five were suppressed. He also wrote against Fludd, and by refuting him, refuted at the same time the Rosecrucian brethren; and here the Aristotelians seemed to behold his labours with a favourable eye. After having overturned several false and visionary systems of philosophy, he began to think of substituting something more solid and satisfactory in their place; and in pursuance of this design he proceeded with the utmost circumspection and caution. He recommended to others, and followed himself, that wise method of philosophical investigation, which, with a slow and timorous pace, rises from the objects of sense to the discussions of reason, and arrives at truth by assiduity, experiment, and an attentive observation of the laws of nature; or, to express the same thing in other words, Gassendi struck out that judicious method, which, by an attention to facts, to the changes and motions of the natural world, leads by degrees to general principles, and lays a solid foundation for rational inquiry. In the application of this method he had recourse chiefly to mathematical succours, from a persuasion that demonstration and certainty were the peculiar fruits of that accurate and luminous science. He drew no assistance from the science of metaphysics, which he overlooked from an opinion that the greatest part of its rules and decisions were too precarious to satisfy a sincere inquirer, animated with the love of truth.*

upon

philosophy.

XXXII. Des Cartes followed a very different method in his philosophical researches. He abandoned the The Cartesian mathematics, which he had at first looked as the tree of knowledge, and employed the science of abstract ideas, or metaphysics, in the investigation of truth. Having accordingly laid down a few plain general principles, which seemed to be deduced immediately from the nature of man, his first business was to form distinct notions of Deity, matter, soul, body, space, the universe, and the various parts of which it is composed. From these notions, examined with attention, compared and combined together according to their mutual relations, connexions, and resemblances, and reduced into a kind of system, he proceed

i See Bougerell, Vie de Gassendi, p. 17 and 23.

k See Gassendi's Institutiones Philosophia; a diffuse production, which takes up the two first volumes of his works, and in which his principal design is to show, that those opinions, of both the ancient and modern philosophers, which are deduced from metaphysical principles, have little solidity, and are generally defective in point of evidence and perspicuity.

ed still further, and made admirable use of them in reforming the other branches of philosophy, and giving them a new degree of stability and consistence. This he effected by connecting all his branches of philosophical reasonings in such a manner, that principles and consequences followed each other in the most accurate order, and that the latter seemed to flow from the former in the most natural manner. This method of pursuing truth could not fail to attract the admiration of many; and so indeed it happened; for no sooner had Des Cartes published his discoveries in philosophy, than a considerable number of eminent men, in different parts of Europe, who had long entertained a high disgust against the inelegant and ambiguous jargon of the schools, adopted these discoveries with zeal, declared their approbation of the new system, and expressed their desire that its author should be substituted in the place of the Peripatetics, as a philosophical guide to the youth in the public seminaries of learning. On the other hand, the Peripatetics, or Aristotelians, seconded by the influence of the clergy, who apprehended that the cause of religion was aimed at and endangered by these philosophical innovations, made a prodigious noise, and left no means unemployed to prevent the downfal of their old system, and to diminish the growing reputation of the new philosophy. To execute this invidious purpose with the more facility, they not only accused Des Cartes of the most dangerous and pernicious errors, but went so far, in the extravagancy of their malignity, as to bring a charge of atheism against him. This furious zeal of the Aristotelians will not appear so extraordinary, when it is considered, that they contended not so much for their philosophical system, as for the honours, advantages, and profits they derived from it. The Theosophists, Rosecrucians, and Chymists, entered into this contest against Des Cartes, but conducted themselves with more moderation than the Aristotelians, notwithstanding their persuasion that the Peripatetic philosophy, though chimerical and impious, was much less intolerable than the Cartesian system.' The consequences of this dispute were favourable to the progress of science; for the wiser part of the European philosophers, although they did not at all adopt the sentiments of Des Cartes, were nevertheless encouraged and

1 See Baillet, Vie de Des Cartes. As also the General Dictionary at the article Des

Cartes.

animated by his example to carry on their inquiries with more freedom from the restraints of tradition and personal authority than they had formerly done, and to throw resolutely from their necks that yoke of servitude under which Aristotle and his followers had so long kept them in subjection.

sary of Des

XXXIII. The most eminent contemporaries of Des Cartes applauded, in general, the efforts he made toward Gassendi the the reformation of philosophy, and that noble chief adver resolution with which he broke the shackles of Cartes. magisterial authority, and struck out new paths, in which he proceeded, without a guide, in the search after truth. They also approved of his method of arising, with caution and accuracy, from the most simple, and, as it were, the primary dictates of reason and nature, to truths and propositions of a more complex and intricate kind, and of admitting nothing as truth that was not clearly and distinctly apprehend as such. They went still further, and unanimously acknowledged, that he had made most valuable and important discoveries in philosophy, and had demonstrated several truths which, before his time, were received upon no other evidence than that of tradition and conjecture. But these acknowledgments did not hinder some of those who made them with the greatest sincerity, from finding several essential defects in the philosophy of this great man. They looked upon his account of the causes and principles of natural things to be for the most part hypothetical, founded on fancy rather than experience. Nay, they attacked the fundamental principles upon which the whole system of his philosophy was built, such as his ideas of the Deity, of the universe, of matter and spirit, of the laws of motion, and other points that were connected with these. Some of these principles they pronounced uncertain; others of a pernicious tendency, and adapted to engender the most dangerous errors; others again they considered as directly contrary to the language of experience. At the head of these objectors was his own fellowcitizen Gassendi, who had made war before him upon the Aristotelians and Chymists; who in genius was his equal; in learning, by much his superior; and whose mathematical knowledge was most uncommon and extensive. This formidable adversary directed his first attacks against the metaphysical principles which supported the whole struc

ture of the Cartesian philosophy. He then proceeded still further; and in the place of the physical system of Des Cartes, substituted one that resembled not a little the natural philosophy of Epicurus, though far superior to it in solidity, much more rational, consistent, and perfect, being founded not on the illusory visions of fancy, but on the testimony of sense and the dictates of experience." This new and sagacious observer of nature had not many followers, and his disciples were much less numerous than those of Des Cartes. But what he wanted in number was sufficiently compensated by the merit and reputation of those who adopted his philosophical system: for he was followed by some of the most eminent men in Europe, by persons distinguished in the highest degree, by their indefatigable application, and their extensive knowledge both of natural philosophy and mathematics. It is also observable, that he had but few disciples in his own country; but among the English, who in his time were remarkable for their application to studies of a physical and mathematical kind, a considerable number adopted his philosophical system. Nay, it is remarkable, that even those eminent philosophers and divines, such as Whichcot, Gale, Cudworth, and More, who entered the lists with Hobbes, whose doctrine came nearer to the principles of Gassendi than to the system of Des Cartes, and revived ancient Platonism in order to crush under its weight the philosopher of Malmesbury, placed Gassendi and Plato in the same class, and explained the sentiments of the latter in such a manner as to make them appear quite agreeable to the principles of the former."

XXXIV. From this period must be dated that famous Two leading schism that divided the philosophical world into Pets, the two great sects, which, though almost agreed conand metaphy-cerning those points that are of the greatest utility and importance in human life, differ widely about

sical.

viz.

m See his Disquisitio Metaphysica, seu Dubitationes et Instantiæ adversus Cartesii Metaphysicam, et Responsa, which are published in the third volume of his works, p. 283. Bernier, a celebrated French physician, has given an accurate view of the philosophy of Gassendi in his abridgment of it, published in French at Lyons, in the year 1684, in eight volumes 12mo. this abridgment will give to the reader a clearer account of this philosophy than even the works of Gassendi himself, in which his meaning is often expressed in an ambiguous manner, and which are beside loaded with superfluous erudidition. The life of Gassendi, accurately written by Bougerelle, a priest of the ora tory, was published at Paris, in 1737. See Biblioth. Francoise, tom. xxvii. p. 353.

See the Preface to the Latin translation of Cudworth's Intellectual System; as also the Remarks that are added to that translation. Dr. Mosheim is the author of that Translation, and of these Remarks.

the principles of human knowledge, and the fundamental points from whence the philosopher must proceed in his search of truth. Of these sects the one may be properly called metaphysical, and the other mathematical. The metaphysical sect follows the system of Des Cartes: the mathematical one directs its researches by the principles of Gassendi. The former looks upon truth as attainable by abstract reasoning; the latter seeks after it by observation and experience. The follower of Des Cartes attributes little to the external senses, and much to meditation and discussion. The disciple of Gassendi, on the contrary, places little confidence in metaphysical discussion, and has principally recourse to the reports of sense, and the contemplation of nature. The former, from a small number of abstract truths, deduces a long series of propositions, in order to arrive at a precise and accurate knowledge of God and nature, of body and spirit; the latter admits these metaphysical truths, but at the same time denies the possibility of erecting, upon their basis, a regular and solid system of philosophy, without the aid of assiduous observation and repeated experiments, which are the most natural and effectual means of philosophical progress and improvement. The one, eagle like, soars, with an intrepid flight, to the first fountain of truth, and to the general relations and final causes of things; and descending from thence, explains by them the various changes and appearances of nature, the attributes and counsels of the Deity, the moral constitution and duties of man, the frame and structure of the universe. The other, more difficult and cautious, observes with attention, and examines with assiduity, the objects that are before his eyes; and arises gradually from them to the first cause and the primordial principles of things. The Cartesians suppose that many things are known by man with the utmost certainty; and hence their propensity to form their opinions and doctrines into a regular system. The followers of Gassendi consider man as in a state of ignorance with respect to an immense number of things, and consequently think it incumbent upon them to suspend their judgment, in a multitude of cases, until time and experience dispel their darkness; and hence it is also, that they consider a system as an attempt of too adventurous a nature, and by no means proportioned to the narrow extent of human knowledge; or at least they think, that the business of system-making ought