Certain it is, that thefe falfe heroes who feek glory from the deftruction of their own fpecies, are, of all men, moft ignorant of themselves; by this wicked ambition they entail infamy and curfes upon their name, instead of that immortal glory they pursued. According to the prophet's words, woe to him who coveteth an evil covetoufnefs to his houfe, that he may fet his neft on high; that he may be delivered from the power of evil. Thou haft confulted fhame to thine houfe, by cutting off many people; and haft finned against thy foul (q). No him into a true hero; and justifies all the waste he made of mankind, under (the fame colour with which the Spaniards excufed their inhuman barbarities towards the poor Indians, viz.) a pretence of civilizing them. And in attributing all his fuccefs to his virtue, he talks more like a foldier ferving under him in his wars, than an hiftorian who lived many years afterwards, whose business it was to transmit his character impartially to future ages. And in what other refpects Mr. Dryden may prefer Plutarch to Seneca, (which he does with much zeal in his Preface to `Plutarch's Lives) yet it must be allowed that, in this inftance at leaft, the latter shows more of the philofopher. See Plut. Mor. Vol. i. ad fin. רע (q) Heb. ii. 9, 10. yn yra yra: that gaineth a wicked gain. Oh! fons of earth! attempt ye ftill to rife, By mountains pil'd on mountains, to the fkies? Heav'n ftill with laughter the vain toil furveys, And buries madmen in the heaps they raife. I 3 Who No man can truly know himself till he be acquainted with this, which is so often the fecret and unperceived fpring of his actions, and until he obferve how far it governs him in his converfation and conduct: virtue and real excellence will rife to view, tho' they be not mounted on the wings of ambition, which, by foaring too high, procures but a more fatal fall. To correct the irregularity and extravagance of this paffion, let us reflect how unfubftantial a pleasure the highest gratifications of it can afford; how many cruel mortifications it expofeth us to, by awakening the envy of others; to what meannefs it often makes us fubmit; how frequently its end is loft by pursuing it with too much ardor; and how much more folid pleasure the approbation of confcience will yield, than the acclamations of ignorant men, who, judging by externals only, cannot know our true character; and whose commendations a wife man would rather despise than court. 'Ex amine but the fize of people's sense, and the condition of their understanding, and will never be fond of popularity, nor you afraid of cenfure; nor folicitous what Who wickedly is wife, or madly brave, Pope's Effay on Mar. judgment they may form of you, who know not how to judge rightly of them• felves (r).' CHA P. XIII. What kind of Knowledge we are already furnifhed with, and what Degree of Esteem we fet upon it. XII. A felf, unless he examine into his MAN can never rightly know him knowledge of other things.. We must confider then the knowledge we have; and whether we do not fet too high a price upon it, and too great a value upon ourselves on the account of it; of what real ufe it is to us, and what effect it has upon us; whether it does not make us too ftiff, unfociable and affuming; tefty, fupercilious and ready to defpife others for their supposed ignorance: if so, our knowledge, be it what it will, does us more harm than good, and we are better without it; ignorance itself would not render us fo ridiculous: fuch a temper, with all our knowledge, fhows that we know not ourselves. • A man (γ) Διελθε τω εις τα ηγεμονικά αμλον, και οψει τινας κρίζας φοβη οιος και περί αύτων οντάς xg7as. Mark Anton, lib. ix. § 18. A man is certainly proud of that knowledge he defpifes others for the want of.' How common is it for fome men to be fond of appearing to know more than they do, and of seeming to be thought men of knowledge ? to which end they exhaust their fund almost in all companies, to outshine the reft fo that in two or three converfations they are drawn dry, and you fee to the bottom of them much fooner than you could at firft imagine; and even that torrent of learning, which they pour out upon you at first so unmercifully, rather confounds than satisfies you their vifible aim is not to inform your judgment, but to display their own; you have many things to except against, but their loquacity gives you no room and their good fenfe, fet off to fo much advantage, ftrikes a modeft man dumb; if you infift upon your right to examine, they retreat, either in confufion or equivocation; and, like the fcuttle-fish, throw a large quantity of ink behind them, that you may not fee where to pursue: whence this foible flows is obvious enough, felf-knowledge would foon correct it. But as fome ignorantly affect to be more knowing, fo others vainly affect to be more ignorant than they are; who; to fhow they have have greater infight and penetration than other men, infift upon the abfolute uncertainty of science; will difpute even first principles; grant nothing as certain, and fo run into downright Pyrronifm; the too common effect of abftracted debates exceffively refined (s). Every one is apt to fet the greatest value upon that kind of knowledge, in which he imagines he himself moft excels; and to undervalue all other in comparison of it: there wants fome certain rule then, by which every man's knowledge is to be tried, and the value of it eftimated; and let it be this, That is the beft and most valuable kind ⚫ of knowledge, that is moft fubfervient to ⚫ the best ends; i. e. which tends to make a man wiser and better, or more agreeable and useful both to himself and others.'For knowledge is but a means that relates to fome end; as all means are to be judged of by (s) Socrates's faying. Nihil fe fcire, nifi id ipfum, favoured of an affected humility. But they that followed went further; and particularly Arcefilas, Negabat effe quicquam, quod fciri poteft; ne illud quidem ipfum quod Socrates fibi reliquiffet. And thus the abfurdity grew to a fize that was monstrous. For to know that one knows nothing, is a contradiction. And not to know that he knows even that, is not to know but that he may know fomething. Relig. of Nat. delin. pag. 40. |