The subject, indeed, stands perhaps but a few degrees above Logic in popular estimation; the one being generally regarded by the vulgar as the Art of bewildering the learned by frivolous subtleties; the other, that of deluding the multitude by specious falsehood. And if a treatise on composition be itself more favorably received than the work of a Logician, the Author of it must yet labor under still greater disadvantages. He may be thought to challenge criticism; and his own performances may be condemned by a reference to his own precepts; or, on the other hand, his precepts may be undervalued, through his own failures in their application. Should this take place in the present instance, I have only to urge, with Horace in his Art of Poetry, that a whetstone, though itself incapable of cutting, is yet useful in sharpening steel. No system of instruction will completely equalize natural powers; and yet it may be of service towards their improvement. A youthful Achilles may acquire skill in hurling the javelin under the instruction of a Chiron, though the master may not be able to compete with the pupil in vigor of arm.

As for any display of florid eloquence and oratorical ornament, my deficiency in which is likely to be remarked, it may be sufficient to observe, that if I had intended to practise any arts of this kind, I should have been the less likely to treat of them. To develop and explain the principles of any kind of trick, would be a most unwise procedure in any one who purposes to employ it; though perfectly consistent for

one whose object is to put others on their guard against it. The juggler is the last person that would let the spectators into his own secret.

It has been truly observed that "genius begins where rules end." But to infer from this, as some seem disposed to do, that, in any department wherein genius can be displayed, rules must be useless, or useless to those who possess genius, is a very rash conclusion. What I have observed elsewhere concerning Logic, that "a knowledge of it serves to save a waste of ingenuity," holds good in many other departments also. In travelling through a country partially settled and explored, it is wise to make use of Charts, and of high-roads with direction-posts, as far as these will serve our purpose; and to reserve the guidance of the Compass or the Stars for places where we have no other helps. In like manner we should avail ourselves of rules as far as we can receive assistance from them; knowing that there will always be sufficient scope for genius in points for which no rules can be given.

In respect, however, of such matters as are treated of here and in the Elements of Logic, it has been sometimes maintained, or tacitly assumed, that all persons accomplish spontaneously, and all, equally well, every thing for which any rules have been, or can be, laid down; and that the whole difference between better and worse success depends entirely on things independent of instruction, and which are altogether the gift of Nature. I can only reply that my own experience has led me most decidedly to an opposite

conclusion: a conclusion which I think is also established by several of the instances given in this and in the other Treatise. Persons not wanting in ability, or in knowledge of their subject, are frequently found either to have fallen into some fallacy, or to have weakened the force of what they had to say, or laid themselves open to misapprehension, or to have committed some other mistake, from which an attentive study of the precepts that have been given might have saved them. There is HARDLY A SINGLE PRECEPT in the Elements of Logic or in the present Work, that IS NOT FREQUENTLY VIOLATED in the compositions of men not deficient in natural powers; as is proved, in several instances, by the examples adduced. And the precepts I allude to are such, exclusively, as it is possible to apply, practically, and—in the strict sense— to follow. I mention this, because one may sometimes find precepts (so called) — laid down, on various subjects, of so vague and general a character as to be of no practical use; such as no one indeed should depart from, but which no one can be really guided by, because he can never take any step in consequence of the enunciation of one of these barren truisms. If e. g. we were to advise a sick man "to take whatever medicines were proper for him," and to "use a wholesome diet," or if we were to bid an Orator "use forcible arguments, suited to the occasion," we should be in fact only telling them to "go the right way to work," without teaching them what is the right way. But no such empty pretence of

instruction will be found, I trust, in the present Treatise.

As for the complaint sometimes heard, of "fettering genius by systems of rules," I shall offer some remarks on that, in the course of the Work.

It may perhaps be hardly necessary to observe, that the following pages are designed principally for the instruction of unpractised writers. Of such as have long been in the habit of writing or speaking, those whose procedure has been conformable to the rules I have laid down, will of course have anticipated most of my observations; and those again who have proceeded on opposite principles, will be more likely to pass censures, as it were in self-defence, than laboriously to unlearn what they have perhaps laboriously acquired, and to set out afresh on a new system. But I am encouraged, partly by the result of experiments, to entertain a hope that the present System may prove useful to such as have their method of composition, and their style of writing and of delivery to acquire. And an Author ought to be content if a work be found in some instances not unprofitable, which cannot, from its nature, be expected to pass completely uncensured.

Whoever, indeed, in treating of any subject, recommends (whether on good or bad grounds) a departure from established practice, must expect to encounter opposition. This opposition does not, indeed, imply that his precepts are right; but neither does it prove them wrong; it only indicates that they

are new; since few will readily acknowledge the plans on which they have long been proceeding, to be mistaken. If a treatise, therefore, on the present subject were received with immediate, universal, and unqualified approbation, this circumstance, though it would not, indeed, prove it to be erroneous, (since it is conceivable that the methods commonly pursued may be altogether right,) yet would afford a presumption that there was not much to be learned from it.

On the other hand, the more deep-rooted and generally prevalent any error may be, the less favorably, at first, will its refutation (though proportionably the more important) be for the most part received.

With respect to what are commonly called Rhetorical Artifices-contrivances for "making the worse appear the better reason," it would have savored of pedantic morality to give solemn admonitions against employing them, or to enter a formal disclaimer of dishonest intention; since, after all, the generality will, according to their respective characters, make what use of a book they think fit, without waiting for the Author's permission. But what I have endeavored to do, is clearly to set forth, as far as I could, (as Bacon does in his Essay on Cunning,) these sophistical tricks of the Art; and as far as I may have succeeded in this, I shall have been providing the only effectual check to the employment of them. The adulteraters of food or of drugs, and the coiners of base money, keep their processes a secret, and dread no one so much as him who detects, describes, and proclaims