rience which it would afford them, the pleasures of imagination with which it would supply them, and the unbounded scope of philosophical inquiries which it would open to their view, place them on that proud eminence whence they could view with indifference those empty trifles, and puerile considerations by which they were formerly disturbed. I am therefore inclined to think, that the error of supposing extreme delicacy of passion, or delicacy of feeling, (both of which I consider different modifications of our natural sensibi

lity, as it happens to be accidentally determined by the circumstances of life,) to be hurtful to taste, has originated from that more generally diffused error, of confounding taste with sensibility.

As to those who affect to be pleased or displeased at every object that fixes their attention, and who are known, at the same time, to possess very little taste, I have only to reply, that no argument can be drawn from affectation. It might as well be maintained, that virtue is a farce, because hypocrites affect to be virtuous. The following sensible reflections on these characters, by Dr. Gerard, may be entertaining to the reader. Treating of those who are extravagant both of praise and censure, he observes, with great justice, that "this extravagance proceeds much less commonly from excess of sensibility, than from a defect in the other requisites of fine taste; from an incapacity

to distinguish and ascertain, with precision, different degrees of excellence or faultiness. Instead of forming an adequate idea of the nature of the beauty or deformity, we go beyond all bounds of moderation, and when we want to express our sentiments, can do it only in general terms, tumid and exaggerated. If we are displeased, we signify it with the inveteracy of a Dennis, in terms of general invective; and without explaining the causes of our disapprobation, pronounce it poor, dull, wretched, execrable. If we are pleased, we cannot tell with what, how, or why, but only declare it fine, incomparable, with the unmeaning rapture of an ancient rhapsodist, who, without understanding the principles of art, or the sense of an author, like a madman, really agitated by the fury which the poets feigned, could recite or praise them with such vehemence, as transported himself, and astonished his auditors."

"From Plato's dialogue inscribed 'Io,'" adds the Doctor, in a note, "we learn that there were men of this character, who travelled through Greece, and contended at the public festivals. Their chief employment was to repeat beautiful passages from the poets, particularly Homer, with a rapturous and enthusiastic pronunciation, as if they had an exquisite and warm perception of their excellence. It is probable that they also declaimed in praise of their favourite verses :

this seems to be implied in the expressions, Tepl ποιητῶ διαλέγειν περὶ Ομήρε λέγειν καὶ ἐνπορέιν, and is insinuated by the proof which Socrates produces of their ignorance of art, from the capacity of every real artist to distinguish beauties from faults, and to point them out in the works of any performer in the kind. Socrates proves, from the concessions of his antagonist, that neither did his sentiments proceed from true taste, from a vigorous perception of the beauties he recited, nor his encomiums from judgment, from a critical skill in the principles of beauty. He therefore, in his usual strain of irony, resolves both into an unaccountable agitation of spirit, proceeding either from madness or from inspiration; and, with great humour, compares the several Muses to as many magnets. The Muse inspires the poet without any agency or knowledge of his; he, in the same manner, conveys the inspiration to his rhapsodist; and he to his attentive hearers just as the loadstone, by its imperceptible and unaccountable influence, attracts a ring of iron, that a second, and that a third."

From what has been now said, it appears, that the more bountiful nature has been to us in the faculty of feeling, the more capable we are of becoming elegant judges of the beauties of nature and of art; but that the mere possession of feeling or sensibility, by no means implies the pos

session of taste, unless this feeling or sensibility be attended with all the other requisites of a perfect taste. It is this latter error that has led to so many false hypotheses on the subject of taste; because such a principle being once admitted, we look up to every man who is endowed by nature with an exquisite feeling, as a man of taste; and afterwards, on finding ourselves deceived, we either run over to the opposite extreme, and maintain that sensibility is hurtful to taste, or we give up the subject in despair, and consider taste as something that has nothing fixed and determined in its nature, and to be as variable and fluctuating as the biases and propensities of the human race.

Those who maintain, that sensibility is rather the matter of taste, than the basis on which it is founded, may, perhaps, object, that the pleasure imparted by beautiful objects does not result from any perception of their beauty, that we are pleased with a beautiful object the moment we look upon it, and do not suspend the pleasure till we first perceive the cause by which it is excited; that the perception of beauty must, therefore, follow, and not precede the emotion which is felt; and that, consequently, we do not know what beauty is, and if not, that we cannot possess taste, till we first feel the pleasing emotion which it produces in the soul; that this

emotion is, therefore, inseparably connected with that discriminating perception of beauty in which I have made taste to consist. This reasoning, no doubt, will appear not only plausible, but conclusive to those who consider taste an instinctive faculty that discerns beauty at a glance, without any previous perception or exercise of judgment; nor do I doubt but the difficulty of getting over it, has led our acutest writers on the subject of taste into many errors. They have all seen, that judgment and experience are necessary to form a correct and elegant taste; but feeling, at the same time, that the emotion of pleasure which the presence of a beautiful object excites in the mind, is instantaneous, and outstrips the celerity of reason, they have proceeded in their theory as if they admitted both truths, at the same moment, an admission, however, which is as unphilosophical as it is absurd. It is this error that has led some eminent writers even so far as to limit the province of taste to the mere power of receiving pleasure from beauty, as Dr. Blair and Akenside; and even those who saw, that a general and enlarged acquaintance with, or antecedent perception of the qualities that constitute beauty in any particular object, was an essential part of taste, still associate with this antecedent knowledge a faculty or power of receiving pleasure from the object, with the beauty of which it made.