that so far only as this is allowed, (i. e. so far only as it is allowed, that the Testimony would not have been given, had it not been true,) can this Argument have any force. Testimony is of various kinds; and may possess various degrees of force,* not only in reference to its own intrinsic character, but in reference also to the kind of conclusion that it is brought to support. In respect of this latter point, the first and great distinction is, between Testimony to matters of Fact, and, to matters of Opinion, or Doctrines. Matters of fact, and of opinion. The expressions "Matter [or Question] of Fact," and "Matter of Opinion," are not employed by all persons with precision and uniformity. But the notion most nearly conformable to ordinary usage seems to be this: by a "Matter of Fact" is meant, something which might, conceivably, be submitted to the senses; and about which it is supposed there could be no disagreement among persons who should be present, and to whose senses it should be submitted: and by a "Matter [or Question] of Opinion" is understood, any thing respecting which an exercise of judgment would be called for on the part of those who should have certain objects before them, and who might conceivably disagree in their judgment thereupon. This, I think, is the description of what people in general intend to denote (though often without having themselves any * Locke has touched on this subject, though slightly and scantily. He says, "In the testimony of others, is to be considered, 1. The number. 2. The integrity. 3. The skill of the witnesses. 4. The design of the author, where it is a testimony out of a book cited. 5. The consistency of the parts and circumstances of the relation. 6. Contrary testimonies." No greater certainty about facts, than opin ions. very clear notion of it) by these phrases. Decidedly it is not meant, by those at least who use language with any precision, that there is greater certainty, or more general and ready agreement, in the one case than in the other. E. G. That one of Alexander's friends did, or did not, administer poison to him, every one would allow to be a question of fact; though it may be involved in inextricable doubt : while the question, what sort of an act that was, supposing it to have taken place, all would allow to be a question of opinion; though probably all would agree in their opinion thereupon. A question of fact, one which might conceivably be submitted to the senses. 66 Again, it is not, apparently, necessary that a Matter of Fact,” in order to constitute it such, should have ever been actually submit ted any or likely to be so to the senses of human Being; only, that it should be one which conceivably might be so submitted. E. G. Whether there is a lake in the centre of New Holland,· whether there is land at the South Pole,— whether the Moon is inhabited, would generally be admitted to be questions of fact; although no one has been able to bear testimony concerning them; and, in the last case, we are morally certain that no one ever will. Questions of opinion may relate to facts. The circumstance that chiefly tends to produce indistinctness and occasional inconsist ency in the use of these phrases, is, that there is often much room for the exercise of judg ment, and for difference of opinion, in reference to things which are, themselves, matters of fact. E. G. The degree of credibility of the witnesses who attest any fact, is, itself, a matter of Opinion; and so, in respect of the degree of weight due to any other kind of probabilities. That there is, or is not, land at the South Pole, is a matter of Fact; that the existence of land there is likely, or unlikely, is matter of Opinion. And in this, and many other cases, different questions very closely connected, are very apt to be confounded together,* and the proofs belonging to one of them brought forward as pertaining to the other. E. G. A case of alleged prophecy shall be in question: the event, said to have been foretold, shall be established as a fact; and also, the utterance of the supposed prediction before the event; and this will perhaps be assumed as proof of that which is in reality another question, and a 66 question of opinion;" whether the supposed prophecy related to the event in question; and again, whether it were merely a conjecture of human sagacity, or such as to imply superhuman prescience. Again, whether a certain passage occurs in certain MSS. of the Greek Testament, is evidently a question of Fact; but whether the words imply such and such a doctrine, — however indubitable it may justly appear to us, is evidently a "matter of opinion." + Facts may relate to opinions. It is to be observed also, that, as there may be (as I have just said) questions of Opinion relative to Facts, so, there may also be questions of Fact, relative to Opinions: i. e. that such and such Opinions were, or were not, maintained at such a time and place, by such and such persons, is a question of Fact. When the question is as to a Fact, it is plain we have to look chiefly to the honesty of a witness, his accuracy, and his * See Treatise on Fallacies, "Irrelevant Conclusion." † See Preface to vol. ii. of Translation of Neander. means of gaining information. When the question is about a matter of Opinion, it is equally plain that his ability to form a judgment is no less to be taken into account.* But though this is admitted by all, it is very common with inconsiderate persons to overlook, in practice, the distinction, and to mistake as to, what it is, that, in each case, is attested. Facts, properly so called, are, we should remember, individuals; though the term is often extended to general statements; especially when these are well established. And again, the causes or other circumstances connected with some event or phenomenon, are often stated as a part of the very fact attested. If, for instance, a person relates his having found coal in a certain stratum; or if he states, that in the East Indies he saw a number of persons who had been sleeping exposed to the moon's rays, afflicted with certain symptoms, and that after taking a certain medicine they recovered, he is bearing testimony as to simple matters of fact: but if he declares that the stratum in question constantly contains coal;-or, that the patients in question were so affected in consequence of the moon's rays, that such is the general effect of them in that climate,† and that that medicine is a cure for such symptoms, it is evident that his testimony, however worthy of credit- is borne to a different kind of conclusion; namely, not an individual, but a general, conclusion, and one * Testimony to matters of opinion usually receives the name of Authority; which term however is also often applied when facts are in question; as when we say, indifferently, "the account of this transaction rests on the Authority" 66 or on the Testimony - of such and such an historian." See Logic, Appendix, Art. Authority.' + Such is the prevailing, if not universal, belief of those who have resided in the East Indies. which must rest, not solely on the veracity, but also on the judgment, of the witness. Character of - Even in the other case, however, - when the question relates to what is strictly a matter of fact, — the intellectual character of the witness is not to be wholly left out of the account. A man strongly influenced by prejudice, to which the weakest men are ever the most liable, may even fancy he sees what he does not. And some degree of suspicion may thence attach to the testimony of prejudiced, though honest men, when their prejudices are on the same side with their testimony: for otherwise their testimony may even be the stronger. E. G. The early disciples of Jesus were, mostly, ignorant, credulous, and prejudiced men; but all their expectations, all their early prejudices, ran counter to almost every thing that they attested. They were, in that particular case, harder to be convinced than more intelligent and enlightened men would have been. It is most important, therefore, to remember - what is often forgotten that Credulity and Incredulity are the same habit considered in reference to different things. The more easy of belief any one is in respect of what falls in with his wishes or preconceived notions, the harder of belief he will be of any thing that opposes these.* Again, in respect of the number of witnesses, it is evident that,― other points being equal, - many must have more weight than one, or a few; but it is no uncommon mistake to imagine many witnesses to be bearing concurrent testimony to the same thing, when in truth they are attesting different things. One or two men may be bearing original testimony to some Number of Witnesses. |