that all this should not call forth an immediate feeling of delight but if you wish the sensation to continue, you must go to the wilderness; you must beware how you come within sight of a human being, or within sound of a human voice; you must recollect that you are now alone upon the earth; or, if you want society, you had better look for it among the beasts of the field than among the ruined species to which you belong; unless indeed the Almighty, in pity to your desolation, should send his angels before the appointed time, that you might learn to forget in their society the outcast objects of your former sympathies. But to go abroad into human society, to walk amongst Beings who are now no longer your fellow-creatures, to feel the charity of your common nature rising in your heart, and have to crush it within you like a sin,

-to reach forth your hand to perform one of the common kindnesses of humanity, and to find it withered by the recollection, that however you may mitigate a present pang, the everlasting pang is irreversible; to turn away in despair from these children whom you have now come to bless and to save (we hope and trust both here and forever!)-perhaps it would be too much for you; at all events, it would be hard to state a degree of exertion within the utmost range of human energy, or a degree of pain within the farthest limit of human endurance, to which you would not submit, that you might have one companion on your lonely way from this world to the mansions of happiness. But suppose, at that moment, that the angel who brought the first intelligence returns to tell you that there are Beings upon this earth who may yet be saved, that he was before mistaken, no matter how,― perhaps he was your guardian angel, and darted from the throne of grace with the intelligence of your salvation without waiting to hear the fate of the rest of mankind, — no matter how,

but he comes to tell you that there are Beings upon the earth who are within the reach of your Redeemer's love, and of your own, that some of them are now before you, and their everlasting destiny is placed in your hands; then, what would first occur to your mind?-privations, - dangers, — difficulties? No; but you would say, 'Lord, what shall I do? Shall I traverse earth and sea, through misery and torment, that of those whom thou hast given me I may not lose one?'" - Ibid. Sermon XI. 391-393. pp.

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[L]. Part III. Chap. i. § 6. p. 316.

In Dr. Campbell's ingenious dissertation (Rhetoric, book ii. chap. 6.), on the causes that nonsense often escapes being detected, both by the writer and the reader," he remarks (sect. 2.), that "there are particularly three sorts of writing, wherein we are liable to be imposed upon by words without meaning."

"The first is, where there is an exuberance of metaphor. Nothing is more certain than that this trope, when temperately and appositely used, serves to add light to the expression, and energy to the sentiment. On the contrary, when vaguely and intemperately used, nothing can serve more effectually to cloud the sense, where there is sense, and by consequence to conceal the defect, where there is no sense to show. And this is the case, not only where there is in the same sentence a mixture of discordant metaphors, but also where the metaphoric style is too long continued, and too far pursued. [Ut modicus autem atque opportunus translationis usus illustrat orationem; ita frequens et obscurat et tædio complet; con

tinuus vero in allegoriam et ænigmata exit. Quint. lib. viii. c. 6.] The reason is obvious. In common speech the words are the immediate signs of the thought. But it is not so here; for when a person, instead of adopting metaphors that come naturally and opportunely in his way, rummages the whole world in quest of them, and piles them one upon another, when he cannot so properly be said to use metaphor, as to talk in metaphor, or rather when from metaphor he runs into allegory, and thence into enigma, his words are not the immediate signs of his thought; they are at best but the signs of the signs of his thought. His writing may then be called, what Spenser not unjustly styled his Fairy Queen, a perpetual allegory or dark conceit. Most readers will account it much to bestow a transient glance on the literal sense, which lies nearest, but will never think of that meaning more remote, which the figures themselves are intended to signify. It is no wonder then that this sense, for the discovery of which it is necessary to see through a double veil, should, where it is, more readily escape our observation, and that where it is wanting, we should not so quickly miss it."

“There is, in respect of the two meanings, considerable variety to be found in the tropical Style. In just allegory and similitude there is always a propriety, or, if you choose to call it, congruity, in the literal sense, as well as a distinct meaning or sentiment suggested, which is called the figurative sense. Examples of this are unnecessary. Again, where the figurative sense is unexceptionable, there is sometimes an incongruity in the expression of the literal sense. This is always the case in mixed metaphor, a thing not unfrequent even in good writers. Thus, when Addison remarks that 'there is not a single view of human nature, which is not

sufficient to extinguish the seeds of pride,' he expresses a true sentiment somewhat incongruously; for the terms extinguish and seeds here metaphorically used, do not suit each other. In like manner, there is something incongruous in the mixture of tropes employed in the following passage from Lord Bolingbroke: Nothing less than the hearts of his people will content a patriot Prince, nor will he think his throne established, till it is established there.' Yet the thought is excelJent. But in neither of these examples does the incongruity of the expression hurt the perspicuity of the sentence. Sometimes, indeed, the literal meaning involves a direct absurdity. When this is the case, as in the quotation from The Principles of Painting given in the preceding chapter, it is natural for the reader to suppose that there must be something under it; for it is not easy to say how absurdly even just sentiments will sometimes be expressed. But when no such hidden sense can be discovered, what, in the first view conveyed to our minds a glaring absurdity, is rightly on reflection denominated nonsense. We are satisfied that De Piles neither thought, nor wanted his readers to think, that Rubens was really the original performer, and God the copier. This then was not his meaning. But what he actually thought and wanted them to think it is impossible to elicit from his words. His words then may justly be styled bold in respect to their literal import, but unmeaning in respect of the author's intention.

"It may be proper here to observe, that some are apt to confound the terms absurdity and nonsense as synonymous; which they manifestly are not. An absurdity, in the strict acceptation, is a proposition either intuitively or demonstratively false. Of this kind are these: Three and two make seven.' 'All the angles of a triangle are greater than two

right angles.' That the former is false we know by intuition; that the latter is so we are able to demonstrate. But the term is further extended to denote a notorious falsehood. If one should affirm, that at the vernal equinox the sun rises in the north and sets in the south,' we should not hesitate to say, that he advances an absurdity; but still what he affirms has a meaning; insomuch, that on hearing the sentence we pronounce its falsity. Now nonsense is that whereof we cannot say either that it is true, or that it is false. Thus, when the Teutonic Theosopher enounces, that all the voices of the celestial joyfulness, qualify, commix, and harmonize in the fire which was from eternity in the good quality,' I should think it equally impertinent to aver the falsity as the truth of this enunciation. For, though the words grammatically form a sentence, they exhibit to the understanding no judgment, and consequently admit neither assent nor dissent. In the former instances I say the meaning, or what they affirm is absurd; in the last instance I say there is no meaning, and therefore properly nothing is affirmed. In popular language, I own, the terms absurdity and nonsense are not so accurately distinguished. Absurd positions are sometimes called nonsensical. It is not common, on the other hand, to say of downright nonsense, that it comprises an absurdity.

"Further, in the literal sense there may be nothing unsuitable, and yet the reader may be at a loss to find a figurative meaning, to which his expressions can with justice be applied. Writers immoderately attached to the florid, or highly figured diction, are often misled by a desire of flourishing on the several attributes of a metaphor which they have pompously ushered into the discourse, without taking the trouble to examine whether there be any qualities in the sub