that though he was troubled to see his wife weep for him, yet: Οφθαλμοὶ δ ̓ ὡσεὶ κέρα ἔστασαν, ἠὲ σίδηρος, "He held the corners of his eyes as firmly as the horn of his bow, or the iron of his spear, and by his wit he kept his eyes from running over." Reason can make every member of the body obey; but use can make it obey willingly: that can command nature, but this can change it: that can make it do what it pleases, but this can make it be so. 4. For there being in man so much brutishness and inclination to forbidden actions and things, to sensual and weak fruitions, nature in many instances calls upon us to die. Ἔα μ' ἀπολέσθαι· τοῦτο γάρ μοι συμφέρει “ Let me perish, for it is for my advantage:" I desire to die because it is pleasant. Γνώμην ἔχοντά μ' ἡ φύσις βιάζεται. 'Nature does seem to do violence to us, and constrain us by violent inclinations to things against reason:' but then when passion supervenes, and, like strong winds, blow vehemently and raise a storm, we should certainly perish, if God did not give us other principles which might be as effective of his purposes, as nature and passion are of death and folly. Passion can be commanded by reason, but nothing hath sufficient and final effort and strength against nature, but custom. Ναῦς ὥς τις ἐκ μὲν γῆς ἀνήρτηται βρόχοις, "For our ship is kept fast and firm in its station by cables, and when the winds blow, we have anchors and fastenings to secure it." Which verses Plutarch expounding, Пeloμara yàp λέγει τὰς ἀντεχούσας κρίσεις πρὸς τὸ αἰσχρὸν, εἶτα ὥσπερ ὑπὸ πνεύματος πολλοῦ ῥηγνυμένας τοῦ πάθους, saith that “the cables which are to secure our ship in tempests, are the firm and permanent judgments against that which is filthy P." They secure when the winds of passion are violent and dangerous. then because the storm is renewed every day, and μévovoiv ai φύσεις, ὡς προῆλθον τὸ πρότερον, nature will revert, and for ever be longing after its own proportions, we must introduce P Xylandri, t. ii. p. 445. • Οδυσσ. τ. 211. But a nature against a nature: and as passion sets nature on work, and is itself overcome by reason, so if this reason become constant, firm, and habitual, it makes nature an artless, jointless enemy. 5. But then on the other side, if we let our evil appetites prevail, and use them to satisfaction and empire, bringing in eyil customs upon our vicious and ill-disposed nature, we are fallen into an evil state of things: for custom and vicious habits are like the locks and bars to hell-gates, a man cannot but do evil, and then his case is intolerable. 6. Now because this is a great state of danger, and consequently a great caution against continuing in sin, I shall put some strength to it, and rescue the whole doctrine concerning this article from the false glosses and imperfect notices of men, which hang upon the duty of repentance like shackles and fetters hindering it to begin betimes, and so to proceed to its measures by the many and just limits and steps of its progression. For the case is this: If you ask, when every man is bound to repent,-I answer, as soon as ever he hath sinned. But how if he does not? then he adds more sin both against God and against his own soul, by delaying this duty, to that he did before in the single action of which he is tied to repent. For every man is bound to repent instantly of every known sin; he sins anew if he does not, though he add no more of the same actions to his heap. But it is much worse if he sins on; not only because he sins oftener, but because if he contracts a custom or habit of sin, he superadds a state of evil to himself, distinct from the guilt of all those single actions which made the habit. This I shall endeavour to prove against the doctrine of the Roman schools, who teach; 7. I. That no man is ordinarily bound to repent instantly of his sin; for the precept of repentance being affirmative, it does not oblige to its present or speedy performance". For it is as in the case of baptism, or prayers; to the time of the performance of which duties, the commandment of God does not specifically bind us, now, or an hour hence, or when it is convenient, or when it becomes accidentally necessary, and determined by something else that intervenes : so it is in repentance; so it be done at all, it matters not ♪ Navarre Compend. Manual. c. 1. n. 31. when, as to the duty of it; when you come to die, or when you justly fear it; as in the days of the plague, or before a battle, or when the holy man comes to take his leave of his dying parishioner, then let him look to it. But else he is not obliged. For the sin that was committed ten years since, grows no worse for abiding; and of that we committed yesterday we are as deeply guilty, as of the early sins of our youth; but no single sin can increase its guilt by the putting off our repentance and amendment. 8. II. The guilt of sin which we have committed, they call habitual sin; that is, a remaining obligation to punishment for an action that is past, a guiltiness: or as Johannes de Lugo' expresses it, "peccatum actuale moraliter perseverans;" "the actual sin morally remaining," by which a man is justly hated by God. But "this habitual sin is not any real quality, or habit, but a kind of moral denomination or ground thereof, which remains till it be retracted by repentance."-The person is still esteemed injurious, and obliged to satisfaction.' That is all. 9. III. The frequent repetition of sinful acts will, in time, naturally produce a habit, a proper, physical, inherent, permanent quality; but this is so natural, that it is no way voluntary but in its cause, that is, in the actions which produced it, and therefore it can have in it no blame, no sinfulness, no obliquity, distinct from those actions that caused it, and requires no particular or distinct repentance"; for when the single acts of sin are repented of, the remaining habit is innocent, and the facility to sin which remains, is no sin at all. 10. IV. These habits of sin may be pardoned without the contrary habit of virtue, even by a single act of contrition, or attrition with the sacrament. And the event of all is this, it is not necessary that your repentance should be so early, or so holy, as to obtain by the grace of God the habits of virtue, or to root out the habit of sin; and, 2. It is not necessary that it should be at all before the hour of death, unless by accident it be inferred and commanded. 4 Vide Infidelity Unmasked, pag. 604. "It is true, the best divines teach that a sinner is not bound to repent himself instantly of his sin," &c. De Pœnit. disp. 7. sect. 5. n. 48. Sic etiam Suarez. tom. 4. in 3. part. disp. 9. sect. 4. n. 23. Granatens. in materià de peccatis, tract. 8. disp. sect. 1. " Ibid. pag. 607. I do suppose these propositions not only to be false, but extremely dangerous and destructive of the duty of repentance, and all its consequent hopes, and therefore I shall oppose against them these conclusions. 1. Every man is bound to repent of his sin as soon as ever he hath committed it. 2. That a sinful habit hath in it proper evils, and a proper guiltiness of its own, besides all that which came directly by the single actions. 3. That sinful habits do require a distinct manner of repentance, and are not pardoned but by the introduction of the contrary. The consequent of these propositions will be this. Our repentance must not be deferred at all, much less to our death-bed. 2. Our repentance must be so early, and so effective of a change, that it must root out the habits of sin, and introduce the habits of virtue; and in that degree in which this is done, in the same degree the repentance is perfect, more or less. For there is a latitude in this duty, as there are degrees of perfection. SECTION II. 1. Every Man is bound to repent of his Sin as soon as he hath committed it. 1. THAT this doctrine is of great usefulness and advantage to the necessity and persuasions of holy life, is a good probable inducement to believe it true; especially since God is so essential an enemy to sin, since he hath used such rare arts of the Spirit for the extermination of it, since he sent his holy Son to destroy it; and he is perpetually destroying it, and will at last make that it shall be no more at all, but in the house of cursing, the horrible regions of damnation. But I will use this only as an argument to all pious and prudent persons, to take off all prejudices against the severity of this. doctrine. For it is nothing so much against it if we say it is severe, as it makes for it, that we understand it to be necessary. For this doctrine which I am now reproving, although it be the doctrine properly of the Roman schools, yet it is their and our practice too. We sin with greediness, and repent at leisure. Pars magna Italiæ est, si verum admittimus, in quâ 'No man puts on his mourning-garment, till he be dead.' This day we seldom think it fit to repent, but the day appointed for repentance is always to-morrow. Against which dangerous folly I offer these considerations. 2. I. If the duty of repentance be indispensably required in the danger of death, and he that does not repent when he is arrested with the probability of so sad a change, is 'felo de se,' uncharitable to himself and a murderer of his own soul, then so is he in his proportion who puts it off one day: because every day of delay is a day of danger; and the same law of charity obliges him to repent to-day, if he sinned yesterday, lest he be dead before to-morrow. The necessity indeed is not so great, and the duty is not so urgent, and the refusal is not so great a sin in health, as in sickness and dangers imminent and visible: but there are degrees of necessity, as there are degrees of danger: and he that considers how many persons die suddenly, and how many more may, and no man knows that he shall not, cannot but confess that because there is danger, there is also an obligation of duty and charity to repent speedily, and that positively, or carelessly to put it off, is a new fault, and increases God's enmity against him. He that is well, may die to-morrow. He that is very sick, may recover and live many years. If therefore a periculum ne fiat,' a danger lest repentance be never done, is a sufficient determination of the divine commandment to do it then, it is certain that it is in every instant determinately necessary; because in every instant there is danger. In all great sicknesses there is not an equal danger; yet in all great sicknesses it is a particular sin not to repent, even by the confession of all sides; it is so therefore in all the periods of an uncertain life; a sin, but in differing degrees. And therefore this is not an argument of caution only, but of duty. For therefore it is of duty, because it is of caution. It could not be a caution unless there was a danger; and if there be a danger, then it is a duty. For he that is very sick must do it. But how if x Juv. iii. 171. Rupert, |