the most successful attention to the study of Composition and of Elocution, are so far from encouraging others by example or recommendation to engage in the same pursuit, that they labor rather to conceal and disavow their own proficiency; and thus theoretical rules are decried, even by those who owe the most to them. Whereas among the ancients, the same cause did not, for the reasons lately mentioned, operate to the same extent; since, however careful any speaker might be to disown the artifices of Rhetoric, properly so called, he would not be ashamed to acknowledge himself, generally, a student, or a proficient, in an Art which was understood to include the elements of Political wisdom.

Utility of

Rhetoric.

4. With regard to the other question proposed, viz. concerning the utility of Rhetoric, it is to be observed that it divides itself into two; first, whether Oratorical skill be, on the whole, a public benefit, or evil; and secondly, whether any artificial system of Rules is conducive to the attainment of that skill.

The former of these questions was eagerly debated among the ancients; on the latter, but little doubt seems to have existed. With us, on the contrary, the state of these questions seems nearly reversed. It seems generally admitted that skill in Composition and in speaking, liable as it evidently is to abuse, is to be considered, on the whole, as advantageous to the Public; because that liability to abuse is, neither in this, nor in any other case, to be considered as conclusive against the utility of any kind of art, faculty, or profession; -because the evil effects of misdirected power require that equal powers should be arrayed on the opposite side; - and because truth, having an intrinsic superiority over falsehood, may be expected to prevail when the skill of the contending

parties is equal; which will be the more likely to take place the more widely such skill is diffused.*

Eloquence supposed to be something that cannot be taught.

But many, perhaps most persons, are inclined to the opinion that Eloquence, either in writing or speaking, is either a natural gift, or, at least, is to be acquired by mere practice, and is not to be attained or improved by any system of rules. And this opinion is favored not least by those (as has been just observed) whose own experience would enable them to decide very differently; and it certainly seems to be in a great degree practically adopted. Most persons, if not left entirely to the disposal of chance in respect of this branch of education, are at least left to acquire what they can by practice, such as school or college exercises afford, without much care being taken to initiate them systematically into the principles of the Art; and that, frequently, not so much from negligence in the conductors of education, as from their doubts of the utility of any such regular system.

tems of rules.

It certainly must be admitted, that rules Erroneous sy not constructed on broad philosophical principles, are more likely to cramp than to assist the operations of our faculties; - that a pedantic display of technical skill is more detrimental in this than in any other

* Arist. Rhet. Ch. I.— He might have gone further; for it will very often happen that, before a popular audience, a greater degree of skill is requisite for maintaining the cause of truth than of falsehood. There are cases in which the arguments which lie most on the surface, and are, to superficial reasoners, the most easily set forth in a plausible form, are those on the wrong side. It is often difficult to a Writer, and still more, to a Speaker, to point out and exhibit, in their full strength, the delicate distinctions on which truth sometimes de pends.

pursuit, since by exciting distrust, it counteracts the very purpose of it; that a system of rules imperfectly comprehended, or not familiarized by practice, will (while that continues to be the case) prove rather an impediment than a help; as indeed will be found in all other arts likewise; - and that no system can be expected to equalize men whose natural powers are different. But none of these concessions at all invalidate the positions of Aristotle; that some succeed better than others in explaining their opinions, and bringing over others to them; and that, not merely by superiority of natural gifts, but by acquired habit; and that consequently if we can discover the causes of this superior success, the means by which the desired end is attained by all who do attain it, we shall be in possession of rules capable of general application; which is, says he, the proper office of an Art.* Experience so plainly evinces, what indeed we might naturally be led antecedently to conjecture, that a right judgment on any subject is not necessarily accompanied by skill in effecting conviction, nor the ability to discover truth, by a facility in explaining it, that it might be matter of wonder how any doubt should ever have existed as to the possibility of devising, and the utility of employing, a System of Rules for "Argumentative Composition" generally; distinct from any system conversant about the subject matter of each composition. I have remarked in the Lectures on Political Economy (Lect. 9), that plain, not altogether without reason, of the prevailing ignorance of facts, relative to this and

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some persons com

to many other subjects; and yet it will often

Knowledge of facts no remedy for logical inac

curacy.

be found that the parties censured, though possessed of less

"Οπερ ἐστί τεχνῆς ἔργον. — Rhet. Book I. Ch. I.

knowledge than they ought to have, yet possess more than they know what to do with. Their deficiency in arranging and applying their knowledge,—in combining facts, — and correctly deducing and employing general principles, shall be greater than their ignorance of facts. Now to attempt remedying this fault by imparting to them additional knowledge,to confer the advantage of wider experience on those who have not the power of profiting by experience, is to attempt enlarging the prospect of a short-sighted man by bringing him to the top of a hill.

"In the tale of Sandford and Merton, where the two boys are described as amusing themselves with building a hovel with their own hands, they lay poles horizontally on the top, and cover them with straw, so as to make a flat roof: of course the rain comes through; and Master Merton then advises to lay on more straw: but Sandford, the more intelligent boy, remarks that as long as the roof is flat, the rain must, sooner or later, soak through; and that the remedy is to make a new arrangement, and form the roof sloping. Now the idea of enlightening incorrect reasoners by additional knowledge, is an error similar to that of the flat roof; it is merely laying on more straw: they ought first to be taught the right way of raising the roof. Of course knowledge is necessary; so is straw to thatch the roof; but no quantity of materials will supply the want of knowing how to build.

"I believe it to be a prevailing fault of the present day, not indeed to seek too much for knowledge, but to trust to accumulation of facts as a substitute for accuracy in the logical processes. Had Bacon lived in the present day, I am inclined to think he would have made his chief complaint against unmethodized inquiry and illogical reasoning. Certainly he would not have complained of Dialectics as corrupting Philos.

ophy. To guard now against the evils prevalent in his time, would be to fortify a town against battering-rams, instead of against cannon. But it is remarkable that even that abuse of Dialectics which he complains of, was rather an error connected with the reasoning process than one arising from a want of knowledge. Men were led to false conclusions, not through mere ignorance, but from hastily assuming the correctness of the data they reasoned from, without sufficient grounds. And it is remarkable that the revolution brought about in philosophy by Bacon, was not the effect, but the cause, of increased knowledge of physical facts: it was not that men were taught to think correctly by having new phenomena brought to light; but on the contrary, they discovered new phenomena in consequence of a new system of philosophizing."

It is probable that the existing prejudices on the present subject may be traced in great measure to the imperfect or incorrect notions of some writers, who have either confined their attention to trifling minutiæ of style, or at least have in some respect failed to take a sufficiently comprehensive view of the principles of the Art. One distinction especially is to be clearly laid down and carefully borne in mind by those who would form a correct idea of those principles; viz. the distinction already noticed in the " Elements of Logic," between an Art, and the Art. "An Art of Reasoning" would imply,

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a Method or System of Rules by the observance of which one may reason correctly;"" the Art of Reasoning" would imply a System of Rules to which every one does conform (whether knowingly, or not,) who reasons correctly and such is Logic, considered as an Art.

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In like manner 66 an Art of Composition " would imply a System of Rules by which a good Composition may be pro