclude, that whatsoever we cannot find out the reason of, or the use, that it serveth to, is therefore ineptly made. We shall give one instance of this; the intestinum cæcum, in the bodies of men and other animals, seems, at first sight, to be but a mere botch or bungle of nature, and an odd impertinent appendix; neither do we know, that any anatomist or physiologer hath given a rational account thereof, or discovered its use: and yet there being a valve at the entrance of it, these two both together are a most artificial contrivance of nature, and of great advantage for animals, to hinder the regurgitation of the fæces upward towards the ventricle.

The first atheistic instance of the faultiness of things, in the frame of nature, is from the constitution of the heavens, and the disposition of the equator and ecliptic, intersecting each other in an angle of three-and-twenty degrees and upwards; whereby, as they pretend, the terrestrial globe is

rendered much more uninhabitable than otherwise it might be." But this is built upon a false supposition of the ancients, that the torrid zone, or all between the tropics, was utterly uninhabitable by reason of the extremity of heat. And it is certain, that there is nothing, which doth more demonstrate a Providence than this very thing, it being the most convenient site or disposition, that could be devised, as will appear, if the inconveniences of other dispositions be considered, especially these three; first, If the axes of those circles should be parellel, and their plains coincident; secondly, If they should intersect each other in right angles; and thirdly (which is a middle betwixt both), If they should cut one another in an angle of forty-five degrees. For it is evident, that each of these dispositions would be attended with far greater inconveniences to the terrestrial inhabitants, in respect of the length of days and nights, heat and cold. And that these two circles should continue thus, to keep the same angular intersection, when physical and mechanic causes would bring them nearer together; this is a farther eviction of a Providence also.

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b

In the next place, the Atheist supposes, that, according to the general persuasion of Theists, the world and all things therein were created only for the sake of man, he thinking to make some advantage for his cause from hence. But this seemeth, at first, to have been an opinion only of some straight-laced Stoics, though afterward indeed recommended to others also, by

a Vide Lucret. lib. v. vers 201.

" Id. lib. ii. vers. 174, 175.

ὅλον μέρους

ἕνεκα·

p. 903.

their own self-love, their over-weaning and puffy conceit of themselves. And so fleas and lice, had they understanding, might conclude the bodies of other greater animals, and men also, to have been made only for them. But the whole was not properly made for any part, but the parts for the whole, and the whole for the Maker thereof. And yet may the things of this lower world be well said to have been made principally (though not only) for man. For Thus Plato, we ought not to monopolize the Divine pov goodness to ourselves, there being other ὅλου, καὶ οὐχ animals superior to us, that are not alDe Legib. together unconcerned neither in this visible creation; and it being reasonable · to think, that even the lower animals likewise, and whatsoever hath conscious life, was made 'partly also, to enjoy itself. But Atheists can be no fit judges of worlds being made well or ill, either in general, or respectively to mankind, they having no standing measure for well and ill, without a God and morality, nor any true knowledge of themselves, and what their own good or evil consisteth in. That was at first but a froward speech of some sullen discontented persons, when things falling not out agreeably to their own private, selfish, and partial appetites, they would revenge themselves, by railing upon nature (that is, Providence), and calling her a stepmother only to mankind, whilst she was a fond, partial, and indulgent mother to other animals; and though this be elegantly set off by Lucretius, yet is there nothing but poetic flourish

a Vide Plin. Hist. Natur. Proem. lib. vii.

b Lib. v. vers. 223.

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