the result of a higher law-both these conceptions are specula tively imperfect, but the former is preferable as a regulative truth. -Summary of Conclusions - parallel difficulties must exist in Theology and in Philosophy-true value and province of Reason in relation to both, 158

LECTURE VII.

Philosophical parallel continued with regard to the supposed moral objections to Christian doctrines. Error of the moral theory of Kant. Moral convictions how far necessary and trustworthy, how far contingent and fallible-parallel in this respect between moral and mathematical science, as based on the formal conditions of experience — possibility of corresponding errors in both. - Human morality not absolute, but relative. - The Moral Law cannot be conceived as an absolute principle, apart from its temporal manifestations - parallel in the idea of Time and its relations. — Morality, as conceived by us, necessarily contains a human and positive element; and therefore cannot be the measure of the Absolute Nature of God. Application of the above principles to Christian Theology. -The Atonement weakness of the supposed moral objections to this doctrine-such objections equally applicable to any conceivable scheme of Divine Providence. - Predestination and Free Will - Predestination, as a determination of the Absolute Mind, is speculatively inconceivable, and therefore cannot be known to be incompatible with human Freedom - parallel in this respect between Predestination in Theology and Causation in Philosophy.- Eternal Punishment-rashness and ignorance of rationalist criticisms of this doctrine the difficulties of the doctrine are not peculiar to Theology, but common to all Philosophy, and belong to the general

problem of the existence of Evil at all, which is itself but a subordinate case of the universal impossibility of conceiving the coëxistence of the Infinite with the Finite. Contrast between illegitimate and legitimate mode of reasoning on evil and its punishment illustrations to be derived from analogies in the course of nature and in the constitution of the human mind. - Extension of the

argument from analogy to other religious doctrines Original Sin - Justification by Faith-Operation of Divine Grace. - Limits of the Moral Reason. Conclusion,

182

LECTURE VIII.

Right use of Reason in religious questions-Reason entitled to judge of a Religion in respect of its evidences, as addressed to men, but not in respect of its correspondence with philosophical conceptions of the Absolute Nature of God.- No one faculty of the human mind is entitled to exclusive preference as the criterion of religious truth the true criterion is to be found in the general result of many and various Evidences-practical neglect of this rule by different writers.- Comparative value of internal and external evidences of religion, the former as negative, the latter as positive.Cautions as requisite in the use of the negative argument from internal evidence-external and internal evidence can only be estimated in conjunction with each other. - Distinction between the proper and improper use of the Moral Sense in questions of religious evidence. - Application of this distinction to facts recorded in Sacred History. - Analogy between physical and moral laws as regards miraculous interventions. - Probable and partial character of the moral argument; error of supposing it to be demonstrative and complete; possibility of mistakes in its application. General

summary of Christian Evidences alternative in the case of their rejection - Christ's teaching either wholly divine or wholly human. - Impossibility of an eclectic Christianity. — Value of the a priori presumption against miracles—nothing gained in point of probability by a partial rejection of the supernatural. — Christianity regarded as a Revelation must be accepted wholly or not at all. — Speculative difficulties in religion form a part of our probation — analogy between moral and intellectual temptations. - General result of an examination of the Limits of Religious Thought-Theology not a speculative science, nor in the course of progressive development. Cautions needed in the treatment of religious knowledge as regulative-this view does not solve difficulties, but only shows why they are insoluble. Instance of the neglect of this caution in Archbishop King's rule of scripture interpretation as regards the Divine Attributes. No explanation possible of those difficulties which arise from the universal laws of human thought—such difficulties are inherent in our mental constitution, and form part of our training and discipline during this life. — The office of Philosophy is not to give us a knowledge of the absolute nature of God, but to teach us to know ourselves and the limits of our faculties. Conclusion,

204

THE

LIMITS OF RELIGIOUS THOUGHT

EXAMINED.

LECTURE I.

YE SHALL NOT ADD UNTO

THE WORD WHICH I COMMAND YOU, NEITHER SHALL YE DIMINISH AUGHT FROM IT. DEUT. IV. 2.

DOGMATISM and Rationalism are the two extremes between which religious philosophy perpetually oscillates. Each represents a system from which, when nakedly and openly announced, the well regulated mind almost instinctively shrinks back; yet which, in some more or less specious disguise, will be found to underlie the antagonist positions of many a theological controversy. Many a man who rejects isolated portions of Christian doctrine, on the ground that they are repugnant to his reason, would hesitate to avow broadly and unconditionally that reason is the supreme arbiter of all religious truth; though at the same time he would find it hard to point out any particular in which the position of reason, in relation to the truths which he still retains, differs from that which it occupies in relation to those which he rejects. And on the other hand, there are many who, while they would by no means construct a dogmatic system on the assumption that the conclusions of reason may always be

made to coincide with those of revelation, yet, for want of an accurate distinction between that which is within the province of human thought and that which is beyond it, are accustomed in practice to demand the assent of the reason to positions which it is equally incompetent to affirm or to deny. Thus they not only lessen the value of the service which it is capable of rendering within its legitimate sphere, but also indirectly countenance that very intrusion of the human intellect into sacred things, which, in some of its other aspects, they so strongly and so justly condemn.

In using the above terms, it is necessary to state at the outset the sense in which each is employed, and to emancipate them from the various and vague associations connected with their ordinary use. I do not include under the name of Dogmatism the mere enunciation of religious truths, as resting upon authority and not upon reasoning. The Dogmatist, as well as the Rationalist, is the constructor of a system; and in constructing it, however much the materials upon which he works may be given by a higher authority, yet in connecting them together and exhibiting their systematic form, it is necessary to call in the aid of human ability. Indeed, whatever may be their actual antagonism in the field of religious controversy, the two terms are in their proper sense so little exclusive of each other, that both were originally employed to denote the same persons;-the name Dogmatists or Rationalists being indifferently given to those medical theorists who insisted on the necessity of calling in the aid of rational principles, to support or correct the conclusions furnished by experience. (1) A like signification is to be found in the later language of philosophy, when the term Dogmatists was used to denote those philosophers who endeav(1) Numbers within brackets refer to Notes at the close of the volume.