which his enemy had used? David proved that way apt to prevail by cutting off the giant's head. But what particularity of method would J. S. have me to use? shall I use reason? To that all the world pretends, and it is the sword that cuts on both sides, and it is used in discourses that can, and that cannot satisfy. Shall I use the Scriptures? in that J. S. is pleased to say, the Quakers outdo me? Shall I use the fathers? The Smectymnuans bring fathers against episcopacy. What shall I bring? I know not what yet, but it ought to be something very particular; that is certain. Shall I then bring tradition? will oral tradition do it? I hope J. S. will, for his own and his three or four friends' sake, like that way. But if I should take it, J. S. might very justly say, that I take a method that is common to those discourses, which have in them power to satisfy the understanding, and those which have no such power: whether this method is used or no in discourses satisfactory, let J. S. speak; but I am sure it is used of late in some discourses, which are not satisfactory, and the name of one of them is "Sure Footing." And do not the Greeks pretend tradition against the Roman doctrine of purgatory, the procession of the Holy Ghost, the supremacy of the bishop of Rome? whether right or wrong I inquire not here, but that they do so is evident; and, therefore, neither is it lawful for me to proceed this way, or even then to call my book A Dissuasive.'-" For it is plain to common sense, that it can have in it no power of moving the understanding one way or other, unless there be some particularity in the method above what is in others;" which it is certain can never be, because there is no method, but some or other have already taken it. And, therefore, I perceive plainly, my book is not any more to be called a Dissuasive, till I can find out some new way and method, which as yet was never used in Christendom. And, indeed, I am to account myself the more unsuccessful in my well meant endeavours, because J. S. tells us that he sees' plainly, that, in the pursuit of truth, method is in a manner all;' J. S. hath a method new enough, not so old as Mr. White, and he desires me to get such another; but "nobis non licet esse tam beatis ;" and I am the less troubled for it, because J. S.'s method is new,' but not right,' and I prove it from an argument of his own; "For," saith he, "it is impossible · any controversy should hover long in debate, if a right method of concluding evidently were carefully taken, and faithfully held to." Now because I see that J. S.'s method, or new way, hath made a new controversy, but hath ended none, but what was before, and what is now is as likely as ever, still to hover in debate;' J. S. must needs conclude, that either he hath not faithfully held to it, or his way is good for nothing. -- Other things he says here, which though they be rude and uncivil, yet because he repeats them in his Sixth Way, I shall there consider them altogether, if I find cause. The Fourth Way. This fourth mine hath, as good luck would have it, nothing of demonstration, nor is his reason founded upon the nature of the thing, as before he boasted, but only ad hominem.' But such as it is, it must be considered. The argument is this, "That though I produce testimony from fathers, yet I do not allow them to be infallible, nor yet myself in interpreting Scripture; nor yet do I, with any infallible certainty, see any proposition I go about to deduce by reason, to be necessarily consequent to any first or self-evident principle, and therefore I am certain of nothing I allege in my whole book." The sum is this, 'No man is certain of any thing, unless he be infallible.' I confess I am not infallible, and yet I am certain this must be his meaning, or else his words have no sense; and if I say true in this, then fallibility and certainty are not such incompossible and inconsistent things. But what does J. S. think of himself? is he infallible? I do not well know what he will answer, for he seems to be very near it, if we may guess by the glorious opinion he hath of himself; but I will suppose him more modest than to think he is, and yet he talks at that rate, as if his arguments were demonstrations, and his opinions certainties. Suppose his grounds he goes upon are as true, as I know they are false; yet is he infallible in his reasoning, and deducing from those principles such feat conclusions, as he offers to obtrude upon the world? If his reason be infallible, so it may be, mine is for aught I know, but I never thought it so yet; and yet I know no reason to the contrary; but it is as infallible as his: but if his be not, it may be all that he says is false; at least he is not sure any thing of it is true; and then he may make use of his own ridiculous speech he made for me, "I know not certainly that any thing I say against your religion, is true," &c. All the men tell us that Cardinal Chigi is now pope, are fallible, they may be deceived, and they may deceive; and yet I suppose Mr. White, though he also be fallible, is sufficiently certain he is so; and if he did make any doubt, if he would sail to Italy, he would be infallibly assured of it by the executioners of the pope's censures, who yet are as fallible as any the officers of Montfalcon. But J. S. however says, I ought to confess that I ought not to dissuade from any thing, "in case neither the fathers nor myself be infallible in any saying or proof of theirs." For the infallibility of the fathers, I shall have a more convenient time to consider it under his Eighth Way. But now I am to consider his reason for this pretty saying, which he says, 'he evinces thus :-"Since to be infallible in none, 'hic et nunc,' (taking in the whole complexion of assisting circumstances) is the same as to be 'hic et nunc,' fallible in all or each; and if they be fallible, or may be deceived in each, they can be sure of none, it follows that who professes the fathers and himself (though using all the means he can to secure him from error) fallible in each, must, if he will speak out like an honest man, confess he is sure of none." This is the evident demonstration, and indeed there are in it some things evidently demonstrative. The first is, that to be infallible in none, is the same as to be fallible in all. Indeed I must needs say, that he says true and learnedly, and it being a self-evident principle, he might, according to his custom, have afforded demonstrations enough for this; but I shall take it upon his own word at this time, and allow him the honour of first communicating this secret to the ignorant world; that he that is not infallible, is fallible.' Another deep note we have here; his words laid plain, without their parentheses, can best declare the mystery; "If they be infallible, or may be deceived in each, they can be sure of none; it follows that they that profess they are fallible in each, must confess they are sure of none." If J. S. always Page 258. write thus subtilely, no man will ever be able to resist him: for indeed this is a demonstration, and therefore we hope it may be æternæ veritatis,' for it relies upon this first and self-evident principle, idem per idem semper facit idem.' Now having well learned these two deep notes out of the school, and deep discourses of J. S., let us see what the man would be at for himself: and though we find it in his parentheses only, yet they could not be left out, and sense be entire without them. When he talks of being infallible, if the notion be applied to his church, then he means an infallibility, antecedent, absolute, unconditionate, such as will not permit the church ever to err. And because he thinks such an infallibility to be necessary, for the settling the doubting minds of men; he affirms roundly, if'infallibility be denied, then no man can be sure of any thing.'-But then when he comes to consider the particulars, and cannot but see, a man may be certain of some things, though he have not that antecedent infallibility, that quality and permanent grace; yet because he will not have his dear notion lost, that 'infallibility and certainty live and die together,' he hath now secretly put in a changeling in the place of the first, and hath excogitated an infallibility 'consequent, conditionate, circumstantiate,' which he calls 'hic et nunc,' 'taking in the whole complexion of assisting circumstances;' now because the first is denied by us to be in any man or company of men, and he perceives, that to be uncertain in every thing, will not be consequent to the want of this first sort, he secretly slides into the second, and makes his consequent to rely upon this deceit. fully. And if the argument be put into intelligible terms, it runs thus: If when a whole complexion of assisting circumstances are present; that is, a proposition truly represented, apt to be understood, necessary to be learned, and attended to by a person desirous to learn, when it is taught by sufficient authority, or proved by evidence, or confirmed by reason; when a man hath his eyes and his wits about him, and is sincerely desirous of truth, and to that purpose, himself considers, and he confers with others and prays to God; and the thing itself is also plain and easy; then if a man can be deceived, he is sure of nothing: and this is infallibility hic et nunc.' But this is not that which he and was done, or what was said, or what was written, is to be told by the present church, which, without further trouble, can infallibly assure us. . And upon this account, the jesuits have got the better of the Jansenists; for though these men weakly and fondly deny such words to be in Jansenius, yet the virtual church can tell better, whether they be or no in Jansenius; or rather, it matters not whether they be or no; for it being the present sense of the pope, he may proceed to condemnation... But J. S. offers at some reason for this: "For," saith he, "fathers being eminent witnesses, to immediate posterity or children, of the church's doctrine received, and councils representatives of the church; their strengths as proofs,-nay, their very existence is not known till the notion of the church be known, which is part of their definition, and to which they relate." This is, but part of his argument, which I yet must consider. apart, because every proposition of his argument hath in it something very untrue; which when I have remarked, I shall consider the whole of it altogether. And here, first, I consider that it is a strange proposition to say, that" the existence of the fathers is not known, till the notion or definition of the church be known.". For who is there of any knowledge in any thing of this nature, that hath not heard of St. Austin, St. Jerome, St. Ambrose, or St. Gregory? The Spaniards have a proverb, " There was never good oglio without bacon, nor good sermon without St. Austin;" and yet, I suppose all the people of Spain that hear the name of St. Austin, it may be, five hundred times every Lent, make no question of the existence of St. Austin, or that there was such a man as he; and yet I believe, not very many of them can tell the definition of the church. Thousands of the people, and the very boys, see the pictures of St. Austin sold in fairs and markets, and, yet are not so wise as to know the notion or nature of the church; and indeed, many wiser people, both among them and us, will be very much to seek in the definition, when your learned men amongst yourselves dispute what that nature or definition is. But, it may be, though J. S. put fathers and councils into the same proposition, yet he means it of councils only, and that is the existence of councils which is not to be had without the notion or definition of church, and this is as false as |