The point, indeed, on which the Reviewer lays the most stress, is one in which there was little room for originality, either in myself or in my supposed teacher. That Revelation is accommodated to the limitations of man's faculties, and is primarily designed for the purpose of practical religion, and not for those of speculative philosophy, has been said over and over again by writers of almost every age, and is indeed a truth so obvious that it might have occurred independently to almost any number of thinkers. Doubt

less there is no truth, however trite and obvious, which may not assume a new and striking aspect in the hands of a great and original writer; and in this, as in other respects, a better acquaintance with Dr. Newman's works might have taught me a better mode of expressing many arguments to which my own language may have done but imperfect justice. Even at this late hour, I am tempted to subjoin, as a conclusion to these observations, one passage of singular beauty and truth, of which, had I known it earlier, I would gladly have availed myself, as pointing out the true spirit in which inquiries like these should be pursued, and the practical lesson which they are designed to teach.

"And should any one fear lest thoughts such as these should tend to a dreary and hopeless skepticism, let him take into account the Being and Providence of God, the Merciful and True; and he will at once be relieved of

his anxiety. All is dreary till we believe, what our hearts tell us, that we are subjects of His Governance; nothing is dreary, all inspires hope and trust, directly we understand that we are under His hand, and that whatever comes to us is from Him, as a method of discipline and guidance. What is it to us whether the knowledge He gives us be greater or less, if it be He who gives it? What is it to us whether it be exact or vague, if He bids us trust it? What have we to care whether we are or are not given to divide substance from shadow, if He is training us heavenward by means of either? Why should we vex ourselves to find whether our deductions are philosophical or no, provided they are religious? If our senses supply the media by which we are put on trial, by which we are all brought together, and hold intercourse with each other, and are disciplined, and are taught, and enabled to benefit others, it is enough. We have an instinct within us, impelling us, we have external necessity forcing us, to trust our senses, and we may leave the question of their substantial truth for another world, 'till the day break, and the shadows flee away.' And what is true of reliance on our senses, is true of all the information which it has pleased God to vouchsafe to us, whether in nature or in grace.” 1

OXFORD, February 18th, 1859.

1 University Sermons, p. 351.

CONTENTS.

LECTURE I.

Dogmatism and Rationalism as methods of religious philosophy-mean-
ing of these terms -errors of the respective systems denoted by
each; the one forcing reason into agreement with revelation, the other
forcing revelation into agreement with reason. Both methods may
be regarded as attempts, from opposite sides, to produce exact coin-
cidence between belief and thought. - Instances of each exhibited
and examined. - Human conceptions are unavoidable in Theology;
but there is need of some principle to determine their proper place
in it. Such a principle can only be gained by an investigation of
the Limits of Human Thought. The proper object of criticism is
not religion, but the human mind in its relation to religion. A
direct criticism of religion as a representation of God can only be
accomplished by the construction of a Philosophy of the Infinite.
It is therefore necessary to inquire whether such a philosophy is pos-
sible; and this can only be ascertained by an examination of the
laws of human thought in general, which will determine those of
religious thought in particular. — Analogous difficulties may be ex-
pected in philosophy and in religion, arising from the limitations of

thought common to both.-Contrast between two opposite statements of the extent of human knowledge, in the words of St. Paul and of Hegel. — Purpose of the following Lectures, as an Examination of the Limits of Religious Thought,

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LECTURE II.

Statement of the two opposite methods by which a Philosophy of Religion may be attempted; the Objective or Metaphysical, based on a supposed knowledge of the nature of God, and the Subjective or Psychological, based on a knowledge of the mental faculties of man. - Relation of these methods respectively to the Criticism of Revelation - dependence of the former method upon the latter. Further examination of the Objective or Metaphysical method. Two different modes in which man may be supposed to be capable of attaining to a knowledge of God-specimen of each-insufficiency of both to found a Rational Theology. Examination of the fundamental ideas of Rational Theology, the Absolute -- the Infinite - the First Cause mutual contradictions involved in these three ideas conception of an eternal Causation incompatible with the Absoluteconception of a temporal Causation incompatible with the Infinite. -The Absolute cannot be conceived as a necessary and unconscious cause, - nor as a voluntary and conscious cause, -nor as possessing consciousness at all, nor as containing within itself any kind of relation, nor as one and simple, out of all relation. Effect of these counter impossibilities on the conceptions of Theology apparent contradictions in the conception of the Divine Attributes as absolute and infinite. Further contradictions involved in the coëxistence of the Relative with the Absolute, and of the Finite with the Infinite. Pantheism avoids these contradictions by denying the