cepted my compliment to his abilities as my unbiassed conviction, and regarded my censure as the offspring of prejudice." Another proof of Sir Stafford Northcote's deficiency for leadership, in Mr. Gladstone's opinion -much as he regarded him personally -was an incident connected with the Bradlaugh episode. Mr. Gladstone was unfortunately out of Parliament at the opening of that controversy, having been obliged to vacate his seat on taking office. Meeting Sir Stafford at the Royal Academy dinner on the Saturday after his re-election, they talked the matter over. Sir Stafford suggested the appointment of a non-Party Committee to examine the question. Mr. Gladstone thought the suggestion good, and proposed the Committee accordingly on Monday. To his amazement and indignation, Sir Stafford Northcote opposed it, under the intimidation of Lord Randolph Churchill and his Party.

1. His wonderful faculty of pity; a magnetic power of sympathy which made him feel the sufferings of others as if they were his own. His unparalleled series of speeches and pamphlets on the Turkish question from 1876 to 1880 were discharged red hot from a nature all on fire against oppression and cruelty. His vivid imagination, like Burke's, brought the victims of Turkish cruelty so close to him that he could almost see their agonized faces and hear their despairing cries. The King of the Hellenes, in a recent letter of tender inquiry after Mr. Gladstone's health, wrote: "I am following with intense anxiety the newspaper reports. I must express my sincere sorrow that he, of all men, should suffer so much; he who has been him

self the comforter of so many mourners in many lands."

veracity; by

2. Mr. Gladstone's which I mean not merely the habit of speaking the truth, but the habitual correspondence of outward action with internal conviction. I don't believe that Mr. Gladstone ever wilfully misrepresented an opponent in controversy or debate; or ever used an argument which, however plausible and useful at the moment, he could not justify to his own conscience. This was the cause of his occasionally involved style of speaking. He thought -as every great orator must in a large measure on his legs, and his anxiety to make his meaning plain and to be just all round, tempted him to expand and qualify. I remember his saying once that the only men he ever knew in public life who had the faculty of saying in their speeches precisely what they meant, neither more nor less, were Lord Palmerston and Mr. Parnell. "I don't possess it at all," he said. But his speeches differ widely in that respect. Some are models of lucidityhis financial statements, for example; and some are keen, crisp, epigrammatic, and quite free from parenthetical amplification. His prose style, too, wonderfully improved with practice. There was always a stately dignity about it. But some of his later essays are models of chaste and sometimes brilliant English.

3. Another rare element in Mr. Gladstone's character was his magnificent courage. Let him be convinced that it was right to do a thing, and if that thing fell within his line of duty he did it, or tried to do it, without ever thinking of the possible consequences to himself. The Alabama Treaty was one instance. He knew that it would make him unpopular; but believing it to be, at bottom, equitable, and that it was the initiation of a great principle, that of peaceful arbitration, he braved the unpopularity of the hour and sacrificed the present for the sake of the future. And we are now reaping the reward in the cordial relations between the two coun

tries-relations which, but for the Alabama Treaty, would have been impossible.

4. And his passion for justice was equal to his courage. It roused him to attack the misgovernment of the Two Sicilies, as it did later the iniquities of Turkish rule. Nor was he less resolute in the cause of justice when the popular tide ran fiercely against him. His opposition to the Ecclesiastical Titles Bill is one out of many examples of this. He was one of a miserable minority of 95 against 438, both Liberals and Conservatives having united their forces in support of the Bill. Mr. Gladstone's speech is very powerful, ending with a noble peroration, in which he expressed his conviction that "a generous people" would one day reverse the verdict of unreasoning passion. But in any case his course, he said, was clear-"to follow the bright star of justice, beaming brightly from the heavens, whithersoever it might lead." His confidence in the triumph of justice was justified sooner than he had expected. For it fell to his own lot, twenty years later, to repeal the Ecclesiastical Titles Bill without an opposing voice.

I may give another instance of his passion for justice which tells against

myself. I chanced to write, in 1878, a rather long article on Lord Beaconsfield in the Spectator. Mr. Gladstone asked me, next time I saw him, if I knew who wrote the article. I told him. He said something complimentary, but added: "There is one point on which, I think, you are not quite just to Lord Beaconsfield. You think him a man of political animosities." I assented, and appealed to the speeches against Sir Robert Peel by way of proof. "I am sure you are wrong," said Mr. Gladstone. "My belief is, that Lord Beaconsfield has no political animosities; and I think I ought to know, for I have sat opposite to him as an opponent now for a good many years. What is true is that he would spare no effort to trample on me while I was an opponent. But that was part of his game. Now that I am no longer opposite him as an official opponent, my belief is that Lord Beaconsfield has no animosity against me at all, as I have certainly none against him. Indeed, there are traits in his character and career for which I shall always honor him: his gallant defence of his race, for example, his devotion to his wife, and his splendid parliamentary pluck."-Fortnightly Review.

IN 1761 was signed the celebrated agreement between the French and Spanish branches of the House of Bourbon, known as "the Family Compact," which was to produce such important results in the political history of Europe.

Pitt, then directing the destinies of this country, saw the necessity for instant action, and urged on his Cabinet the importance of an immediate declaration of war against Spain, but, failing to carry with him the great majority of his colleagues, resigned office and shortly afterward had the satisfaction of seeing the Government driven to do what he had originally recommended.

It was on the 4th of January, 1762, that war against Spain was declared by England, but delay still dogged our footsteps and the chief active measure of the coming campaign was not commenced until two months later, when on the 5th of March a combined naval and military force sailed from Portsmouth, having for its ultimate destination the rich city of Havana, then, in fact, if not in name, the capital of the "Pearl of the Antilles."

Of all the Spanish possessions in the West Indies this important place the centre of their trade, the key to their American possessions, the rich and prosperous capital of their West Indian Empire, possessing a fine harbor and a commanding strategical position -undoubtedly presented the most favorable and promising point of attack. It is said that the Duke of Cumberland was the author of the scheme for its reduction, and having laid it before the Cabinet was in return granted the privilege of nominating the officers in chief command who were to carry out his design. A consideration of the persons thus appointed bears out this statement, since most of them were personal friends of the Duke and members of his immediate entourage.

The chief command of the military forces was conferred upon George, third Earl of Albermarle and head of the house of Keppel, who had from boyhood been closely associated with the Duke, whose aide-de-camp he was and with whom he had served at Fontenoy and Culloden.

Lord Albemarle's second brother, Augustus Keppel, afterward raised to the peerage with the title of Lord Keppel for his distinguished services, was appointed second in command of the naval portion of the expedition, while the third brother, William, until then Colonel of the recently raised 56th Regiment of Foot (now the 2d battalion of the Essex Regiment), was selected for a brigade command with the rank of Major-General.

Upon the return of the successful expedition and the distribution of the very large sums of prize money resulting from it, it was said, and not perhaps without some show of reason, that the enterprise had been undertaken to enrich the Keppel family-a result it certainly achieved.

The command of the fleet was given to Sir George Pocock, K.B., Admiral of the Blue, who had greatly distinguished himself in the East Indies, receiving no less than seven wounds when leading the attack upon Chandernagore.

Albemarle's second in command was a man who had already seen a large amount of active service and was an aide-de-camp to the King, and who, some twenty years later, was to draw the attention of all Europe to the fortress of Gibraltar, which, as Governor, he held successfully against the combined French and Spanish forces throughout a period of three years and seven months. George Augustus Eliott, afterward created Baron Heathfield for his splendid services, at Gibraltar, was at this time best known as a distinguished cavalry officer who now, in front of Havana, was, as a besieger,

to learn those practical lessons of fortress defence which, twenty years later as defender, he turned to such good account against a similar foe.

Such were the principal leaders of the expedition that sailed for the West Indies at the commencement of March, 1762, but the men they were to lead and the ships they were to command were to be largely drawn from forces already on the far side of the Atlantic.

Of the 16,000 men destined for the land forces but little more than 4,000 were supplied from England, the remainder were to come, 4,000 from North America, and 8,000 from an army then operating under General Monckton against Martinique.

The naval force was in much the same state, for Pocock had with him when he sailed but five ships of the line, the rest were to be obtained from Rodney, who was co-operating with Monckton. The welcome intelligence of the fall of Martinique was received on arrival at Barbados, and on the 26th of April the necessary military and naval reinforcements were obtained and the combined force set sail for Cuba.

The fleet, reinforced a little later by a fresh addition, numbered about about twenty sail of the line with about an equal number of smaller war vessels, convoying 156 transports and store ships. Sir George Pocock flew his flag on the Namur, of ninety guns, and Commodore Keppel was on board the Valiant of seventy-four guns.

Besides being presently reinforced by a squadron under Captain Hervey, who was to play an important part in the naval attack on Havana, the fleet was further augumented in the course of operations by nine more ships of war. The military portion of the expedition sailing from Martinique numbered 11,350 men, but the American contingent only arrived just before the conclusion of operations.

The contrast between the number of ships employed to transport some 11,000 men and that now necessary for a like purpose is very striking, and not less so is the circumstance-accentuat

ing the difference between those days of sailing ships and these of large, fast, powerful steamers-that when Sir George Pocock decided to save time by approaching Havana along the northern coast of Cuba through the dreaded Bahama Channel he was thought to attempt an unusual and somewhat dangerous feat, and took precautions which to us sound excessive.

His judgment, however, was sound, and having passed the long Bahama Channel in seven divisions between the 27th of May and the 6th of June, he arrived before Havana without mishap on the last named date.

Havana lies upon the western side of the long and narrow channel that leads to its inner and spacious harbor, then considered capable of accommodating 100 sail of the line. The city was defended by two forts, placed at opposite sides of the narrow entrance, the one on the eastern side, and therefore facing the city, being known then, as now, by the name of Fort Moro. This work formed the chief defence of the place, and presently became the main object of the attack, and its fall practically placed the city of Havana at the mercy of the attackers. It was inaccessible from the sea, and was secured on the land side by several outworks and by a main ditch 80 feet deep and 40 feet wide, cut out of the solid rock, and guarded toward the sea by a narrow ledge or wall along which the besiegers eventually approached the main work.

On the western or city side of the channel was Fort Puntal or de la Punta-the name still survives-while farther in, on a level with the water, was a strong work mounting twelve guns and known as "The Twelve Apostles." Higher up still was the Shepherd's Battery, and above all were the Cavanos Hills extending inland from Fort Moro to the plains of Guana

macoa.

The western side of the city was defended by a chain of smaller works, the country beyond which was devoid of soil or vegetation, and offered no advantages to an attacker. Eastward of

Fort Moro, however, the ground was well wooded, and thickly dotted with villages and country-houses.

It is a somewhat curious coincidence that inside the harbor, protected by the long, narrow channel and the intervening land from the fire of the British ships, lay the Spanish fleet, very much as, at the present time of writing, lies Admiral Cervera's squadron within the somewhat similar harbor of Santiago de Cuba. The difference between the relative value of the bottledup fleets is that whereas Cervera's ships, armed with modern ordnance, will doubtless be able to play some part in the land defence against an army operating against the forts, the Spanish fleet at Havana in 1762 was out of range of the ground over which the besiegers worked, and its ships were therefore useless, save as affording garrisons and reliefs to the forts attacked.

The Spanish fleet thus voluntarily placed itself out of action within the inner harbor of Havana, and farther sank three of its best ships within a boom at the mouth of the outer entrance, thus reversing Admiral Sampson's stratagem with the Merrimac at Santiago, not with the object of shutting itself in, but of shutting the British fleet out.

Once arrived at Havana, Albemarle lost no time in commencing operations; indeed the rainy season had already set in, and there was no time to waste. Within twenty-four hours all arrangements for the disembarcation of the troops had been made, the spot selected for the landing being some miles to the eastward of Fort Moro, between the mouths of the rivers Bocca Nao and Coximar.

In order to distract the attention of the Spaniards, a feint was made by Admiral Pocock to the west of Havana, where he landed some marines, while the disembarkation of the main body of the British troops was effected in flat-bottomed boats, under the superintendence of Commodore Keppel. slight resistance was offered by a small work on the shore, which was speedily silenced by the guns of the fleet, and NEW SERIES.-VOL LXVIII., No. 2.

A

the army safely landed in three divi

sions.

It is said that the present garrison of Havana have recently erected earthworks along this part of the coast, as if fearing a repetition by the Americans of our landing in 1762.

Once the invading force was firmly established on Cuban soil the Cavanos heights were seized and operations were begun against Fort Moro by a force under General Keppel, while another under General Eliott was advanced to the town of Guanamacoa, to act as a covering force and to endeavor to obtain a supply of water and provisions. A third party, under Brigadier-General Howe, was stationed on the western side of the city to engage the attention of the defenders in that direction, but no serious operations were undertaken by it, as it was quickly seen that the capture of Fort Moro was the object to be aimed at, and every effort was concentrated upon it.

The operations that now commenced were protracted for several weeks, during which the besiegers suffered very great hardships and endured considerable privations. The climate was most unhealthy and speedily produced fevers and similar illnesses; the country was unsuited for siege operations, being wooded and almost roadless; while the soil was so scanty in the immediate neighborhood of the works as to offer but slight cover for the besiegers, who were put to great labor, first to construct their batteries and approaches on the rocky ground, and then to arm them with guns dragged through most difficult country.

At one time no less than 4,000 soldiers and 3,000 seamen were prostrated by sickness, and contemporary accounts paint a vivid, if unpleasant, picture of the sufferings endured.

The position of the fleet was scarcely better than that of the army. Anchored in an open roadstead, off a rocky coast, daily expecting the commencement of the hurricane season, and looking longingly for reinforcements which did not appear, the British forces by sea as well as on land were in an almost des

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